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P R E F A C E
THIS book is a comprehensive treatment of case and statutory 
law applicable particularly to public accountants. The first chapter 
is concerned with the public accountant’s liability for negligence, 
libel and fraud. The three remaining chapters involve the law 
relative to the public accountant’s certificate, the accountant as an 
expert witness and some special rights of public accountants.
In the development of the subjects, primary emphasis has been 
placed upon the case law in England and America. I am reasonably 
sure that every appeal case in England prior to July, 1933, and 
every appeal case in America prior to February, 1935, has been 
taken into consideration in the preparation of this work. A limited 
search of the English law books leads me to believe that no im­
portant appeal case on the responsibilities of auditors arose in 
England during the period from July, 1933, to January, 1935. While 
the English decisions cited in the treatise have been colored some­
what by the English companies acts, the portions of such opinions 
reported have to do in the main with common-law principles. The 
English companies acts have been reviewed only so far as has been 
necessary to afford a proper interpretation of the English case law 
presented. The American state and District of Columbia statutes 
on public accountants have been summarized under appropriate 
titles. While these summaries have been supported principally by 
citations to Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, 
published by the American Institute of Accountants in 1930, I 
found from a close search of state and District of Columbia stat­
utes as of July, 1933, that the summaries were as applicable in 1933 
as in 1930. The United States statutes affecting directly public 
accountants have been reviewed to January 1, 1935.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to: Professors James L. 
Dohr and Roy B. Kester of Columbia University for their criti-
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cisms and suggestions as to organization and content of the treatise; 
Professors I. P. Hildebrand, R. W. Stayton, W. P. Keeton, and 
A. W. Walker of the University of Texas School of Law for con­
ferences on unsettled questions of law; Walter A. Staub, partner of 
Lybrand, Ross Brothers & Montgomery, A. P. Richardson, Editor 
of the Journal of Accountancy, J. M. B. Hoxsey of New York 
Stock Exchange, and Professor Chester F. Lay of the University 
of Texas School of Business Administration for materials furnished; 
and my wife for her untiring efforts in helping me with the manu­
script.
Wiley D aniel R ich.
Hardin-Simmons University, 
Abilene, Texas, 1935.
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LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND RIGHTS
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Chapter I
LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT FOR 
NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD AND LIBEL
The development of the law on the liability of the public ac­countant for negligence, fraud and libel is unfolded in this chapter under main divisions as follows:
I. Interest in the public accountant’s liability for negligence and 
fraud.
II. Nature of negligence.
III. Liability of the public accountant to his client for negligence.
IV. Liability of the public accountant to his client for libel.
V. Liability of the public accountant to third parties for negligence
and fraud.
VI. Extension of the ambit of negligence rather than that of fraud 
to cover the public accountant’s liability to third parties for inno­
cent but negligent misrepresentation.
VII. Criminal liability of the public accountant for fraud.
I
INTEREST IN TH E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT’S LIABILITY 
FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD
In “boom” periods, in which business enterprises are led to be­
lieve that prosperity abounds, the public accountant has rarely been 
held accountable for the negligent character of his services; but 
whenever a business depression has occurred, public accountants, 
with other classes in the business community, have been brought 
to task for the wide-spread distress. Out of the fire of business and 
public reaction against public accountants in each business depres-
3
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sion of the last half century there have been wrought in England 
and America the greatest legal developments of the responsibilities 
of public accountants.
As in preceding economic depressions, there has been prevalent 
during the past few years of dislocations of trade and industries a 
keen public and professional interest in the duties of public account­
ants. The public has sought to surround investments in business 
with greater safeguards by means of placing more responsibilities 
upon the accounting profession. Several cases, the United States 
securities act of 1933, as amended in 1934, and the United States 
securities exchange act of 1934, dealing with negligence and fraud 
of public accountants, have thus far resulted.
II
NATURE OF NEGLIGENCE
“Negligence has been defined to be either the non-performance or 
the inadequate performance of a legal duty. The existence of a duty 
to plaintiff, omission to perform it or performance in an improper 
or inadequate manner and injury to him resulting therefrom, are 
essential to the maintenance of an action for negligence.” 1 In neg­
ligence there is no wrongful intent. Negligence is unreasonable 
conduct, in violation of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, resulting 
directly in injury to the plaintiff. Every action for negligence must 
be based upon all the following elements: (1) a failure to exercise 
due care; (2) a breach of duty; (3) an injury; (4) defendant’s act 
a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
F ailure to E xercise D ue C are
The tests which courts have advanced for determining the lack 
of due care or the existence of negligence have been many. The 
early decisions and writings upon negligence generally divided the 
subject into gross, ordinary, and slight negligence, depending upon
1 Newton Auto Salvage Co. v. Herrick (supreme court of Iowa, 1927) 212 N. W. 
680.
5the amount of care required in the particular circumstances.2 Thus, 
according to this school of thought, slight negligence is the want of 
great diligence; gross negligence is the want of slight diligence; 
ordinary negligence is the want of a moderate amount of diligence. 
For example, persons who employ dangerous agencies, such as guns 
and explosives, may be held liable for slight negligence for such 
persons are required to use a very high degree of care. A gratuitous 
bailee, i.e., one who takes custody of a chattel solely for the benefit 
of the bailor, is liable only for gross negligence, for such a person 
owes a duty to the owner of the chattel to exercise only a slight 
degree of care. An ordinary bailee for hire may be held liable for 
ordinary negligence if he fails to use a moderate amount of care 
with reference to the chattel. While the theory of three degrees of 
negligence commands the support of some of the best courts in the 
country and is to be found in a few statutes, it is undesirable and 
leads to confusion.
The better and more recent view of negligence holds that “the 
law imposes but one duty in such cases, and that is the duty to use 
due care; and the law recognizes only one standard by which the 
quantum of care can be measured, and that is the care which a 
person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like circum­
stances.” 3 The test should be what a reasonable person would have 
done or would have omitted to have done in the particular set of 
circumstances. The test of the existence of negligence is, not what 
the defendant thought was wise, but whether an ordinarily careful 
and reasonable person would have thought the particular course of 
action was wise and would have acted as did the defendant. Again, 
in different language, the test of the existence of negligence is 
whether a reasonable person would have foreseen injury to the 
plaintiff and then acted as did the plaintiff in the circumstances. 
The juror or the judge furnishes the standard of an ordinary rea­
sonable man. If the particular circumstances involve special skill, 
technique or scientific learning, the defendant must have conducted
2 29 Cyc. 415-426. Burdick’s Law of Torts, 1926, pp. 510-513.
3 Union Traction Co. v. Berry (supreme court of Indiana, 1919) 188 Ind. 514, 
121 N. E. 655, 124 N. E. 737; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, T. D. No. 4, 1929, secs. 165-171.
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himself as other persons of the same profession or calling would 
have done in the same circumstances.4
As a requisite to the existence of negligence in a breach of duty 
there must have been an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff. 
In determining whether or not a risk was unreasonable, as viewed 
by an ordinary prudent man in the position of the defendant at 
the time the alleged act of negligence occurred, the magnitude of 
the risk must be balanced against the utility of the particular con­
duct, and, if the risk exceeded the utility, the conduct was negli­
gent.5 If a reasonable person would have deemed the defendant’s 
conduct to involve too great risk as compared to the utility that 
might be derived from the act, then negligence was existent. In 
considering the reasonableness of the risk it is not sufficient to show 
that the chances of no injury were greater than the chances of 
injury, for, where there was probability of injury from the conduct, 
the conduct was negligent, unless it was sufficiently useful to offset 
the risk of injury. A person rushing in front of a speeding train 
to rescue a child is not assuming an unreasonable magnitude of 
risk in  view of the great utility involved, namely, the saving of the 
child’s life.6 On the other hand, a person would assume an un­
reasonable amount of risk if he should rush before a rapidly moving 
train to save a cat. The risk would be too great as compared to the 
utility. Money in a business is a legal object of utility. It has been 
held that a business owner is not required to incur an unreasonable
4 Chapman v. Walton, io  Bing. 57, 131 Reprint 826 (1833). Note: “Every man
who offers his services to another and is employed, assumes the duty to exercise 
in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and diligence. 
In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, 
he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of 
skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions 
are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him 
in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, 
undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without 
fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for infallibility, 
and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for 
losses consequent upon mere errors of judgment." (Cooley on Torts, third edition, 
volume II, p. 1386.)  
5 Note: In the determination of the reasonableness of conduct in negligence cases, 
courts rarely state that the comparison of the utility with the risk of injury of an 
act is the basis of decision; yet, in reality such comparison is the underlying prin­
c p le of substantially all the decisions on negligence. (The American Law Institute, 
explanatory notes on torts, tentative draft No. 4, 1929, p. 7.)
6 Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871).
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amount of expense in taking precautions against injury.7 He must 
take such precautions as the business can afford. In other words, 
in view of all the circumstances, he must balance the risk of injury 
against the utility of money required to take precautions. He is not 
negligent as long as he does not take an unreasonable risk in order 
to save the cost of precautions.
The distinction between the existence of negligence as a matter 
of fact and the existence of negligence as a matter of law deserves 
consideration.8 The determination of reasonableness or unreason­
ableness of conduct is an inference from data. If the inference of 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of conduct can not be governed 
by a precedent, but must be made on the basis of the factual data 
in terms of the common experience of the lay jurors, the question 
of negligence is said to be one of fact. On the other hand, if general 
rules of law can be applied to a set of facts from which only one 
inference may be drawn, the question of negligence is one of law. 
If the circumstances of a case in which a decision is made are so 
peculiar that a similar case will never arise again, no precedent is 
established; but if the circumstances are such as commonly happen, 
the decision affords a precedent, and whenever a new set of facts 
arises similar to the precedent, the court will rule that, if the jury 
finds such a set of facts to exist, there is negligence per se, that is, 
negligence as a matter of law. For example, it is negligence as a 
matter of law for one to point a gun at another person and pull 
the trigger, even though the actor believes the gun to be unloaded.9
Breach of D uty
Liability for a negligent act can exist only where the act was done 
in breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. One’s legal duty and 
moral duty may not be the same. One is morally bound to rescue 
a stranger from drowning, but he owes no legal duty to do so. 
One’s legal duty to exercise care may arise from the express terms 
of a contract or from legislation, but generally it grows out of
7 Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev. 46.
8 Cooley on Torts, vol. II, pp. 1428-1438. Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Har­
vard L. Rev. 50.
9 Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev. 50.
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common-law implications from a contractual relationship or from 
other circumstances.10
One’s duty to use care, arising from the express terms of a con­
tract, may be as varied as it is possible to make different contracts. 
Where a negligent act is nothing more than a breach of the express 
terms of a contract, the action for recovery must be brought on the 
contract and not in tort.11 The public accountant’s duty to use care 
in the accountant-client relation as affected by the terms of the 
auditing contract is given extended treatment in a subsequent part 
of this volume.
There are great variations in the duty of care as imposed by 
legislation. Where an act in breach of a statute becomes both a 
public and a private wrong, American courts uniformly hold that 
the public and the party aggrieved have concurrent remedies.12 
The public wrong is sought to be cured through indictment; the 
private wrong is sought to be remedied through tort action. But, 
where an act is a public wrong, courts do not always hold that 
there exists also a private wrong. If a statute requires an affirmative 
act, as in the case of a municipality placing its own duty upon 
citizens to keep snow off sidewalks abutting the property of such 
citizens, the violation of the statute would not be negligence per 
se—the defendant would owe to the person injured no duty to 
perform the affirmative act. On the other hand, it has been held 
by many courts that the commission of an act forbidden by statute 
constitutes negligence per se, and that damages should be allowed 
where the defendant’s act was a proximate cause of the injury to 
the plaintiff. This type of holding would seem to be sound. If a 
statute prohibits certain conduct, it is because that conduct has 
been found dangerous to society. It is fair to presume that an 
ordinary reasonable person would not engage in conduct dangerous 
to society and that one who does so may be guilty of negligence. 
If society has seen fit to protect itself by prohibiting certain conduct, 
it would be logical to conclude that such conduct would also violate 
the defendant’s common-law duty to exercise care to the particular
10 29 Cyc. 424, 425.
11 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 46, 47.
12 Ibid., pp. 42-46.
8 R esponsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
person or class of persons protected by the statute. Some courts, 
however, have held that liability for negligence does not necessarily 
follow the breach of a prohibitory statute and that under police 
ordinances there is no implied power to create tort liability.13 The 
English companies acts and the United States securities act of 1933 
have placed specific responsibilities upon public accountants to exer­
cise due care to particular classes of persons.
Whatever legal duty the defendant may owe to the plaintiff is to 
be found principally in the common-law implications requiring a 
person to conduct himself in such a manner as not to injure an­
other’s person or property.14 This duty of care owed to others may 
be implied from a contract, or it may be implied from many other 
circumstances. The defendant’s duty to use due care does not 
extend to the world in general, but only to the particular plaintiff 
or the definite class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs. The 
defendant owes a duty of care only to those persons who might 
reasonably be expected to be endangered by the risk taken by the 
defendant.15 For example, one driving a car down a street owes a 
duty of careful driving to all those pedestrians and motorists who 
might reasonably be expected to be injured by his reckless driving. 
But if the driver should negligently collide with a car containing 
bombs and thereby set off an explosion which injured office workers 
in adjacent buildings, he would not be liable to such persons—he 
would have owed those persons no duty of careful driving, for 
it would not have been reasonably expected that his negligent 
driving would injure persons in adjacent buildings.
Injury
The plaintiff’s action for negligence must be founded upon an 
injury to his person or property. If the plaintiff does nothing more 
than to prove an injury, with the other elements essential to an 
action for negligence, he can recover only substantial damages. It 
behooves the plaintiff to prove the actual monetary loss resulting
13 Burdick’s Law of Torts, p. 45.
14 29 Cyc. 424, 425.
15 Harper on Torts, pp. 165-170.
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from the injury if he would obtain proper redress for defendant’s 
negligent conduct.16
P roximate Cause of Injury
The defendant’s liability to the plaintiff for negligence is depend­
ent upon proof that the defendant’s negligent act was the direct 
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The direct cause of injury has been 
interpreted to mean a substantial factor in producing the alleged 
damage.17 An act is a direct cause if it is a substantial part of the 
causative antecedents, if it is one of several substantial factors. If 
the plaintiff’s injury would not have happened without the defend­
ant’s negligent act, the defendant’s act was a direct cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury. If the injury would have occurred regardless of 
the defendant’s negligent act, the defendant’s conduct was not the 
actual cause of the injury. Before the defendant’s act can be said 
to have been the actual cause of the alleged damage, the effect of 
the act must have had an appreciable continuation, either down 
to the very moment of injury, or, at least, down to the setting in 
motion of the final active injurious force which immediately pro­
duced the damage.
A review of a few cases on direct causation of injury is in order. 
Direct causation of injury was held to have existed where the de­
fendant with a boat negligently ran into a group of piles in a 
stream, whereby force communicated from one pile to another fin­
ally created a wedge between two piles so as to injure plaintiff who 
was caught within the wedge.18 In another case where the defen­
dant negligently left in the highway a truck loaded with iron slabs 
in such a way that some of the iron could easily slide off the 
truck, and a third person wrongfully moved the truck and unin­
tentionally let slabs of iron fall off and injure plaintiff, it was 
held that the defendant’s act was a direct cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury.19 A child was negligently sold gun powder by the defen­
dant. With its parent’s knowledge the child placed the powder in 
a cupboard; and later, after the child was handed the powder by
16 Ibid., pp. 283-287.
17 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 32-38.
18 Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251 (1875).
19Lane v. Atlantic Works, i n  Mass. 136 (1872).
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its parent, the child used the powder and thereby sustained an in­
jury. The court held in this case that the active effect of the 
defendant’s conduct was so slight that no cause of action arose.20 
Where a client who was interested in a corporation wrote to the 
defendant accountant a libelous letter concerning two officers of 
the company, and the accountant negligently left the letter where 
a third person found it and communicated it to the company officers, 
the court held that the accountant’s act was not a direct cause of 
the client plaintiff’s damages sustained from having been sued by 
the officers, that the chain of causation between the accountant’s 
negligent act and the plaintiff’s loss was broken by the wrongful 
conduct of the third person.21 As shown by these cases, it is not 
always easy to determine whether or not a particular act was 
the cause of an injury. If the defendant negligently induced a 
third person’s act, which was the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury, the defendant is generally held to have caused directly the 
injury. But, on the other hand, where a third person intervened 
to break the chain of causation between the commission of the 
negligent act and the happening of the injury, courts hold that 
the act was not the direct cause of the injury.
The defendant’s reasonable ability to foresee risk of injury 
to the plaintiff as a test to determine whether an act was the 
proximate cause of the injury deserves consideration. The majority 
of American courts hold that before a finding that a negligent act 
was the proximate, direct, or substantial cause of an injury can be 
justified, it must appear that the injury was the natural and prob­
able consequence of the negligent act, and that the injury ought 
to have been foreseen by the defendant in the light of the attend­
ing circumstances.22 Under this rule courts hold that defendant 
must have been able reasonably to foresee injury to the plaintiff 
or to the class of persons to which plaintiff belonged. The defen­
dant is not charged with prevision of injury to persons in general 
but only those in the class threatened by the risk taken by the 
defendant. A railroad company negligently failed to keep its stock-
20 Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507 (1870).
21 Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, page 60, post.
22 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 38-41. Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” Harvard 
Law Review Association, Selected Essays on the Law of Torts, p. 263.
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pen in repair. A passing train, as a result of the engineer’s negli­
gence, frightened plaintiff’s cattle enclosed within the pen. The 
stampeded cattle injured not only themselves, but the plaintiff 
while he was attempting to make the gate secure. The court im­
puted to the defendant railroad company ability to foresee the prop­
erty loss, that is, the injury to the cattle, but refused to charge 
the defendant with prevision of the personal injury to the plain­
tiff.23
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III
LIABILITY OF TH E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO HIS 
CLIENT FOR NEGLIGENCE
Relation of the A ccountant-client Contract to the P ublic 
A ccountant’s L iability for N egligence
Robert H. Montgomery, in his address before the International 
Congress on Accounting, 1933, London, had this to say about the 
scope of the public accountant’s employment: 24
“In determining whether or not an auditor has been guilty of 
negligence, it is necessary to consider specifically what he was em­
ployed to do. A client can not expect a detailed audit where the 
auditor was engaged to make merely a balance-sheet audit. The 
auditor should be careful, however, to obtain definite written in­
structions to which he can refer and to limit his statements and 
certificates to the matters of which he has actual knowledge.
“Sometimes after a balance-sheet audit, specifically requested in 
writing, has been made and the report rendered, it is discovered that 
petty defalcations have been going on for a long time. It is natural 
for the client, in such a case, to criticize the auditor, but if the latter 
has specific instructions to which he can refer, he can clearly show 
that the detection of the small theft was not within the scope of the 
audit.
“The scope of the employment can not be determined simply from 
the compensation paid, though in a doubtful case the amount of 
compensation would be some evidence of the character of employ-
23 T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896).
24 R. H. Montgomery, The Auditor's Responsibility in Relation to Balance-sheets 
and Profit-and-loss Accounts, p. 3.
ment. An auditor may undertake to perform for one hundred dollars 
work for which the reasonable compensation is one thousand dol­
lars. He will, nevertheless, be held to have agreed to exercise the skill 
of his calling in the work which he agreed to do.”
A public accountant’s liability for negligence will usually involve 
a breach of duty emanating from a contract. A breach of a contract 
may or may not be the result of negligence. If the plaintiff’s right 
which had been invaded by the defendant was created solely by the 
agreement of the parties, the plaintiff is limited to an action for 
breach of contract. On the other hand, if the invaded right of the 
plaintiff was created by law, the plaintiff may sue in tort. The dis­
tinction between a cause of action resulting from an invasion of a 
right created solely by contract and a cause of action resulting 
from an invasion of a right created solely by law was clearly set 
forth by the supreme court of Alabama: “Take for illustration 
the contract of a carpenter to repair a house partly decayed or 
defective. The implications of his contract are that he will bring 
to the service reasonable skill, good faith and diligence. If he fail 
to do the work or leave it incomplete the remedy, and the only 
remedy, against him is ex contractu. Suppose in the attempted 
performance he, by his want of skill or care, destroys, damages and 
needlessly wastes the materials furnished by the hirer; or suppose 
that in making the needed repair he did it so unskillfully or care­
lessly as to damage other portions of the house—this is tort, for 
which the contract furnished the occasion. The contract is mere in­
ducement, and the action is on the case.” 25 Between the extreme 
situations, first, where negligent conduct is merely an invasion of a 
right created by agreement, and, second, where negligent conduct 
is merely an invasion of a right created by law, a numerous and 
extensive class of cases involves negligent conduct which is both a 
breach of duty created by contract and a breach of duty created 
by law.26 The plaintiff in such cases may elect to sue in either 
contract or tort. For example, the bailee of a horse, which is in­
jured through the bailee’s negligence, may be sued either for
25 Insurance Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala. 170 (1883). In accord: Junker v. Forbes 
(C.C.A., 1891) 45 Fed. 840; Royce v. Oakes, 20 R. I. 252, 38 A. 371, 39 L. R. A. 
845 (1898).
26 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 46-48.
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breach of his contract to treat the horse with ordinary care or for 
breach of his legal duty so to treat the horse.27 Wherever the plain­
tiff is entitled to sue in either contract or tort, generally it is to 
his advantage to sue in tort (trespass on the case for negligence). 
The plaintiff is entitled to substantial damages without proof of 
actual damage if he bases his claim on negligence; but if he sues 
in contract, he can recover only a nominal sum, unless he proves 
his actual damage. It is also true that, if the plaintiff bases his claim 
on negligence, he can attach defendant’s property prior to judg­
ment. The plaintiff can not attach defendant’s property prior to 
judgment where his action is brought in contract. On the other 
hand, it may be more advantageous to the plaintiff to sue in con­
tract because the proof of the cause of action can be effected more 
easily in assumpsit than in tort.28 Obviously, it would generally be 
better for the public accountant if he were charged with a breach 
of contract than if he were charged with negligence for the same 
offense.
Of course, a definite contract reduced to writing will save many 
difficulties in the accountant-client relation, but not all. If the 
public accountant merely fails to perform the duties intended by 
the contract—as where he fails to perform the audit at all or fails 
to bring to the task he has undertaken a reasonable amount of 
skill, good faith and diligence—he can be held liable only in con­
tract. If the auditor carries out the terms of the auditing contract, 
express or implied in fact, but in so doing violates a duty implied 
by law, he can be held liable only in tort. For example, if an audi­
tor should, inadvertently and without any wrongful intention, 
divulge to a third person a client’s trade secret which was learned, 
not in the audit, but incidentally from a conversation with an 
employee of the client, the auditor would be liable to his client only 
in tort (for negligence). In most cases where a public accountant 
is guilty of negligence to his client his negligence amounts to a 
breach of duties created by the intentions of the parties to the 
auditing contract and also his common-law duties implied from 
the contract and other circumstances. For example, it is submitted
27 Pelton v. Nichols, 180 Mass. 345, 62 N. E. I (1902).
28 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 50, 51.
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that, where an auditor has undertaken a detailed audit, if the audi­
tor in verifying the cash-disbursements record fails to test the genu­
ineness of cancelled cheques, he can be held liable for loss resulting 
from his negligence either on the ground of negligence or for breach 
of contract. In every contract rights and obligations are created 
either by the intentions of the contracting parties or by implications 
of the law from the circumstances. The public accountant and his 
client would intend nothing about verification of cancelled cheques 
at the time of making the contract for a detailed audit. But, on the 
other hand, a court would imply a duty on the part of the auditor 
to verify cancelled cheques in a detailed audit for the client—the 
court would imply the obligation of the auditor to afford justice 
in the circumstances. Hence, a failure to test the genuineness of 
cheques would be a breach of a phase of the contract implied by 
law and would give to the client a right to sue in contract (in 
assumpsit). This breach of a duty implied by law would also give 
rise to an action in tort.
On February 24, 1933, a group of the largest accounting firms 
of New York addressed to President Richard Whitney of the New 
York Stock Exchange a letter relative to the scope of the auditor’s 
employment. The letter was signed by: Arthur Anderson & Co.; 
Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co.; Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.; 
Haskins & Sells; Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery; Peat, Mar­
wick, Mitchell & Co.; Price, Waterhouse & Co.; Touche, Niven & 
Co.; Arthur Young & Co. Two paragraphs of the letter read as 
follows:
“We fully recognize the importance of defining the responsibility 
of auditors and of bringing about a proper understanding on the 
part of the investing public of the scope and significance of financial 
audits, to the end that their importance should not be underrated nor 
their protective value exaggerated in the minds of investors. This is 
the more necessary because the problem of delimiting the scope of 
audits or examinations is essentially one of appraising the risks against 
which safeguards are desirable in comparison with the costs of pro­
viding such safeguards. The cost of an audit so extensive as to safe­
guard against all risks would be prohibitive; and the problem  is, 
therefore, to develop a general scheme of examination of accounts
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under which reasonably adequate safeguards may be secured at a cost 
that will be within the limits of a prudent economy. The position was 
clearly stated by a partner in one of the signatory firms in 1926 as 
follows:
“ ‘In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying down 
counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the scope of the audit 
unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the maintenance of this safeguard 
entails an expense; and this expense can be justified only if the value 
of the safeguard is. found to be fully commensurate with its cost. 
The cost of an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would 
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from it. A super­
ficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of false security which 
it creates. Between the two extremes there lies a mean, at which 
the audit abundantly justifies its cost.’ ”
The statement to the New York Stock Exchange is founded on 
solid legal principles. Of course, if an auditor expressly agrees to 
check every item in an entire set of books, he will generally be 
held liable for failing to do so. In the absence of an express agree­
ment covering in detail every sort of review and verification which 
it would be possible to make, the question arises: How far must 
the audit extend in view of the requirements for safeguards and 
the amount of compensation inuring to the auditor? In other 
words, how much risk of errors may be taken as compared to the 
utility accruing to the public accountant in the form of audit fees? 
It is well-established law that if the defendant assumed an unrea­
sonable amount of risk as compared to the utility of his act, he 
was negligent; and, if his conduct violated a duty owed the plain­
tiff and resulted directly in injury to the plaintiff, he is liable.29 
It would not be expected that the accountant should take no risk 
at all as compared to his compensation; neither would it be ex­
pected that the accountant should take no precautions at all against 
errors. The accountant is expected to assume a reasonable amount 
of risk of error as compared to his compensation. The test of rea­
sonableness of the accountant’s assumption of risk as compared to 
his compensation is how much risk other skilled professional ac­
countants would have taken in the same set of circumstances.
29 Henry T. Terry, “Negligence,” 29 Harvard L. Rev., pp. 40-54.
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D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to Inquire into the Substantial 
A ccuracy of A ccounting Reports
The first important English court decision on the duties of an 
auditor 30 was rendered by Justice Sterling of the chancery division 
in 1887. This case, Leeds Estate Building and Investment Company 
v. Shepherd,31 extended the auditor’s duties to inquiry into the 
soundness, not merely the mathematical accuracy, of the figures 
included in the balance-sheet.
The articles of association of the Leeds Estate, Building and In­
vestment Company entitled the directors and manager to a bonus 
in proportion to the amount of profits available for dividends. It 
was to the interest of these officers to report profits as high as 
possible. And that is what they did; they overstated the assets of 
the balance-sheet so as to show a profit available for dividends. 
The auditor, elected by a vote of the stockholders, accepted with­
out any inquiry whatever the reports of the manager and directors 
and certified the accuracy of the balance-sheet which included a 
profit-and-loss account. Dividends were illegally paid out of capital 
as a result of the inaccurate statement. The stockholders brought 
an action for damages against the auditor and other officers of the 
company. Justice Sterling held:
“It was in my opinion the duty of the auditor not to confine 
himself merely to the task of verifying the arithmetical accuracy of 
the balance-sheet, but to inquire into its substantial accuracy, and to 
ascertain that it contained the particulars specified in the articles of 
association (and consequently a proper income and expenditure ac­
count), and was properly drawn up, so as to contain a true and 
correct representation of the state of the company’s affairs.”
The principle of the Leeds Estate Building and Investment Co. v. 
Shepherd case seems too obvious to the modern accountant to re-
30 Note: “The sphere of accountancy is strictly limited to work of a constructive 
nature upon the books and accounts of a business or undertaking and involves little 
liability beyond that of an agent to his principal, while that of the auditor is confined 
to the criticism of accounts already prepared and submitted to him for certification 
and report; and therein lies the whole essence of his liability.” (Grainger, W. H., 
“The Duties, Obligations and Liabilities of Auditors,” The Accountant, London, 
1923, volume 68, p. 521.)
31 (1887) 36 Ch. D. 787.
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quire statement; yet, this early decision laid a foundation stone 
upon which many cases rest. The auditor certainly falls short of 
his duty if he stops at merely verifying the arithmetical accuracy 
of the balance-sheet. Proving the accounting equation upon which 
the balance-sheet is based is not enough. The auditor must reason­
ably test the genuineness of the representation and amount of each 
item on the balance-sheet.32
82 Under the English companies acts the auditor is an officer of the company 
and directly responsible to the stockholders by whom he was elected. While the 
English cases are colored with the auditor’s duties as set forth in the companies 
acts, it is generally true that the principles laid down in such decisions find general 
application in the common law. The English accountants’ attitude toward the 
auditor’s duties was colorfully portrayed in an address before a meeting of chartered 
accountants during the economic depression of the middle nineties:
“In conclusion, I would remark that it is impossible for an auditor to check in 
detail, in a few days, work which it has taken a large staff twelve months to do. 
An audit is really an examination by an expert in accounts resembling the diagnosis 
of a skilled physician. His wide experience and knowledge of affairs enable him 
by a careful examination to form an opinion as to the financial soundness of the 
business and to say whether the balance-sheet gives a truthful account of the state 
of the institution. The expert may be mistaken, for he is neither omniscient nor 
infallible. Many a man has been told by a physician that he has not six months to 
live, and yet has survived for a score of years; but eminent physicians still have a 
large practice, and rightly so. Much depends on the experience, the judgment and 
the character of the expert you have called in. He observes how the books are kept, 
suggests precautions against fraud, points out in what way the accounts can be 
arranged so that the working of the business can be facilitated and its operations 
controlled, and forms an opinion whether the liabilities are stated at too little or 
the assets put down at too much. Subsequent visits enable him to keep the accounts 
on right lines, if his advice be followed. If through negligence on his part loss is 
sustained, he is liable for damages. If he is not merely negligent but is guilty of 
wilfully shutting his eyes to the truth; if when the truth lay under his hand he 
abstained from finding it out, not from mere negligence, but from the wilful deter­
mination not to inquire, then he may be liable to imprisonment. If he has been 
auditor of a company, and it is wound up, he may, as an officer of the company, 
be examined as to the manner in which he performed his duties, and unless he 
has full notes of his audit, to which he can refer, and an able counsel, it may go 
hardly with him. If through want of care on his part a dividend has been paid out 
of capital, he may have to refund as damages 50 or 100 times the amount of the 
modest fee he has been paid. If, owing to any report of his, a dividend has not 
been paid, and alarm is in consequence occasioned amongst the shareholders or 
customers, and the company comes to a premature end, he runs the risk of being 
sued for damages for having by his report caused the suspension of a concern 
which was perfectly sound. He is between Scylla and Charybdis and needs a clear 
brain and a stout heart, for the responsibility of auditors is a reality; but so far 
as the members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants are concerned, I think I 
may safely say that they intend to face that responsibility, and to perform the duty 
that is laid upon them without fear and without favor.” (Theodore Gregory, “The 
Responsibilities of Auditors,” The Accountant, London, 1894, volume 20, p. 957.)
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D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to E xercise Reasonable C are 
to Show the W hole T ruth as to V alue of A ssets 
R epresented by the Balance-sheet
Perhaps the world’s greatest single legal development in defining 
the duties of the public accountant with respect to a proper showing 
of the values of assets on the balance-sheet was made by the English 
court of appeal in 1895 in the case In re London and General 
Bank.33
The London and General Bank was a limited company formed 
for the purpose of lending to and otherwise assisting certain build­
ing companies called the “Balfour” group. The bank’s profits con­
sisted of interest and commissions derived from loans to the “Bal­
four” group.
For some years prior to the action in this case the greater part 
of the capital of the bank had been advanced to four of the “Bal­
four” companies on securities which were insufficient and difficult 
of realization. The defendant, Theobald, had been auditor of the 
company since 1882, and had in his reports to the directors re­
peatedly called their attention to the precarious financial position 
of the bank, which became more evident year by year. His reports 
to the shareholders took the form of a certificate or memorandum 
written on the balance-sheet for the year; and in the earlier years 
contained a statement to the effect that in his opinion the balance- 
sheet exhibited a correct view of the position of the bank. But for 
the year 1891 this statement was omitted from Mr. Theobald’s 
report to the shareholders.
The report to the directors for 1891 was submitted on February 
3, 1892. In the balance-sheet of that date the most important asset 
was £ 346,975, put down as “Loans to customers and other securi­
ties.” The report, also, contained a detailed statement calling the 
directors’ serious attention to the unsatisfactory nature of such loans 
and securities and the difficulty of their realization in the following 
sentences:
“The gravity of the situation is enhanced by the fact, as we be­
lieve it to be, that the board is in many cases powerless to decline
33 (1895) 2 Ch. 673.
further help because they are powerless to realize. We beg also 
respectfully to point out that the quarters from which the bank 
obtains by far the larger proportion of its business are such that 
the constitution of the bond must make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain a sufficiently independent opinion upon many vital ques­
tions which have to be decided in the management.” The auditors 
concluded the report to the directors with the observation: “We can 
not conclude without expressing our opinion unhesitatingly that 
no dividend should be paid this year.” This last sentence, however, 
the auditor was persuaded by the chairman of the board to omit 
before the report was officially laid before the directors. The report 
contained this postscript: “We do not wish it to be understood 
that we consider all the accounts in the schedule unsecured, but 
as a whole the capital therein represented is locked up.”
In contrast with this report to directors, the certificate signed 
by the auditor and laid before the shareholders at their annual 
meeting was as follows: “We have examined the above balance- 
sheet and compared it with the books of the company; and we 
certify that it is a correct summary of the accounts therein recorded. 
The value of the assets as shown on the balance-sheet is dependent 
upon realization.” The report to the shareholders as originally 
drawn contained this additional sentence: “And on this point we 
have reported specifically to the board.” But this sentence, at the 
request of the chairman of the board, was withdrawn before the 
report was presented to the meeting of shareholders.
The favorable report of the auditor to the shareholders induced 
them to declare a dividend. The shareholders believed they were 
paying dividends out of profits of the bank; but, as a matter of 
fact, the shareholders were disbursing invested capital in the form 
of dividends. For this conduct it was contended by the shareholders 
that the auditor was guilty of misfeasance. Hence arose this action 
on the part of the shareholders to recover from the auditor, Theo­
bald, the sum paid out as dividends.
The holding in this case that the auditor was guilty of mis­
feasance doubtless could have been sustained on the basis of com­
mon law. However, the English companies acts played a part in 
the decision. The relevant sections follow:
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By subsection I of section 7 of the companies act of 1879, a bank­
ing company registered after that date was required to have its 
accounts audited by an auditor elected annually by the stock­
holders.
By subsection 5 of the 7th section of the companies act of 1879, 
“Every auditor shall have a list delivered to him of all books kept 
by the company, and shall at all reasonable times have access to 
the books and accounts of the company; and any auditor may, in 
relation to such books and accounts, examine the directors or any 
other officer of the company.”
By subsection 6 of the 7th section of the companies act of 1879, 
“the auditor or auditors shall make a report to the members on 
the accounts examined by him or them and on every balance-sheet 
laid before the company in general meeting during his or their 
tenure of office; and in every such report shall state whether, in 
his or their opinion, the balance-sheet referred to in the report is a 
full and fair balance-sheet properly drawn up, so as to exhibit a 
true and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, as shown 
by the books of the company.”
On a former appeal of this case judgment was given on the pre­
liminary point whether the auditor of a banking company were an 
officer of the company within the 10th section of the companies 
act of 1890, and it was held that the auditor was an officer within 
the meaning of the act and if guilty of misfeasance might be made 
liable in damages under that section.
Lord Justice Lindley delivered the opinion of the court:
“* * * In connection with these articles (the charter), and in order 
to save repetition, it should be stated that by the articles of this bank 
it is the duty of the directors, and not of the auditors, to recommend 
to the shareholders the amounts to be appropriated for dividends 
(clause 98), and it is the duty of the directors to have proper ac­
counts kept, so as to show the true state and condition of the company 
(clause 103). Lastly, it is for the shareholders, but only on the recom­
mendation of the directors, to declare a dividend (clause 115). It is 
impossible to read s. 7 of the companies act, 1879, without being 
struck with the importance of the enactment that the auditors are to 
be appointed by the shareholders, and are to report to them directly,
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and not to or through the directors. The object of this enactment is 
obvious. It is evidently to secure to the shareholders independent 
and reliable information respecting the true financial position of the 
company at the time of the audit. * * * It is no part of an auditor’s 
duty to give advice, either to directors or shareholders, as to what 
they ought to do. An auditor has nothing to do with the prudence 
or imprudence of making loans with or without security. It is 
nothing to him whether the business of a company is being con­
ducted prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably. It is 
nothing to him whether dividends are properly or improperly de­
clared, provided he discharges his own duty to the shareholders. His 
business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the 
company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. 
But then comes the question, How is he to ascertain that position? 
The answer is, By examining the books of the company. But he does 
not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry and without 
taking any trouble to see that the books themselves show the com­
pany’s true position. He must take reasonable care to ascertain that 
they do so. Unless he does this his audit would be worse than an 
idle farce. Assuming the books to be so kept as to show the true 
position of a company, the auditor has to frame a balance-sheet show­
ing that position according to the books and to certify that the 
balance-sheet presented is correct in that sense. But his first duty is to 
examine the books, not merely for the purpose of ascertaining what 
they do show, but also for the purpose of satisfying himself that they 
show the true financial position of the company. This is quite in 
accordance with the decision of Stirling, J. in Leeds Estate Building 
and Investment Co. v. Shepherd, (1887) (36 Ch. D. 787). An auditor, 
however, is not bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and 
skill in making inquiries and investigations. He is not an insurer; he 
does not guarantee that the books do correctly show the true position 
of the company’s affairs; he does not even guarantee that his balance- 
sheet is accurate according to the books of the company. If he did, he 
would be responsible for error on his part, even if he were himself 
deceived without any want of reasonable care on his part, say, by the 
fraudulent concealment of a book from him. His obligation is not 
so onerous as this. Such I take to be the duty of the auditor: he must 
be honest—i.e., he must not certify what he does not believe to be 
true, and he must take reasonable care and skill before he believes 
that what he certifies is true. What is reasonable care in any par­
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ticular case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. Where 
there is nothing to excite suspicion very little inquiry will be reason­
ably sufficient, and in practice I believe business men select a few cases 
at haphazard, see that they are right and assume that others like them 
are correct also. Where suspicion is aroused, more care is obviously 
necessary; but, still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than 
reasonable care and skill, even in a case of suspicion, and he is 
perfectly justified in acting on the opinion of an expert where special 
knowledge is required. Mr. Theobald’s evidence satisfies me that he 
took the same view as myself of his duty in investigating the com­
pany’s books and preparing his balance-sheet. He did not content 
himself with making his balance-sheet from the books without 
troubling himself about the truth of what they showed. He checked 
the cash, examined vouchers for payments, saw that the bills and 
securities entered in the books were held by the bank, took reason­
able care to ascertain their value, and in one case obtained a solicitor’s 
opinion on the validity of an equitable charge. I see no trace whatever 
of any failure by him in the performance of this part of his duty. 
It is satisfactory to find that the legal standard of duty is not too 
high for business purposes and is recognized as correct by business 
men. The balance-sheet and certificate of February, 1892 (i.e., for the 
year 1891), was accompanied by a report to the directors of the bank. 
Taking the balance-sheet, the certificate, and report together, Mr. 
Theobald stated to the directors the true financial position of the 
bank, and if this report had been laid before the shareholders Mr. 
Theobald would have completely discharged his duty to them. Un­
fortunately, however, this report was not laid before the shareholders, 
and it becomes necessary to consider the legal consequences to Mr. 
Theobald of this circumstance. A person whose duty it is to convey 
information to others does not discharge that duty by simply giving 
them so much information as is calculated to induce them, or some 
of them, to ask for more. Information and means of information are 
by no means equivalent terms. Still, there may be circumstances under 
which information given in the shape of a printed document cir­
culated amongst a large body of shareholders would, by its conse­
quent publicity, be very injurious to their interests, and in such a case 
I am not prepared to say that an auditor would fail to discharge his 
duty if, instead of publishing his report in such a way as to insure 
publicity, he made a confidential report to the shareholders and invited 
their attention to it and told them where they could see it. The
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auditor is to make a report to the shareholders, but the mode of 
doing so and the form of the report are not prescribed. If, there­
fore, Mr. Theobald had laid before the shareholders the balance- 
sheet and profit-and-loss account, accompanied by a certificate in the 
form in which he first prepared it, he would perhaps have done 
enough under the peculiar circumstances of this case. I feel, however, 
the great danger of acting on such a principle; and in order not to be 
misunderstood I will add that an auditor who gives shareholders 
means of information instead of information respecting a company’s 
financial position does so at his peril and runs the very serious risk of 
being held judicially to have failed to discharge his duty.
“In this case I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Theobald did 
fail to discharge his duty to the shareholders in certifying and laying 
before them the balance-sheet of February, 1892, without any refer­
ence to the report which he laid before the directors and with no 
other warning than is conveyed by the words, ‘The value of the assets 
as shewn on the balance-sheet is dependent upon realization.’ The 
most important asset on that balance-sheet is put down as ‘Loans to 
customers and other securities,’ £ 346,975, and on these a full and 
detailed report was made to the directors showing the very unsatis­
factory state of these loans and securities, and it is impossible to read 
the oral evidence, the report of Balfour and Brock, dated December 
22, 1891, and the report of the auditor to the directors of February 3, 
1892, without coming to the conclusion that the entry of that large 
sum as a good asset without explanation was unjustifiable. It is a 
mere truism to say that the value of loans and securities depends on 
their realization. We were told that a statement to that effect is so 
unusual in an auditor’s certificate that the mere presence of those 
words was enough to excite suspicion. But, as already stated, the 
duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry, 
and, although an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that 
something was seriously wrong, it by no means follows that ordinary 
people would have their suspicions aroused by a similar statement if, 
as in this case, its language expresses no more than any ordinary 
person would infer without it. But Mr. Theobald relies on the fact 
that he was induced to omit from his certificate all reference to the 
report which he made to the directors because Mr. Balfour, the 
chairman, promised to mention that report in his speech to the share­
holders, and he did so. But, although Mr. Balfour twice alluded to the 
report, he did so in such a way as to avoid attracting attention to it.
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The second time he mentioned it was after a dividend had been 
declared and when a motion to reappoint the auditors was before 
the meeting. The truth is that not a word was said to convey to the 
shareholders the substance of the information contained in the report 
or to induce them to ask any question about it. The balance-sheet 
and profit-and-loss account were true and correct in this sense—that 
they were in accordance with the books. But they were, nevertheless, 
entirely misleading, and misrepresented the real position of the com­
pany. Under these circumstances I am compelled to hold that Mr. 
Theobald failed to discharge his duty to the shareholders with respect 
to the balance-sheet and certificate of February, 1892. Possibly he did 
not realize the extent of his duty to the shareholders as distinguished 
from the directors, and he unfortunately consented to leave the chair­
man to explain the true state of the company to the shareholders 
instead of doing so himself. The fact, however, remains, and can 
not be got over, that the balance-sheet and certificate of February, 
1892, did not show the true position of the company at the end of 
1891, and that this was owing to the omission by the auditor to lay 
before the shareholders the material information which he had ob­
tained in the course of his employment as auditor of the company, 
and to which he called the attention of the directors.
“But then it is contended that, even if this be so, there was after 
all no payment of dividend out of capital, and further that, even if 
there was, still that such payment was not the natural or immediate 
result of Mr. Theobald’s certificate and of the accounts which he 
prepared. Whether the payment was made out of capital or not is a 
question of fact. The payment was professedly made out of profits 
made by the bank, by charging its customers with interest and com­
mission on loans and discount. The books showed such profits; but 
the question is, Where did the money come from with which the 
dividends were paid? The money came from cash at the bankers’ 
or in hand; but this cash could not be properly treated as profit, and 
the directors and auditors knew this perfectly well. This part of the 
case has been most carefully investigated by the learned judge whose 
decision we are reviewing and, after attending closely to the observa­
tions of counsel on the reasonings and conclusions contained in the 
judgment appealed from, I see no reason whatever for dissenting 
from them. On the contrary, I entirely agree with the learned judge 
in saying that the profits for the year 1891 never really existed except 
on paper, and that, to use his words, ‘whatever may be the right
L iability for N egligence, F raud and L ibel 25
26 R esponsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
line to draw as to when profit not received may be carried to profit 
for the purpose of the annual revenue account, it is plain that there 
was not justification for so doing in the present case.’ The real truth is 
that the assets of the bank were put down in the balance-sheet at far 
too high a figure, and this entry, though not misleading if explained 
(as it was to the directors), was seriously misleading in the absence 
of explanation. Mr. Theobald says that he regarded the assets of the 
bank as only locked up; but his report and the schedule to it go far 
beyond this. The value of the principal asset depended on the proba­
bility of the Balfour group of companies and some of the other large 
borrowers repaying their loans. They were financing each other; 
their indebtedness to the bank had increased largely during the year; 
the securities held by the bank for these loans were, to say the least, 
to a great extent of very doubtful value; and yet the total amount due 
to the bank in respect of these loans is inserted in the balance-sheet 
as a good asset, without any deduction and without a word of ex­
planation to the shareholders. We know now that those assets have 
realized a comparatively small sum, and we were very properly warned 
against the danger of doing injustice by being wise after the event. 
But, disregarding the result of realization, and attending only to what 
was known to the auditors in February, 1892, the entry in the balance- 
sheet of the sum of £ 346,975 as a good asset was wholly unjustifiable, 
unless explained. We are now in a position to understand the true 
meaning of the passage contained in the auditors’ report to the 
directors of February 3, 1892, and which runs thus: ‘We can not 
conclude without expressing our opinion unhesitatingly that no 
dividend should be paid this year.’ I find it impossible to treat this as 
a statement by the auditors that there are profits divisible amongst 
the shareholders, but that the auditors can not recommend a dividend. 
I can only regard the passage as meaning that there are no funds 
out of which a dividend can properly be paid, and therefore no 
dividend ought to be paid this year. A dividend of 7 per cent. was, 
nevertheless, recommended by the directors, and was resolved upon 
by the shareholders at a meeting furnished with the balance-sheet 
and profit-and-loss account certified by the auditors, and at which 
meeting the auditors were present, but silent. Not a word was said to 
inform the shareholders of the true state of affairs. It is idle to say that 
these accounts are so remotely connected with the payment of the 
dividend as to render the auditors legally irresponsible for such pay­
ment. The balance-sheet and account certified by the auditors, and
showing a profit available for dividend, were, in my judgment, not the 
remote, but the real operating cause of the resolution for the pay­
ment of the dividend which the directors improperly recommended. 
The auditors’ accounts and certificate gave weight to this recom­
mendation, and rendered it acceptable to the meeting. It was wholly 
unnecessary for the official receiver to call a shareholder to say that he 
was induced by the auditors’ certificate to concur in the resolution 
to pay a dividend. As to this part of the case res ipsa loquitur.”
The duty which the auditor owed to the shareholders of the Lon­
don and General Bank emanated from the companies acts; yet, in 
view of the fact that the auditor was elected by the shareholders, 
it would seem that the auditor’s duty would have been held not 
different under contract and in the absence of the statute providing 
that the auditor owed as an officer a duty to state to the share­
holders the true financial condition of the business. In other words, 
it would appear that all the principles laid down in this case are 
applicable at common law.
Following the Leeds Estate Building and Investment Company 
v. Shepherd case, supra, the London and General Bank case held 
that an auditor is in duty bound to ascertain and state the true 
financial position of his client’s business at the time of the audit. 
In ascertaining the financial condition of the business, the auditor 
must go beyond the mere showing of the books; he must exer­
cise reasonable care to ascertain whether or not the books them­
selves show the true financial position of the business. Yet, the 
auditor is not an insurer; he does not guarantee that the books 
show the true financial position of his client’s business. As a mat­
ter of fact, it is impossible to know the true financial position of 
an unliquidated enterprise. An auditor is bound only to exercise 
reasonable care and skill in making inquiries and investigations 
to determine whether the records and the balance-sheet correctly 
show the financial condition of the business. The test of the rea­
sonableness of the amount of care and skill exercised by the audi­
tor in making inquiries and investigations is the amount of care 
and skill other members of the profession would have made in 
the same circumstances. It is not enough that the auditor deter­
mine for himself the correct values of items on the balance-sheet.
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He must show the true values of the balance-sheet items in unequiv­
ocal terms. The auditor must not stop at stating in his report to his 
client the means of information which will show correct values of 
the assets represented on the balance-sheet; he must clearly state 
the values of assets to the best of his knowledge after he has 
exercised a reasonable amount of care and skill in determining 
such values.
In the instant case it was also held that, since the stockholders 
of the bank used the auditor’s balance-sheet prior to declaring a 
dividend upon recommendation of the board of directors, proof of 
negligence of the auditor in overstating the values of the assets of 
the bank was sufficient to fix the auditor’s liability to the stock­
holders for injury resulting from payment of dividends out of 
capital. It was not necessary to prove that the false balance-sheet 
induced the stockholders to declare the dividends out of capital. 
The court held that proof of the circulation of printed copies of 
the balance-sheet among the stockholders was sufficient evidence 
from which to infer that the defendant’s negligent audit was the 
proximate cause of the stockholders’ injury. The principle of res 
ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) was applied in holding 
defendant’s negligence, not the remote, but the real operating cause 
of the stockholders’ loss.
Ordinarily, in actions for negligence the plaintiff must prove by 
direct evidence that the defendant committed a specific act of 
negligence, and that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. But such proof may be dispensed 
with where the proven circumstances were such as to make it pos­
sible to infer a negligent act on the part of the defendant, and 
that the defendant’s negligent act was the direct cause of the plain­
tiff's injury. This rule, res ipsa loquitur, applies where the instru­
mentalities causing the injury were under the control of the de­
fendant and the nature of the case was such that in the ordinary 
course of events no injury would have resulted without negli­
gence.34 In this case the court did not infer from  the circumstances 
the existence of negligence, for the defendant’s specific act of negli­
gence, the preparation and certification of the false balance-sheet,
34 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 515-517; Cooley on Torts, p. 1425.
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was proven by direct evidence. It was not necessary for the court 
to determine whether the preparation of the balance-sheet was 
under the control of the auditor or not. The court merely inferred 
that no injury would have happened except for the defendant’s 
negligence and, therefore, that the proven negligence was the proxi­
mate cause of the injury.
It would seem that in most instances a dividend would not be 
declared by the directors of a corporation unless the auditor’s re­
port would justify such a dividend. If the auditor’s report gives 
assets at inflated values as a result of the auditor’s negligence, and 
the directors, after receiving such report, declare a dividend injuri­
ous to the business of the corporation, it should be held that the 
circumstances attendant upon the injury were of such a character 
as to justify an inference that the auditor’s negligence caused the 
injury.
The principles laid down in In re London and General Bank 
are unimpeachable. The case has been followed in many decisions 
and should be followed in future decisions under like conditions.
T he A uditor’s D uty R elative to Stock-in-trade
The auditor’s duty relative to a proper showing of the value of 
stock-in-trade on the balance-sheet was set forth by the English 
court of appeal, 1896, in the oft-quoted case of In re Kingston 
Cotton Mill Company.35 The facts of the case follow:
For several years prior to 1894 the defendant auditors were the 
official auditors of the Kingston Cotton Mill Company. In their 
capacity as company auditors the defendants audited the company’s 
records and prepared balance-sheets as of the close of each of those 
years. The auditors included in each of such balance-sheets a certifi­
cate that the balance-sheet gave a correct view of the financial 
condition of the Kingston Cotton Mill Company at the date of 
the particular balance-sheet. The stockholders relied upon these 
several balance-sheets and paid out dividends for each of the four 
years preceding 1894. Each of these balance-sheets overstated the 
financial condition of the company. The result was that the divi­
dends were paid out of invested capital. The company became in-
35 (No. 2), (1896) 2 Ch. D. 279.
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solvent and went into the hands of a liquidator in 1894. To restore 
the estate’s losses from the payment of these improper dividends 
the liquidator brought an action against the company auditors for 
negligence under s. 10 of the English companies act of 1890, 
which provided for the liability of company auditors to the com­
pany for losses resulting from their failure to use reasonable care 
and skill in representing the financial condition of the company.
The alleged negligent conduct of the defendant auditors con­
sisted in the auditors’ failure to disclose an overstatement of the 
company’s stock of cotton yarn. The auditors did not look into the 
manager’s figures for the cotton-yarn inventories on the dates of 
the balance-sheets. They simply accepted the manager’s certificate 
that the inventory sheets showed correctly the values and quanti­
ties of cotton yarn on hand. The auditors placed in their balance- 
sheets immediately preceding the figures for the inventories the 
words, “As per manager’s certificate.” The auditors had access to 
figures for the beginning inventories, the cost of purchases and the 
cost of sales. They could have easily tested the accuracy of the 
manager’s figures for stocks; but they did not. The court in the 
following language refused to hold the auditors liable for negligence 
in overstating inventories:
“* * * The auditors did not profess to guarantee the correctness 
of this item. They assumed no responsibility for it. They took the 
item from the manager, and the entry in the balance-sheet showed 
that they did so. I confess I can not see that their omission to check 
his returns was a breach of their duty to the company. It is no part 
of an auditor’s duty to take stock. No one contends that it is. He 
must rely on other people for details of the stock-in-trade on hand. 
In the case of a cotton mill he must rely on some skilled person for 
the materials necessary to enable him to enter the stock-in-trade at 
its proper value in the balance-sheet. In this case the auditors relied 
on the manager. He was a man of high character and of unques­
tioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him. 
The learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed 
for trusting him. The auditors had no suspicion that he was not to 
be trusted to give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade on 
hand, and they trusted him accordingly in that matter. But it is said 
they ought not to have done so, and for this reason. The stock
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journal showed the quantities—that is, the weight in pounds—of the 
cotton and yarn at the end of each year. Other books showed the 
quantities of cotton bought during the year and the quantities of 
yarn sold during the year. If these books had been compared by the 
auditors they would have found that the quantity of cotton and yarn 
in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than the 
quantity shown in the stock journal, and so much less that the value 
of the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be 
right, or at all events was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion 
and demand further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned 
judge. But, although it is no doubt true that such a process might 
have been gone through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would 
have been discovered, can it be truly said that the auditors were 
wanting in reasonable care in not thinking it necessary to test the 
managing director’s return? I can not bring myself to think they 
were, nor do I think that any jury of business men would take a 
different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds must have been 
detected if the entries in the books had been put together in a way 
which never occurred to any one before suspicion was aroused. The 
question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter­
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors 
in relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert 
relating to matters on which information from such a person was 
essential. I can not think there was. The manager had no apparent 
conflict between his interest and his duty. His position was not similar 
to that of a cashier who has to account for the cash which he receives, 
and whose own account of his receipts and payments could not 
reasonably be taken by an auditor without further inquiry. The 
auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the learned judge has held it to be. 
The order appealed from must be discharged with costs.
“•  * * But in determining whether any misfeasance or breach of 
duty has been committed, it is essential to consider what the duties 
of an auditor are. They are very fully described in In re London and 
General Bank , (1895) 2 Ch. D. 673, to which judgment I was a 
party. Shortly, they may be stated thus: It is the duty of an auditor 
to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care, and 
caution which a reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor 
would use. W hat is reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on 
the particular circumstances of each case. An auditor is not bound 
to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach his work with suspicion
L iability for N egligence, F raud and L ibel 31
or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is 
a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the com­
pany. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon 
their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is 
anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the 
bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound 
to be reasonably cautious and careful.
“In the present case the accounts of the company had been for 
years falsified by the managing director, Jackson, who subsequently 
confessed the frauds he had committed. It is only, however, just to 
him to say that they were not committed with a view of putting 
money in his own pocket, but for the purpose of making things 
appear better than they really were and in the hope of the com­
pany ultimately recovering itself. Jackson deliberately overstated the 
quantities and values of the cotton and yarn in the company’s mills. 
He did this for many years. It was proved that there is great waste in 
converting cotton into yarn, and the fluctuations of the market in the 
prices of cotton and yarn are exceptionally great. Jackson had been so 
successful in falsifying the accounts that what he had done was never 
detected or even suspected by the directors. The auditors adopted the 
entries of Jackson and inserted them in the balance-sheet as ‘per 
manager’s certificate.’ It is not suggested but that the auditors acted 
honestly and honestly believed in the accuracy and reliability of 
Jackson. But it is said that they ought not to have trusted the figures 
of Jackson, but should have further investigated the matter. Jackson 
was a trusted officer of the company in whom the directors had every 
confidence; there was nothing on the face of the accounts to excite 
suspicion, and I can not see how in the circumstances of the case it 
can be successfully contended that the auditors are wanting in skill, 
care or caution in not testing Jackson’s figures.
“It is not the duty of an auditor to take stock; he is not a stock 
expert; there are many matters in respect of which he must rely on 
the honesty and accuracy of others. He does not guarantee the dis­
covery of all fraud. I think the auditors were justified in this case in 
relying on the honesty and accuracy of Jackson and were not called 
upon to make further investigation. It is not unimportant to bear in 
mind that the learned judge has found the directors justified in 
relying on the figures of the managing director.
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“The duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. Their 
work is responsible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate. 
I should be sorry to see the liability of auditors extended any further 
than in In re London and General Bank , (1895) 2 Ch. D. 673. Indeed, 
I only assented to that decision on account of the inconsistency of the 
statement made to the directors with the balance-sheet certified by 
the auditors and presented to the shareholders. This satisfied my 
mind that the auditors deliberately concealed that from the share­
holders which they had communicated to the directors. It would be 
difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must not be 
made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes 
of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when 
those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are 
undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the posi­
tion of an auditor intolerable. The appeal will be allowed.
“* * * It is said that it is easy to be wise after the event. In former 
years when the stock journal was correctly entered the alterations in 
value in a year were frequently very considerable. The increase in the 
years now in question did not excite any suspicion in the directors. 
Why should it in the auditors? They had no reason to distrust the 
manager. Moreover, he had, or was supposed to have, taken the 
stock which was actually on the premises at the date to which the 
balance-sheets referred. The auditors could not do this. The only book 
from which they could obtain information as to the quantities re­
ceived in the year, other than the stock journal, was a book called 
the ‘invoice guard book,’ in which were pasted the invoices received 
with goods supplied. But this was not necessarily accurate. Invoices 
received might have been omitted. Goods might in some cases have 
been received without invoices. Were the auditors bound to enter 
upon an investigation which could not bring out an accurate result in 
order to test the truth of a statement by the manager which no one 
had any reason to discredit?”
In the Kingston Cotton Mill Company case it was held that it is 
no part of an auditor’s duty to take stock. This holding was made 
in reference to a set of facts in which the auditor had no reason 
to suspect dishonesty on the part of the manager who certified 
the amount of stock-in-trade, and in which the auditor clearly 
showed in the balance-sheet that the figures for the value of the 
inventory were obtained from the manager. It was also held that,
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in the absence of suspicion of dishonesty, the auditor has no duty 
to check by means of book figures the value of inventories as given 
by a competent officer of the business.
There are important dicta in one of the opinions in the decision 
with respect to the auditor’s duty to use care. An auditor, accord­
ing to the dicta, is charged with a duty to perform his work with 
such care, skill and caution as a reasonably careful and cautious 
auditor would use in the particular circumstances. The auditor is 
not expected to enter upon his work with suspicion or a foregone 
conclusion that there is something wrong. He is, according to this 
case, entitled to rely upon employees who have been trusted by his 
client, provided the auditor takes reasonable care. The opinion 
doubtless does not mean that the auditor should accept blindly 
statements of trusted employees of the client. The auditor would 
be derelict in his duty if he should accept his client’s trusted em­
ployee’s certificate of a cash count where it was at all feasible for 
the auditor to count the cash. A reasonable amount of care would 
require a thorough investigation of circumstances which ordinarily 
would excite suspicion.
The Kingston Cotton Mill Company case is sound in principles; 
it has been followed in other decisions; and it should be followed 
in future decisions in similar circumstances, even where the audi­
tor’s duties arose only from contract.36
The professional attitude of public accountants towards assum­
ing responsibility for the showing of the value of inventories has 
been expressed as follows: 37
“The Bradford Chartered and Incorporated Accountants at a joint 
meeting * * * resolved:
“ ‘( I ) That this meeting is of opinion that professional accountants 
are unable to express reliable opinions upon the market values of 
stock-in-trade.
“ ‘(2) That it is not within the functions of a professional account­
ant or auditor to value stocks, and therefore those practising ac-
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36 Note: A holding in agreement with In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company is to 
be found in Henry Squire, Cash Chemist, Ltd., v. Ball, Baker & Co. (C.A., 1911) 
106 L. T. 197, 28 T. L. R. 81.
37 Grainger, W. H., “The Duties, Obligations, and Liabilities of Auditors,” The 
Accountant, 1923, volume 68, p. 521.
countants represented at this meeting are not prepared to undertake 
responsibilities of this nature, or to give certificates as to the value 
of the said stocks, which might deprive auditors of the protection 
to which they are entitled under judicial ruling laid down in the 
Kingston Cotton Mills case.’ ”
When a client hires an auditor to review his books, generally he 
does not expect that the auditor will take stock. Auditors generally 
do not have the specialized knowledge of merchandise requisite 
to a proper valuation of a stock of goods. Besides, the client, in 
most instances, would be unwilling to pay the fees necessary to 
justify the auditor’s taking stock.
The auditor should be required to take stock only in case he 
expressly agreed to do so. In the usual auditing contract, it would 
be unreasonable to require the auditor to take stock. If the implica­
tions of law should place upon the auditor the duty to take stock, 
an onerous burden would be thrust upon him; the cost of safe­
guards would be too great as compared to his compensation. The 
auditor is entitled to assume a reasonable amount of risk of error 
with respect to the value of inventories in comparison with the 
utility of his compensation.38
D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to V erify the Inventory of 
Securities
The common-law liability of the public accountant to verify the 
inventory of securities for his client was set forth by the English 
court of appeal, In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.,39 
1924. The facts of the case follow:
The City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., carrying on a large 
international business in fire and marine insurance, had occasion 
to buy and sell securities in great amounts through Ellis & Co., a 
brokerage firm. The company’s managing director, Bevan, was 
also a partner in the brokerage firm of Ellis & Co., and he caused 
enormous sums of the company’s money to be kept on deposit 
with the firm for the purpose of dealing in securities. During 1921 
and the two preceding years the accounts the company maintained
38 Note: See page 6, ante.
39 (1925) Ch. 407, 40 T. L. R. 853, 94 L. J. (Ch.) 445, 133 L. T. 520.
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with Ellis & Co. showed much larger amounts of money and 
securities than were really with the firm. Bevan had improperly 
taken the funds through his brokerage firm, and had concealed 
his dishonesty through a false showing of the company’s accounts 
with Ellis & Co. In auditing the company’s records for 1921 and 
the two preceding years the auditors, Lepine and partner, made 
no further investigation of the securities supposed to be in the 
custody of Ellis & Co. than to obtain a certificate of custody from 
one of the firm partners. At the close of each of the three years the 
figures as thus certified were in agreement with the company’s 
accounts and were used in the company’s balance-sheet certified by 
the auditors. Soon after 1921 the company went into bankruptcy; 
and the receiver brought an action for negligence against the audi­
tors to recover a huge loss sustained from dealings with Ellis & 
Co. The court refused judgment to the receiver under a provision 
in the company’s charter relieving company officers from liability 
to the company for unwillful negligence. The court’s decision on 
the propriety of the auditors’ acceptance of Ellis & Co.’s certificate 
of securities held for the company follows:
“* * * Banks in ordinary course do hold certificates of securities 
for their customers; it is part of their business to do so, and therefore 
certificates in the hands of bankers are in their proper custody, and 
if a bank is a reputable bank, you may legitimately accept the certifi­
cate of that bank, because it is a business institution in whose custody 
you would expect both to find and to put securities, and also it is 
respectable; but the fact that it calls itself a bank does not seem to me 
to conclude the matter either one way or the other. On the other 
hand, it may be said that it is the duty of an auditor not to take a 
certificate as to possession of securities, except from a person who is 
not only respectable—I should prefer to use the word ‘trustworthy’— 
but is also one of that class of persons who, in the ordinary course of 
their business, do keep securities for their customers. It may be said 
that a stockbroker does not, in the ordinary course of his business, 
keep securities for his customers, and therefore he is ruled out, be­
cause the auditor ought not to accept, from a person of that class, 
whether he be respectable or not, a certificate that he has securities 
in his hands. Now, accepting the rule as so stated, that it is right to 
find the securities in the hands of a bank, whose business it is to hold
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securities, and applying the proviso that the bank must be one that is 
trustworthy, it seems to me that the rule may, prima facie, be a right 
one to follow; but it is going too far to say that, under no circum­
stances, may you be satisfied with a certificate that securities are in 
the hands of a stockbroker, because it seems to me that, in the 
ordinary course of business, you must, from time to time, and you 
legitimately may, place in the hands of stockbrokers securities for 
the purpose of their dealing with them in the course of their business. 
With a large institution like the City Equitable Co., with a very 
considerable number of investments to make and securities to sell, 
it may well be that, for the convenience of all parties, it may have 
been a useful method of business, even if it be examined with the 
most exiguous care, for the directors to have decided that they would, 
in the interests of their business, leave securities of a considerable 
amount in the hands of their stockbrokers, who, I suppose, at that 
time held a position not less trustworthy or respected than the City 
Equitable Co. itself. I do not wish in any way, by anything that I say, 
to discharge the auditors from their duties as laid down in the Kings­
ton Cotton Mill case; far less do I wish to discharge them from their 
duty of seeing that securities are held, and accept the certificate that 
they are so held from a respectable, trustworthy and responsible 
person, be that person a bank or an individual; but in applying my 
mind to the facts of this case, I am not content to say that, simply 
because a certificate was accepted otherwise than from a bank, 
therefore there was necessarily so grave a dereliction of duty as to 
make the auditors responsible. In my opinion it is for the auditor to 
use his discretion and his judgment, and his discrimination as to 
whom he shall trust; indeed that is the right way to put a greater 
responsibility on the auditors.
“If you merely discharge him by saying he accepted the certificate of 
a bank because it was a bank, you might lighten his responsibility. 
In my view, he must take a certificate from a person who is in the 
habit of dealing with and holding securities, and whom he, on reason­
able grounds, rightly believes to be, in the exercise of the best judg­
ment, a trustworthy person to give such a certificate. Therefore, I 
by no means derogate from the responsibility of the auditor—I rather 
throw a greater burden upon him; but at the same time, I throw a 
burden upon him in respect of which the test of common sense and 
business habits can be applied, rather than impose on him a rigid
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rule which is not based on any principle either of business or com­
mon sense.
“So we come to the responsibility which the learned judge finds, 
and I think rightly, falls upon Mr. Lepine. Now what is that? He 
finds that, in respect of these securities, Mr. Lepine did what he 
ought not to have done, by accepting from Ellis & Co. a statement 
of the securities which they, at that time, declared that they held. 
The learned Judge says: ‘In my judgment, not only did Mr. Lepine 
commit a breach of his duty in accepting, as he did, from time to 
time the certificate of Ellis & Co. that they held large blocks of the 
company’s securities, but he also committed a breach of his duty in 
not either insisting upon those securities being put in proper custody, 
or in reporting the matter to the shareholders.’ As I have said, the 
learned judge also finds that, in what he did Mr. Lepine acted 
honestly and in all good faith, ‘holding the mistaken belief as to what 
his duty was.’ I agree with the learned judge. It seems to me that 
Mr. Lepine has made a mistake, and a grave mistake. In justification 
of him it may be said that every artifice was brought into play in 
order to deceive him, and to maintain the apparent responsibility and 
trustworthiness of Ellis & Co. But that does not discharge him from 
having put aside what I described to counsel for the appellant as the 
rule of the road applied with the proviso as to business rules and 
common sense. Therefore Mr. Lepine would, prima facie, be liable 
in respect of that dereliction of duty.”
The City Equitable Fire Insurance Company case placed upon 
the auditor with respect to verification of the inventory of securi­
ties in the hands of a custodian for the client no further duty than 
to obtain from the custodian a certificate that he has in his posses­
sion certain securities belonging to the auditor’s client, provided 
the custodian ordinarily keeps securities for customers and is trust­
worthy. Banks will generally meet the requirements for such custo­
dians. Stock-brokerage firms or other institutions may meet the two 
qualifications. If the auditor uses less care in proving the inventory 
of securities in the hands of another person than that involved 
in obtaining a certificate of possession from a person who is in 
the habit of dealing with and holding securities, and whom the 
auditor, on reasonable grounds, rightly believes to be, in the exer­
cise of the best judgment, a trustworthy person to give such cer­
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tificate, the auditor may be held liable to his client for loss result­
ing proximately from the auditor’s negligence.
The responsibility placed upon auditors by the City Equitable 
Fire Insurance Company case is reasonable. The case has been 
followed in other decisions; and it should be followed in future 
decisions under like conditions.
D uty of the P ublic A ccountant to V erify C ash
The earliest English case dealing directly with the auditor’s 
duties in regard to ascertaining the validity of cash payments was 
decided by the court of appeal in 1899. This case, Thomas v. The 
Corporation of Devonport,40 was an action in which Thomas 
sought compensation for audit services rendered in his character 
of elective auditor of the borough and also for audit services ren­
dered to the sanitary authority of that town. The opinion reads:
“But language was used [in the lower court] which, in my view, 
suggests too narrow a judgment of what the proper duties of the 
elective auditor are. I do not subscribe to the doctrine that his 
sole duty is to see whether there are vouchers, apparently formal 
and regular, justifying each of the items in respect of which the 
authority seeks to get credit upon the accounts put before the audi­
tors for audit. I think that is an incomplete and imperfect view of 
the duties of the auditors. I think an auditor is not only entitled, 
but justified and bound to go further than that, and by fair and 
reasonable examination of the vouchers to see that there are not 
amongst the payments so made payments which are not authorized 
by the duty of the authority, or contrary to the duty of the authority, 
or in any other way illegal or improper. If he discovers that any such 
improper or illegal payments appear to have been made, his duty will 
certainly be to make it public by report to the authority itself, and 
the burgesses who create that authority.”
Unquestionably it is the duty of an auditor in a review of cash 
disbursements to scrutinize the paid vouchers to ascertain whether 
the payments were properly authorized or not. In the absence of 
circumstances indicating wrongful conduct on the part of the 
authority to whom has been delegated the power to approve dis-
40 (1900) I Q. B. 16.
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bursements, the auditor would not be negligent in accepting as 
correct payments evidenced by properly signed vouchers. On the 
other hand, if circumstances should be such as to excite suspicion 
that the executive authorized to approve the payments of vouchers 
had abused his power, or if the circumstances would seem to in­
dicate that the executive’s approval of disbursements had in par­
ticular instances been fraudulently procured, the auditor would be 
required to report the matter to the proper authority—a failure to 
do so would constitute negligence on the part of the auditor.
While the facts of Thomas v. The Corporation of Devonport 
are peculiar, the principles of the decision are sound and have 
been applied in other decisions concerned with auditors’ duties in 
the verification of disbursements.41
Fox and Son v. Morrish, Grant, and Co.42 is the most recent 
English case on the auditor’s duty to verify cash. The case was 
reviewed by the king’s bench division in 1918. Justice A. T. 
Lawrence, delivering the opinion, said:
“The liability of the defendants turned on what they were em­
ployed to do. It had been urged by the defense that Mr. Grant was 
not employed to audit the accounts, and was therefore not responsible 
for the documents which he prepared. It was true that he was not 
employed as auditor fully and generally, but he was employed under 
a specific engagement, as the result of an interview between the 
plaintiffs and the defendants under which he was to check the books, 
and it was understood that it was not to be a full audit. There was no 
requirement on the part of the plaintiffs that the defendants should 
verify everything. The question was whether Mr. Grant was wanting 
in due care and skill in the performance of his duty, in not having 
in any way checked the amounts appearing in the cashbook as ‘cash 
in hand’ and ‘at the bank.’ He made out his balance-sheets without 
taking any steps to ascertain whether those figures were correct. It 
turned out that Cranston, a dishonest clerk of the plaintiffs, ingeni-
41 The English court of appeal in Cuff v. Condon and County Land and Building 
Company, Limited, (1912) I Ch. 440, 81 L. J. (Ch.) 426, 19 Mans. 166, 106 L. T. 
285, (1912) W. N. 40, 28 T. L. R. 218, seemed to imply that, where auditors 
in auditing the books of a real-estate company failed to investigate the counterfoils 
of rent receipts issued to tenants, the auditors would be liable for negligence.
42 35 T. L. R. 126, 63 S. J. 193.
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ously seeing that the bank passbook was not investigated, took ad­
vantage of that and played upon it.
“The eminent accountants who had been called as witnesses on 
both sides endeavored to give evidence as favorable as possible to the 
defendants. They had tried to mitigate the severity of the standard 
laid down by Mr. Matthews; but they did not achieve complete suc­
cess. They had to admit that in the preparation of balance-sheets the 
cash at the bank and in hand must be stated, and in stating it one 
must either look at the passbook or get a certificate from the bankers; 
or if that was not done the client must be told that had not been done. 
That was the real gravamen of the case as far as the defendants were 
concerned. Mr. Grant did not tell the plaintiffs that he was not doing 
this. He frankly admitted that he never had, as he was not bound 
to do so under the retainer. As to that, he was wrong. He agreed 
that the object of having a balance-sheet drawn up was that Mr. 
Fox might know what his business position was; and it was im­
possible for him to know how matters stood without knowing what 
was the result in cash. All business was conducted for the purpose of 
producing cash. There was not a single word in the retainer, or 
anything which passed between the parties, which relieved Mr. Grant 
from seeing that the cash was accurately stated in the balance-sheet. 
If the passbook had been looked at it would have been found that 
what was stated to be at the bank was not at the bank; and if the bank 
passbook had been examined it would have been found that the figures 
in the books had been inserted by Cranston.
“There was a clear default of duty on the part of Mr. Grant; 
though it was natural and easy for him to slip into it at the time. 
But there was nothing in the arrangement made which discharged 
him from the duty of seeing that when he made a statement on his 
balance-sheet there was a foundation for it. It was a positive state­
ment which was intended to be acted upon.”
Fox and Son v. Morrish, Grant, and Company held that an 
auditor in undertaking a balance-sheet audit is duty bound to 
exercise reasonable care to verify the amount of cash on hand and 
in the bank. The auditor is derelict in duty if he states in his 
client’s balance-sheet that “cash at the bank” is a certain amount 
without having ascertained the correctness of the figures from a 
bank certificate or from an investigation of the client’s passbook. 
Likewise, the auditor is negligent if he states in his client’s balance-
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sheet that “cash on hand” is a certain amount without having taken 
ariy steps to ascertain the correctness of the figures. Though the 
decision does not so state, the auditor or one of his employees 
should count the “cash on hand.” The auditor is not justified in 
accepting the cashbook figures for cash, nor in accepting from his 
client’s employee figures for the count of “cash on hand”—unless, 
of course, the auditing contract expressly provided that the auditor 
would not be required to verify the showing of cash, and the 
balance-sheet clearly showed that the figures for “cash on hand” 
had not been verified. Dicta in the case imply that the auditor 
might have been relieved of liability had he stated in the balance- 
sheet that cash had not been verified. The underlying principles 
of the decision are sound and should be followed in future deci­
sions involving similar facts.
The leading American case on the liability of the public accoun­
tant for negligence in failing to detect embezzlement is the famous 
City of East Grand Forks v. Steele 43 case decided by the supreme 
court of Minnesota in 1913. This case was an action for breach of 
an auditing contract to conduct a skillful and diligent investiga­
tion of the plaintiff’s records to disclose any defalcations which 
might have existed. The opinion reads in part as follows:
“The defendants, representing themselves to be expert accountants, 
and able to detect any irregularities in the transactions of the city 
officers, contracted with the city to investigate and audit the books, 
accounts and financial transactions of the city and of its officers for the 
year 1908, and especially the books, accounts, and financial trans­
actions of the city clerk, for the sum of $150. The city clerk, in addi­
tion to his ordinary duties as clerk, was also employed to collect 
money due the city for electric lights, water and sewer assessments 
and licence fees and had given a surety bond to secure the faithful 
performance of these additional duties. The investigation of these 
collections, and of whether they had been properly accounted for, 
was included in the duties of the defendants. They made the investi­
gation and audit, and in February, 1909, reported to the city that all 
books and accounts had been correctly kept and all funds properly
43 141 N. W. 181, 121 Minn. 296, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 
720. See Smith v. London Assurance Corporation, (1905) 96 N. Y. S. 820, 109 
App. Div. 882.
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accounted for. Plaintiff, believing they had made a correct report and 
had properly performed their work, paid them the full contract price 
therefor.
“In December, 1909, defendants again contracted with the city to 
make a similar investigation and audit, concerning both the years 
1908 and 1909, for the sum of $500. They made such an investigation 
and audit and reported the result thereof. Plaintiff, still believing that 
they had made a correct report and had properly performed their 
work, paid them the full contract price for this second audit. In fact, 
the clerk had embezzled the sum of $1,984.26 during the year 1908, 
and the further sum of $5,339 during the year 1909 and prior to the 
investigation made by the defendants. The defendants failed to dis­
cover and disclose these defalcations, by reason of incompetence and 
negligence. They were discovered and disclosed by an investigation 
made by the state examiner immediately after defendants had com­
pleted their second audit. If in making their first audit defendants 
had discovered and reported the defalcation then existing, it could 
have been recovered from the surety company, and the clerk would 
have been removed from office, and his subsequent embezzlement 
could not have occurred. The surety company became insolvent be­
fore the investigation made by the state examiner, and the amount 
of the defalcations of the clerk has been wholly lost to the city.
“This is not an action in tort, but an action to recover damages 
for breach of contract. As said by Justice Mitchell in Whittaker v. 
Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25 N. W. 632, 57 Am. Rep. 55 (an action 
brought to recover for the negligence of a physician): ‘Where the 
action is not maintainable without pleading and proving the con­
tract, where the gist of the action is the breach of the contract, either 
by malfeasance or nonfeasance, it is in substance, whatever may be 
the form of the pleading, an action on the contract. * * * The founda­
tion of the action is the contract, and the gravamen of it its breach.’
“The rule governing liability for breach of contract is given in the 
syllabus to Sargent v. Mason, 101 Minn. 319, 112 N. W. 255, as 
follows: ‘In an action for damages for breach of contract, the de­
faulting party is liable only for the direct consequences of the breach, 
such as usually occur from the infraction of like contracts, and within 
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into 
as likely to result from its nonperformance.’
“To recover damages, not naturally and necessarily resulting from 
a breach of the contract, on the ground that such damages were within
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the contemplation of the parties when making the contract, it is said 
in Liljengren F. & L. Co. v. Mead, 42 Minn. 420, 44 N. W. 306, 
that ‘there must be some special facts and circumstances, out of which 
they naturally proceed, known to the persons sought to be held liable, 
under such circumstances that it can be inferred from the whole 
transaction that such damage was in the contemplation of the parties, 
at the time of making the contract, as the result of its breach, and 
that the party sought to be charged consented to become liable for 
it.’ This rule is well established.
“The damages claimed on account of the losses resulting from 
the defalcations of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety are too 
remote to be recovered, without showing the existence of special 
circumstances, known to defendants, from which they ought to 
have known that such losses were likely to result from a failure to 
disclose the true condition of affairs. Such losses are neither the 
natural nor the proximate consequences of the failure of defendants 
to make a proper audit. Neither are any facts shown from which it 
may be inferred that a loss from either of these causes was or ought 
to have been contemplated, when the contract was made, as likely to 
result from a breach of duty on the part of defendants.
“If, at the making of the contract and in the light of the knowledge 
then possessed by them, the parties had taken thought as to what 
consequences might reasonably be expected to result from its breach, 
there is nothing set forth in the complaint from which we can say 
that they ought to have foreseen or to have contemplated that the 
clerk was likely to commit a crime, or that his surety was likely to 
become bankrupt, and thereby entail financial loss upon the city. 
There may be circumstances under which the negligence of an expert 
accountant may make him liable for losses, as where he is employed 
to determine the amount that should be exacted from a surety for the 
default of his principal; but the facts alleged in the complaint do not 
bring this case within any such rule.
“Defendants represented themselves as expert accountants which 
implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In accepting 
employment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff 
had the right to expect that in the performance of their duties they 
would exercise the average ability and skill of those engaged in that 
branch of skilled labor. They were employed to ascertain, among 
other things, whether any irregularities had occurred in the financial 
transactions of the city clerk, and, if so, the nature and extent of
such irregularities. If, from want of proper skill, or from negligence, 
they did not disclose the true situation, they failed to perform the 
duty which they had assumed and failed to earn the compensation 
which plaintiff had agreed to pay them for the proper performance 
of such duty.
“The work of an expert accountant is of such technical character 
and requires such peculiar skill that the ordinary person can  not 
be expected to know whether he performs his duties properly or 
otherwise, but must rely upon his report as to the thoroughness and 
accuracy of his work. The full contract price having been paid in 
the belief, induced by defendants’ report, that such report disclosed 
fully and accurately the condition of the city’s accounts, the city is 
entitled to recover back the amounts so paid, upon proving that, 
through the incompetence or the negligence of defendants, the report 
was in substance misleading and false.”
In the City of East Grand Forks n. Steele case it is possible that 
the judge, when he held that the auditor was incompetent and 
negligent in failing to disclose the defalcations of the city clerk, 
had in mind specific acts or omissions committed by the auditor 
in the course of the audit of cash collections. But, in view of the 
context of the opinion, it is more probable that the judge found 
the existence of negligence from the fact that the auditor con­
tracted to bring to his task that degree of professional skill and 
diligence necessary to uncover defalcations and then failed to dis­
close the irregularities of the city clerk. When a public accountant 
as such enters into an auditing contract he expressly or impliedly 
agrees to give to his client such skill and diligence as reasonably 
prudent, skillful, and diligent public accountants would give in 
the circumstances.44 After having entered into such a contract, 
the auditor would be guilty of negligence if he should fail to 
exercise the care, skill and diligence which other professional ac­
countants normally would have furnished in the circumstances.
The auditor contracted to investigate and audit the client’s books 
for the purpose of discovering any irregularities that may have 
existed during the audit period. The auditor’s negligence in failing 
to discover the defalcations amounted to nothing more than an
44 Smith v. London Assurance Corporation, 96 N. Y. S. 820, 109 App. Div. 882, 
would seem to support the holding in City of East Grand Forks v. Steele.
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invasion of the client’s rights which had been created solely by the 
auditing contract. The auditor’s negligence was not an invasion of 
any right of the client, created by implications of the law. Hence, 
the gist of the cause of action was a breach of the contract, and by 
well-established law the remedy had to be limited to an action in 
contract. Since the cause of action could be in contract only, the 
damages, in accordance with well-settled legal principles, had to be 
limited to such losses as the contracting parties, at the time of mak­
ing the agreement and in the light of the knowledge then pos­
sessed by them, might have reasonably contemplated would follow 
naturally from a breach of the contract. The court held that the 
defendant in the light of knowledge possessed at the time of the 
making of the contract was not chargeable with ability to foresee 
losses resulting from embezzlement by the city clerk and bank­
ruptcy of the surety company subsequent to the audit, and, therefore, 
was not liable for such losses. The court held that the only dam­
ages resulting directly from the auditor’s breach of contract were 
the loss of the service fees which had been remitted to the auditor.
If the auditor’s negligent conduct had been a breach of a duty 
implied by law and the action had been brought in tort, the dam­
ages would have been such losses as the auditor might reasonably 
have foreseen, at the time of the commission of negligence and in 
the light of circumstances existing at that moment, would result 
naturally and directly.45 Though the case was decided on the basis 
of a breach of contract, the court stated that the loss resulting 
from the defalcation of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety 
subsequent to the audit was neither the natural nor the proximate 
consequence of the failure of the defendant to make a proper audit. 
Had the cause of action been brought in tort for negligence, it 
would seem that the proper inference to be drawn from the opin­
ion would lead to the conclusion that the court would have held 
the defendant’s negligence not to constitute a reasonably dis­
cernible or direct cause of the loss from defalcation of the clerk 
and bankruptcy of the clerk’s surety, both of which occurred sub­
sequent to the audit. Without knowledge of the clerk’s dishonesty 
and without information relative to the financial condition of the
45 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 39-41.
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clerk’s surety a reasonably prudent, skillful and diligent auditor 
would not have foreseen as resulting from his negligence losses 
from defalcation of the clerk and insolvency of his surety.
The City of East Grand Forks v. Steele decision is based upon 
well-settled legal principles. It has been followed in other cases; 
and it may well be accepted as the law with respect to the particu­
lar circumstances.
T he N ew York Stock E xchange on the P ublic A ccountant’s 
D uty to M ake a Proper V erification of Cash
On October 24, 1933, J. M. B. Hoxsey, executive assistant of the 
New York Stock Exchange committee on stock list, addressed to 
the governing committee of the exchange a letter which reads in 
part as follows:
“Your committee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and verifica­
tion of the cash transactions of large companies can most efficiently 
and economically be performed by permanent employees of the 
corporation, particularly today, when bookkeeping is to so large an 
extent done by mechanical means, and that it would involve un­
warranted expense to transfer such work to independent auditors 
or to require them to duplicate the work of the internal organization. 
Your committee, however, feels that the auditors should assume a 
definite responsibility for satisfying themselves that the system of 
internal check provides adequate safeguards and should protect the 
company against any defalcation of major importance. Unless so 
satisfied, the auditors should make clear representations on this point 
—in the first place, to the management, and in default of action by 
the management, to the shareholders. Your committee also suggests 
that this limitation on the scope of the audit, though an entirely 
proper one, should be specifically mentioned in the common form of 
audit report.”
In the absence of an express contract relieving the auditor of the 
detailed scrutiny and verification of cash transactions, it is ex­
tremely doubtful that courts would excuse an auditor from such 
verification work, even in large companies where bookkeeping is 
done chiefly by mechanical means and where the auditor has used 
reasonable care in satisfying himself that the system of internal
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check provides adequate safeguards against defalcations. The com­
mon law, in a detailed audit, places upon the auditor the duty to 
make the detailed scrutiny and verification of all cash receipts and 
disbursements necessary to uncover irregularities and defalcations, 
and to ascertain the correctness of the cash balance. The common 
law, in a balance-sheet audit, places upon the auditor the duty to 
prove the correctness of the figures for the cash balance by means 
of a count of the “cash on hand,” and an investigation of the client’s 
bank pass-book, or of the bank’s certificate, showing the client’s 
“cash at the bank.” 46 The limitation of the scope of the cash audit 
as suggested by the New York Stock Exchange could be made 
safely only where the auditing contract expressly provides for such 
limitation and where the audit report clearly mentions the limited 
extent of the verification of cash.
D uty of the P ublic A ccountant R elative to Secret R eserves
The American courts have not ruled on the public accountant’s 
liability with respect to secret reserves. There are two outstand­
ing English cases on the point. One case, Newton v. Birmingham 
Small Arms Company, Limited,47 dealt with the auditor’s duty to 
his client, the stockholders, in regard to hidden reserves. This case 
is reported below. The other case which involved the criminal 
liability of the auditor of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company is 
given later under the subject “Criminal liability of the public 
accountant for fraud.”
The stockholders of the Birmingham Small Arms Company in 
February, 1906, passed a resolution which authorized the directors 
to set aside out of profits a secret reserve fund which the directors 
could invest as they saw fit. The directors were bound to disclose 
the particulars of this inner reserve fund to the company auditors; 
but the company auditors were prohibited from revealing any in­
formation whatever about the secret fund to the stockholders or 
otherwise. Newton, the plaintiff stockholder in this case, sought a 
court order to prevent the enforcement of such resolution. After
46 Note: See “Duty of the Public Accountant to Verify Cash,” page 39, ante.
47 (1906) 2 Ch. 378, 1906 W. N. 146.
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reviewing the English companies acts and ruling that secret reserve 
funds could be maintained under such acts, the court held:
“The special resolutions in the present case provide that the balance- 
sheet shall not disclose the internal reserve fund. It must, therefore, 
omit on the assets side of the balance-sheet the assets which make up 
the amount standing to the credit of that fund and the contra item— 
namely, the credit balance of the fund—on the liability side. The 
result will be to show the financial position of the company to be not 
so good as in fact it is. If the balance-sheet be so worded as to show 
that there is an undisclosed asset, whose existence makes the finan­
cial position better than that shown, such a balance-sheet will not, in 
my judgment, be necessarily inconsistent with the act of parliament. 
Assets are often, by reason of prudence, estimated, and stated to be 
estimated, at less than their probable real value. The purpose of the 
balance-sheet is primarily to show that the financial position of the 
company is at least as good as there stated, not to show that it is not 
or may not be better. The provision as to not disclosing the internal 
reserve fund in the balance-sheet is not, I think, necessarily fatal to 
these special resolutions. The act, however, provides that the auditors 
shall report to the shareholders on the accounts examined by them. 
These auditors will examine, amongst others, the accounts of the 
internal reserve fund. A principal question in this case, I think, is 
whether it is a compliance with these words of the act that the 
auditors shall report that they have examined the accounts as to the 
internal reserve fund, that they are satisfied with them, and that the 
funds have been employed in the manner authorized by the company’s 
regulations, or whether there will be default in complying with the 
act if they do not go on to say how the fund has been employed. In 
my judgment such a report would be a sufficient report within the 
act if the auditor is bona fide satisfied that in making this report, 
and nothing further, he is truly reporting as to ‘the true and correct 
view of the state of the company’s affairs.’ But the special resolutions 
do not stop there. They provide that it shall be the duty of the auditor 
not to disclose any information with regard to this fund to the share­
holders or otherwise. It is, I think, inconsistent with the act of 
parliament that the auditor shall be bound, even when he thinks that 
the true state of the company’s affairs is affected by facts relating to 
the internal reserve fund, to withhold all information with regard to 
the same from the shareholders. If, for instance, the directors had in­
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vested the internal reserve fund upon investments which might involve 
the company under certain circumstances in enormous loss, the act, I 
think, requires that the auditor shall be at liberty and be bound to 
report that fact. In reporting upon the accounts submitted to them 
the auditors do not, of course, report as to the details of accounts to 
which they find no cause to take exception. Their duty is to call 
attention to that which is wrong, not to condescend upon all the 
details of that which is right. It is, I think, competent to the statutory 
majority of the shareholders to say that as to particular items of their 
business it is to the interest of the corporation that there shall be 
secrecy, and that the auditors, who must for the purposes of their 
audit know all such details, shall not, unless their duty under the 
statute requires it, disclose such details to the members. There is no 
suggestion in this case that these clauses are intended to be used 
for any other than a legitimate purpose. Those who are engaged in 
commerce are familiar with the fact that undue publicity as regards 
the details of their trade, or as to their financial arrangements, may 
often be very injurious to traders, having regard to the rivalry of com­
petitors in trade, to complications sometimes arising from strained 
relations between capital and labor, and the like. There are legitimate 
reasons for ensuring secrecy to a proper extent. It is not, I think, 
necessary, nor, having regard to the great utility of these acts, is it 
desirable, to expose persons who trade under these acts to the neces­
sities of a publicity from which their competitors are free, unless 
such publicity is required to ensure commercial integrity. I am not 
disposed to look too closely for reasons why I should find clauses 
such as these to be inconsistent with the act if I see that the true 
purpose of the act is satisfied. I think, however, these special resolu­
tions go too far. Any regulations which preclude the auditors from 
availing themselves of all the information to which under the act 
they are to make as to the true and correct state of the company’s 
affairs, are I think, inconsistent with the act.”
The Newton v. Birmingham Small Arms Company case held 
that under the company act of 1900 the company auditor was 
not required to show in the balance-sheet items which the directors 
desired to keep secret from the stockholders, provided the auditor 
stated in his certificate that he had examined the accounts as to 
the internal reserve fund, and that he was satisfied with them. 
But it was held that if the auditor, through his investigation of
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internal reserve accounts, found that the directors had abused the 
privilege of managing the secret fund, the auditor was obligated 
to report that which was wrong. The court relieved the auditor 
of the duty to disclose secret reserves on the theory that such 
secrecy is often essential to the proper management of the com­
pany. The allowance of secret reserves was based on the proposition 
that a disclosure of inner reserves might reveal to competitors of 
the business information which would be injurious to the client, 
or that such a disclosure might inspire labor to strike for higher 
wages. While no case has ruled on secret reserves under the com­
panies acts passed subsequent to the act of 1900, since all the 
subsequent acts, including the consolidating companies act of 
1929, have required the company auditor to state whether or not 
the balance-sheet shows the true and correct financial position of 
the company and have not expressly prohibited secret reserves, it 
would appear that the decision of the Newton v. Birmingham Small 
Arms Company case could have been rendered under any of these 
subsequent acts as well as under the act of 1900.
It would seem that the court was in error in holding that an 
auditor may fail to disclose a secret reserve in the balance-sheet 
and yet comply with the company act of 1900 which required that 
the auditor should state whether the balance-sheet exhibited a cor­
rect view of the condition of the company’s financial affairs. Such 
a compliance with the act can not logically be explained by the 
proposition that “the purpose of the balance-sheet is primarily to 
show that the financial position of the company is at least as good 
as there stated, not to show that it is not or may not be better.” 
The London and General Bank case, supra, and several other deci­
sions have held that a balance-sheet showing assets at a higher 
value than their real worth does not present truly the financial 
condition of the business. Showing less than the real value of the 
property is as far from the truth as showing more than the real 
value of the property.
There is some justification for permitting secret reserves on the 
ground that it may become necessary for the corporate manage­
ment to follow a conservative program with respect to the pay­
ment of dividends, and that the withholding of the payment of
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dividends becomes well nigh impossible where the stockholders 
know the full worth of the business. Yet, under American common 
law the managing director of a corporation may work great loss 
to stockholders through the maintenance of secret reserves. Accord­
ing to the majority view of American courts a director may pur­
chase from a stockholder shares of stock in the company without 
revealing to the shareholder secret reserves.48 There would be much 
less risk of loss to stockholders through the maintenance of secret 
reserves under the minority view of the American courts, which 
holds that a corporate director is a quasi-trustee of the stockholders 
and under obligation to disclose inner reserves to a stockholder 
prior to purchasing shares of the corporation from such stock­
holder.49 This minority view has the support of eminent author-
48 “Directors’ Liability to Individual Shareholders and to the Corporation,” 45 
Harvard Law Review 1389 (1931); Board v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); 
Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxter 107 (Tenn., 1874).
49 Note: The minority view was clearly set forth by the supreme court of Georgia 
in 1903 in the following language: “All the authorities agree that he (director) 
is trustee for the company, and in his capacity as such he serves the interests of 
the entire body of stockholders, as well as those of the individual shareholder, who 
usually can not sue in his own name for wrongs done the company by the officer. 
. . . No process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy the fact that 
the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stock­
holder. . . . Not a strict trustee, since he does not hold title to the shares, not 
even a strict trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with his cestui que 
trust, but a quasi-trustee as to the shareholder’s interest in the shares. If the market 
or contract price of the stock should be different from the book value, he would 
be under no legal obligation to call special attention to that fact, for the stockholder 
is entitled to examine the books, and this source of information, at least theo­
retically, is equally accessible to both. It might be that the director was in posses­
sion of information which his duty to the company required him to keep secret; 
and, if so, he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation 
to the company overrides that to an individual holder of stock. But if the fact so 
known to the director can not be published, it does not follow that he may use 
it to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of one whom he also represents. 
The very fact that he can not disclose prevents him from dealing with one who 
does not know and to whom material information can not be made known. If, 
however, the fact within the knowledge of the director is of a character calculated 
to affect the selling price, and can, without detriment to the interest of the com­
pany, be imparted to the shareholder, the director, before he buys, is bound to 
make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the information is a quasi-asset of the 
company, and the shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of 
an asset as to any other regularly entered on the list of the company’s holding. 
If the officer should purposely conceal from a stockholder information as to the 
existence of valuable property belonging to the company and take advantage of this 
concealment, the sale would necessarily be set aside. The same result would logi­
cally follow where the fact giving value to the stock was of a character which
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ity; 50 and it is thought by no less an authority on corporation law 
than Dean I. P. Hildebrand of the University of Texas law school 
that the doctrine making a director a quasi-trustee of stockholders 
will be accepted by the majority of American courts within a 
decade.
But the wisdom of allowing inner reserves or the duty to reveal 
such reserves to stockholders of the American corporation is no 
business of the public accountant—under common law. Certainly, 
if a director is not, by the weight of authority, a quasi-trustee of 
stockholders under obligations to disclose to them secret reserves 
prior to the purchase of their shares, the auditor who contracts 
independently with the directors would have no fiduciary relation­
ship with the stockholders and would not be obligated to disclose 
secret reserves to them by means of the balance-sheet prepared from 
his audit. Even if courts should follow the minority view, making 
a director a quasi-trustee under obligations to disclose secret re­
serves to a stockholder prior to the purchase of his shares, the audi­
tor would owe no common-law duty to a stockholder to reveal 
secret reserves in the balance-sheet prepared from an audit of the 
company. If the minority view should be followed, in the absence 
of circumstances indicating that a director intended to use the 
auditor’s report to induce a stockholder to sell shares of stock to the 
director for himself or for the corporation, the auditor would not 
be charged with negligence in failing to report secret reserves. It 
has been held—City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, supra—that 
an auditor is not chargeable with ability to foresee dishonest con­
duct on the part of a trusted employee of a business.
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could not formally be entered on the record. Where the director obtains the 
information giving added value to the stock by virtue of his official position, he 
holds the information in trust for the benefit of those who placed him where this 
knowledge was obtained, in the well-founded expectation that the same should be 
used first for the company and ultimately for those who were the real owners of the 
company. The director can not deal on this information to the prejudice of the 
artificial being which is called the corporation, nor, on any sound principle, can 
be permitted to act differently towards those who are not artificially but actually 
interested.” ( Oliver v . Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232.) See also: Strong v. 
Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277, 66 
L. R. A. 261 (1904).
50 A. A. Berle, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees,” 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1365 (1932).
Inference of N egligence on the P art of the  P ublic A ccountant
The burden of showing no negligence is placed upon the auditor 
where the client has proved damages to have resulted from an 
incorrectly stated balance-sheet, according to the case, In re Re­
public of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Limited,51 decided by 
Justice Astbury of the English chancery division in 1913. The opin­
ion in part reads:
“Now, there are some legal matters which an auditor must obvi­
ously know, as there are others which it is equally obvious he could 
not be held responsible for not knowing, and it may not always be 
easy to say in which category any particular case falls. I think that 
auditors of a limited company are bound to know or make them­
selves acquainted with their duties under the articles of the company 
whose accounts they are appointed to audit and under the companies 
acts for the time being in force; and that when it is shown that audited 
balance-sheets do not show the true financial condition of the com­
pany and that damage has resulted, the onus is on the auditors to 
show that this is not the result of any breach of duty on their part. 
The authorities, however, are not very clear as to what, if any, is the 
liability of auditors of a limited company for including or passing 
in accounts audited by them sums paid by the company or its direc­
tors prior to the audit, and which, by reason of the want of author­
ity in the regulations of the company or non-compliance with some 
statutory provision of the companies acts, ought not in the particular 
circumstances to have been paid, nor, if any liability would other­
wise exist, what is sufficient by way of warning or identification in 
the audited accounts for the necessary information to be expressly 
conveyed by the auditors to the company in order to free them from 
further responsibility.”
In this case, where the plaintiff liquidator had merely proved 
an incorrect balance-sheet prepared by the defendant auditor, and 
financial loss resulting therefrom, the court inferred from such 
circumstances that negligence not only existed but also resulted 
directly in the loss which was the basis of complaint. Negligence 
is regularly inferred from proof of injury in a certain class of cases
51 (1914) I Ch. D. 139, (1913) W. N. 329, 30 T. L. R. 78, 58 S. J. 321, 83 
L. J. (Ch.) 235, 2I Mans. 67, 109 L. T. 741, 110 L. T. 141.
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where the defendant has been required by contract or statute to do 
something safely. This rule of presumption of negligence, res ipsa 
loquitur, on the part of the defendant is ordinarily limited to cases 
of absolute duty, or an obligation practically amounting to that of 
an insurer. Wherever the defendant is required to exercise the 
highest care and skill with regard to the safety of some one else, 
res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) applies—negligence 
and the injury resulting directly therefrom are presumed.52 Thus, 
when a common carrier’s passenger is injured the common car­
rier is presumed to have caused the injury through negligent con­
duct. The common carrier may rebutt the inference of negligence by 
proof that the injury arose from an accident which the utmost 
skill, foresight and diligence could not have prevented. As far as 
proof of the existence of negligence and the loss resulting therefrom 
is concerned, the Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, 
Limited, case puts the company auditor in the class of persons 
required by statute or contract to do a thing safely. While the 
English companies acts place upon the company auditor a duty to 
render a balance-sheet which gives the true financial position of 
the company, according to the best of his information and the 
explanations given him and as shown by the books, it would 
seem that the court went too far in the present case in presuming 
negligence merely from the failure to comply with the statute. In 
the London and General Bank  case, supra, after specific acts of 
negligence in the preparation of the balance-sheet had been proven 
by direct evidence, the court presumed that the defendant auditor’s 
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss which resulted 
from the declaration of dividends out of capital subsequent to the 
circulation of copies of the balance-sheet among the stockholders 
who declared the dividends. In the English case, Henry Squire, 
Cash Chemist, Limited, v. Ball, Baker & Co., 106 L. T. 197, 28 
T. L. R. 81, it was held that, where a money-lender hired an audi­
tor to investigate a borrower’s books in order that the money­
lender might ascertain the wisdom of advancing a loan to the bor­
rower prior to the making of the loan which resulted in a loss 
to the money-lender, the money-lender would have to prove specific
52 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 514-516.
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negligence on the part of the auditor and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the money-lender’s loss before he 
could recover.
In rare instances negligence has been presumed where the de­
fendant’s duty was not absolute but arose in the ordinary course 
of business. In cases of this sort it is essential that it shall appear 
that all the elements of the occurrence were within the exclusive 
control of the defendant, and that the result was so far out of the 
usual course that there is no fair inference that it could have been 
produced by any other cause than negligence of the defendant. 
For example, negligence was presumed where sparks escaped from 
a fire pot (which was used in repairing a roof) and set fire to the 
building.53 It would seem that an auditor is rarely, if ever, in such 
exclusive control of the audit that he could be presumed to have 
been negligent where his reports have been proven incorrect. The 
client’s employees generally have access to the records during the 
audit, and may change, substitute or otherwise manipulate the 
records. The employees may divert cash deposits or securities so 
as to render an incorrect showing of the client’s financial affairs. 
The auditor does not assume the responsibility of verifying every 
entry in the entire set of records, even in a detailed audit. It may 
easily happen that the balance-sheet prepared from an audit is 
incorrect through no lack of reasonable care and skill of the audi­
tor. Inferring negligence on the part of the auditor merely from 
an incorrect report is placing an onerous and unjustifiable burden 
upon the auditor and should not be countenanced by the courts.
Where negligence in the preparation of a balance-sheet has been 
proven by direct evidence, in some circumstances the inference 
that the loss resulted proximately from such defective balance- 
sheet may well be made. For example, where it has been proved 
that an auditor was negligent in preparing a balance-sheet which 
understated the worth of his client’s business, and the client imme­
diately after such audit sold his business at a loss, a court would 
be justified in inferring that the auditor’s negligence was the 
proximate cause of his client’s loss.
53 Cooley on Torts, third edition, volume II, pp. 1415-1428.
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C ontributory N egligence on the P art of the C lient
The supreme court of New York in 1925 rendered a strong deci­
sion, Craig v. Anyon,54 which defines the responsibility of the 
public accountant for negligence where the client is guilty of con­
tributory negligence. In this case the defendant auditors had for 
many years audited the books of the plaintiff brokerage firm. As 
a part of their audit contract with the plaintiffs, the defendants had 
originally agreed to calculate the indebtedness of customers on open 
account, and to “supervise, superintend and send out” statements 
of account to the customers of the plaintiffs. The defendants 
never performed this part of their audit contract; and in failing to 
do so, the court found, they were guilty of negligence. The plain­
tiffs knew from year to year that the defendants had not lived up 
to their agreement with respect to their audit of customers’ ac­
counts, and did nothing about it. In fact, the plaintiffs refused to 
allow statements of account to be sent to customers.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs entrusted the entire management and 
control of the commodities department of their brokerage busi­
ness to an employee named Moore. Moore had complete charge 
of the records of the department; he was margin clerk, whose duty 
it was to decide what margin should be maintained, and he had 
full supervision of buying and selling for customers. The plain­
tiffs took no trouble at all to investigate the work of Moore; they 
simply relied upon him with an unquestioning faith to carry on 
the work of the commodities department. The defendant auditors 
also trusted Moore. In these circumstances Moore was able to 
manipulate the account of a customer, Zabriskie, so as to effect 
the loss. Zabriskie’s original margin with the firm was only $200; 
but in the course of a few years under the direction of Moore the 
plaintiffs paid out to Zabriskie $123,689.04 without once investigat­
ing the credit position of Zabriskie or making an examination of 
his account to see whether anything was due him. These payments 
to Zabriskie were improper; and they constituted the loss which 
the plaintiffs contended was a direct result of the negligence of the 
defendant auditors. The defendants argued that the loss resulted
54 208 N . Y. S. 259, 212 App. Div. 55. (Affirmed in the court of appeals of 
New York, 1926, 152 N. E. 431, 242 N. Y. 569.)
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from the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. A portion of the 
opinion reads:
“There is no doubt in this case that plaintiffs could have prevented 
the loss by the exercise of reasonable care, and that they should not 
have relied exclusively on the accountants.
“We think the damages can not be said to flow naturally and 
directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs 
should not be allowed to recover for losses which they could have 
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care.
“The plaintiffs, in effect, contend that defendants are chargeable 
with negligence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing, 
wholly overlooking the fact that although they were closely affiliated 
with Moore, who was constantly under their supervision, they were 
negligent in failing properly to supervise his acts or to learn the true 
condition of their own business and to detect his wrongdoing.”
In the Craig v. Anyon case the court held that the defendant 
auditors were excused from liability for their negligent audit be­
cause of the contributory negligence on the part of the client 
brokerage firm. The court held that the plaintiffs’ own contribu­
tory negligence was a substantial cause of the loss resulting from 
fraudulent payments to a customer of their brokerage firm. The 
conduct of the plaintiffs amounting to negligence consisted of sev­
eral specific acts of omission and commission. It was deemed by 
the court that the plaintiffs failed to use reasonable care when 
they placed the defalcator in complete charge of all the transac­
tions and accounting for the commodities department of their 
brokerage firm and later exercised no control or supervision over 
him whatsoever. It was also thought by the court that there was a 
lack of due precaution on the part of the plaintiffs in that they 
refused to allow the defendant auditors to superintend and send 
out certain statements of account to customers in accordance with 
an auditing contract formed in prior years. Moreover, the plain­
tiffs were aware of the fact that the defendants were not even cal­
culating the liability of the customers on open contract, at the time 
of each audit, and did nothing about it. This negligence of the 
plaintiffs, the court held, was the direct cause of their loss. Had 
the plaintiffs exercised due care, according to the opinion, the loss
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would not have occurred. In other words, the defendants’ negli­
gent audit was not the direct cause of the plaintiffs’ loss. The chain 
of causation between the defendants’ negligent audit and the plain­
tiffs’ loss was broken by a criminal act—made possible by the 
plaintiffs’ negligence—of the defalcator, so that there was not pres­
ent that sequential relation between the negligent audit and the 
plaintiffs’ loss which is required to make an act the direct cause 
of an injury. The defendants were not expected to foresee that a 
trusted employee of their clients would take advantage of their 
negligent audit and effect their clients’ loss.
The tests for the existence of contributory negligence are the 
same as those for the existence of negligence upon which it is 
sought to establish a claim for damages. By the great weight of 
authority in England and America “ ‘the onus of proving affirma­
tively that there was contributory negligence, on the part of the 
person injured, rests, in the first instance, upon the defendant, 
and in the absence of evidence tending to that conclusion, the 
plaintiff is not bound to prove the negative in order to entitle’ 
him to recover.” 55 Wherever contributory negligence is shown 
to have been a substantial cause of the plaintiffs’ loss, it affords a 
complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery at common law. According 
to the United States supreme court, “the general accepted and most 
reasonable rule of law applicable to actions in which the defense is 
contributory negligence may be thus stated: Although the defen­
dant’s negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury 
complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained 
if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced 
to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; 
subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years, 
that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not 
defeat the action, if it be shown that defendant might, by the 
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the conse­
quences of the injured party’s negligence.” 56 By this authority it is 
possible for the plaintiff to defeat the defense of contributory
55 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 520-521.
56 Grand Trunk, Railway Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36
L. Ed. 485 (1892).
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negligence by showing that no injury would have resulted from 
his own negligence if the defendant had acted with reasonable care 
and prudence. Such a showing would, of course, establish the fact 
that the plaintiff’s negligence was not the proximate cause of his 
injury.57
In the light of the well-settled law on contributory negligence 
it must be concluded that the Craig v. Anyon case is correctly 
decided. The finding of the existence of negligence on the part of 
the plaintiffs, and the determination that the plaintiffs’ loss would 
not have occurred except for their own negligence, i.e., that plain­
tiffs’ and not defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs’ loss, are sound conclusions of the court. The case should 
be followed in future decisions in like circumstances.
L iability of the P ublic A ccountant to his C lient for N egligent 
D isclosure of C onfidential C ommunications
Weld-Blundell v. Stephens,58 decided by the house of lords in 
1920, appears to be the only case in England and America involv­
ing a public accountant’s liability for negligent disclosure of a 
confidential communication from his client. The plaintiff, Weld- 
Blundell, had lent money to the Float Electric Company, Limited, 
and, on being asked for a further advance, employed the defen­
dant, Stephens, a chartered accountant, to look into the affairs of 
the company. In a letter of instructions to Stephens, Weld-Blundell 
reflected upon Lowe, the previous manager of the company, and 
Comins, the auditor of the company. Stephens, upon receipt of the 
letter, handed it to his partner, Swift, with instruction to go to the 
Float Company’s offices and make certain inquiries. Swift acci­
dentally dropped and left the letter in the manager’s room of the 
Float Company’s offices. The manager, Hurst, read the letter and 
communicated its contents to Lowe and Comins, who immediately 
brought actions of libel against Weld-Blundell, and recovered dam­
ages against him. Weld-Blundell then sued Stephens for breach of 
an implied duty to keep secret the letter of instructions. Three of
57 Burdick’s Law of Torts, pp. 519-527.
58 9 B. R. C. 368, (1919) 1 K. B. 520, 88 L. J. K. N. S. 689, 120 L. T. N. S. 
494, (1919) W. N. 46, 35 T. L. R. 245, 63 Sol. Jo. 301.
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the five judges held that the chartered accountant’s negligence was 
not the proximate cause of Weld-Blundell’s loss from libelous con­
duct; the other two judges gave dissenting opinions. The majority 
view of the house of lords, as represented by a portion of Lord 
Sumner’s opinion, follows:
“The crux of the present question was the intervention of Hurst 
between the accountant and Lowe and Comins. Further, no want 
of care had to be proved here against the defendant, for he accepted 
the decision that he broke his contract by his partner’s omission to 
be careful, though not by any deliberate, intentional or wanton 
breach. That at once made it possible to lay aside large classes of 
authorities. What a defendant ought to have anticipated as a reason­
able man was material, when the question was whether or not he was 
guilty of negligence, that is, of want of due care according to the 
circumstances. That, however, went to culpability not to compensa­
tion (Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Ex., 781; Smith v. L. and 
S. W. Rly., L., R., 6 C. P., 14, per Justice Blackburn). Again, what 
ordinarily happened or might reasonably be expected to happen was 
material, where a series of physical phenomena had to be investigated 
and the remoteness of the damage or the reverse was to be decided 
accordingly. * * *
“In general (apart from special contracts and relations and the 
maxim: respondeat superior), even though A was in fault he was 
not responsible for injury to C, which B, a stranger to him, deliber­
ately chose to do. Though A might have given the occasion for B’s 
mischievous activity, B then became a new and independent cause 
(e.g., Cobb v. G. W. R., (1893) 1 Q. B. 459, 63 L. J. Q. B. 629; 
Attorney-general v. Conduit Colliery, (1895) 1 Q. B. 301, 64 L. J. Q. B. 
207). It was hard to steer clear of metaphors. Perhaps one might be 
forgiven for saying that B snapped the chain of causation; he was 
no mere conduit-pipe through which consequences flowed from A to 
C, no mere moving part in a transmission gear set in motion by A; 
in a word, that he insulated A from C. It was quite plain that when 
Swift dropped the letter and found out his loss, the matter would have 
ended there but for the idle hands of Hurst. He gave the letter a fresh 
start and on his original impulse it came to be sued on. Precisely the 
same result would have happened if the person who dropped the 
letter in  H u rs t’s office had  previously got it by picking Sw ift’s pocket. 
Again, the matter could not be worse for Stephens than if he had
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shown Hurst the letter himself, that is, had published to him Weld- 
Blundell’s original libel. .What then? Would the defendant have been 
liable if Hurst had re-published it (as indeed he did) without author­
ity from him and not in accordance with any intention or desire on 
his part actual or imputable? Ward v. Weeks (supra) said no. The 
case was ninety years old and he (Lord Sumner) saw no reason to 
doubt it. The repetition, said Chief Justice Tindal, was ‘the volun­
tary act of a free agent, over whom the defendant had no control, 
and for whose acts he is not answerable, and this repetition was 
the immediate cause of the damage.’ Yet, taking men as one found 
them, few things were more certain than the repetition of a calumny 
confidentially communicated, even on an honorable understanding 
of secrecy.
“* * * He (Lord Sumner) could not see that there was any evi­
dence in law in either case, because he could not see that the mere 
probability that actions might be brought for the libels could turn 
Hurst’s act into defendant’s act. It might be material if the want of 
care were in -dispute, but it was not. Remoteness of damage was a 
question of cause and effect—a different question. That a jury could 
finally make A liable for B’s acts merely because they thought it was 
antecedently probable that B would act as he did, apart from A’s 
authority or intention, seemed to him to be contrary to principle 
and supported authority.
“Lord Wrenbury (of majority holding) said that the relations be­
tween Weld-Blundell and Stephens were such that the latter no doubt 
owed a duty to the former and in that duty he was negligent. Weld- 
Blundell’s liability to pay money to Lowe and Comins, however, 
arose, not from that negligence but from his own wrongful act in 
indulging in malicious libel. It bore no pecuniary relation to Stephens’ 
wrongful act. Stephens’ act was not the cause (whether with or 
without the word ‘effective’) of his having to pay but was an act 
without which possibly he would never have been called upon to pay. 
It was not causa causans, but at most causa sine qua non.
“In discharging his liability to pay damages for malicious libel 
Weld-Blundell suffered no damage at all. A man was not damnified 
by being compelled to satisfy his legal obligation. * * *
“Assuming that it could be said that Stephens made publication 
to Lowe of the libel on Comins and made publication to Comins 
of the libel to Lowe, nothing resulted from this for: ( 1) Weld-Blundell 
was not liable in respect of that publication which he had not author-
ized, and (2) he was made liable not for that publication but for the 
publication made by Weld-Blundell to Stephens, and the last-men­
tioned publication had been made and its consequence incurred be­
fore the events happened that Swift dropped the letter and Hurst 
picked it up and wrongfully read it, and as a result Lowe and Comins 
were informed. Nothing that Stephens did created the liability under 
which Weld-Blundell lay. He (Lord Wrenbury) was quite unable to 
follow the proposition that the damages given in the libel actions 
were in any way damages resulting from anything which Stephens did 
in breach of duty.”
In the Weld-Blundell v. Stephens case it was held that where a 
chartered accountant received from his client a confidential letter 
which contained matter reflecting upon two other persons, and 
where he negligently permitted the letter to be published, through 
the wrongful act of a third person, to the two injured persons, the 
chartered accountant was not liable to the client because the client’s 
loss resulted wholly from his own wrongful act in writing and 
sending the libelous letter to the chartered accountant. The client 
could not be excused from his libelous conduct on the basis of a 
privileged communication between him and the accountant be­
cause the client was guilty of malice in writing and sending the 
letter. The accountant’s negligence could not have been the direct 
cause of the publication of the libelous letter after it reached the 
accountant, because the chain of causation extending from the 
accountant’s negligent act was broken by the wrongful conduct of 
the third person. Moreover, it was held that the accountant would 
not have been liable to his client had the accountant authorized the 
wrongful publication by the third person, or had himself given the 
letter to one of the two injured persons in publication of the 
wrongful statement of the other, because the client’s loss was due 
to his own wrongful act.
In harmony with the usual English and the minority view in 
America, the present case makes the continuous and unbroken effect 
of defendant’s negligent conduct, regardless of ability to foresee 
injury, the test of liability for negligence. According to this type 
of holding, ability to foresee injury is merely a test to determine 
the existence of negligence and is not a test to determine whether
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the negligent act was the direct cause of the alleged injury.59 It 
would appear that the court might have arrived at the conclusion 
that the accountant’s negligence was not the direct cause of the 
publication by Hurst, on the ground that the accountant could not 
have reasonably foreseen the wrongful conduct of Hurst. At any 
rate, the conclusions of the case are sound; the accountant was 
not liable, first, because his negligent act was not the direct cause 
of the wrongful publication by Hurst, and, second, because the 
client’s loss was due to his wrongful act and not to the instrumen­
talities resulting in the exposure of his wrongful act.
The Weld-Blundell v. Stephens case does not involve the lia­
bility which an auditor may incur from negligently disclosing his 
client’s trade secrets learned during the course of an audit where 
the client is guilty of no wrongful conduct. The negligent disclo­
sure of such information would doubtless be interpreted by courts 
as a breach of duty implied from the audit contract and would 
subject the auditor to liability to his client if the client’s loss were 
the proximate result of the accountant’s act (see page 197, post).
IV
LIABILITY OF TH E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO HIS 
CLIENT FOR LIBEL
“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication, which exposes any 
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes 
him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure 
him in his business.” 60 The publication may be effected by means 
of writing, printing, pictures, images or anything that is the object 
of the sense of sight, communicated to a third person. At common 
law libel is generally a criminal offense as well as a private wrong 
against the injured party. Where the defendant has delivered an 
untrue and injurious writing to the plaintiff, or to a third person 
at the request of the plaintiff, the defendant can not be held liable 
for the defamatory writing. It is necessary to prove that the defama-
59 Note: See leading English case, In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Company, 
3 K. B. 560, 90 L. J. K. B. 1353 (C. A., 1921).
60 Taylor v. Hearst, 40 P. 392, 107 Cal. 262, 269 (1895).
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tory writing was read by a third person and that publication of 
the plaintiff was the intended or discernible result of the defen­
dant’s acts before an action can be maintained for libel. The 
defendant may not have intended or foreseen injury to the plain­
tiff, but he must have either intended or foreseen publication of 
the defamatory writing to a third person before an action can be 
maintained for libel. The libelant may or may not have composed 
the defamatory writing. It is enough that the defendant published 
defamatory writing of the plaintiff to a third person in circum­
stances from which it can be reasonably inferred that the defendant 
intended or foresaw publication. Libel generally involves malice on 
the part of the wrongdoer; sometimes it involves only negligence; 
then, again it may involve only accident. The defendant may have 
published injurious falsehoods with the intent to damage the plain­
tiff; a newspaper may have negligently published another news­
paper’s copy which was untrue and injurious to the plaintiff; or, 
again, by mere accident the newspaper may have published libelous 
matter, as where an article described a particular person as a “col­
ored” rather than as a “cultured” gentleman.61
The occasions inviting libelous conduct on the part of public 
accountants are extremely rare. Granted that a public accountant 
does make an audit from which he prepares a false report which 
is injurious to his client’s business, as where the report falsely 
shows a condition of bankruptcy, his communication of that report 
to his client would not amount to libel. Furthermore, if the ac­
countant should, at the direction of his client, present to a third 
person a false business report injurious to the client, no action for 
libel could be maintained. If the public accountant should prepare 
a false report injurious to his client’s business, and the report, 
through no fault of the accountant, should be taken from his 
(accountant’s) possession and read by a third person, the accountant 
would not be held accountable for libel, since the communication 
of his report would have been effected in circumstances from which 
it could not be reasonably inferred that he intended or foresaw
61 Burdick’s Law of  Torts, pp. 349-370; Harper on Torts, pp. 497-552; Cooley 
on Torts, volume I, pp. 366-463.
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publication of the injurious report.62 Of course, if an auditor should 
prepare a false report injurious to his client’s business, and cause a 
third person to read the report, the auditor would be held ac­
countable in an action for libel.
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V
LIABILITY OF TH E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT TO THIRD 
PARTIES FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD
T he P ublic A ccountant N ot L iable to T hird P arties for 
M ere N egligence
In 1919 the supreme court of Pennsylvania rendered the decision 
in Landell v. Lybrand 63 as follows:
“Appellees, defendants below, are certified public accountants, and, 
as such, audited the books and accounts of the Employer’s Indemnity 
Company for the year 1911. The appellant, plaintiff below, averred 
in his statement of claim that he had been induced to buy eleven 
shares of the capital stock of that company, at the price of $200 per 
share, on the strength of the report made by the appellees as to its 
assets and liabilities at the close of the year 1911, the report having 
been shown to him by someone who suggested that he purchase the 
stock. A further averment was that the report was false and untrue, 
that the stock purchased by him on the strength of it is valueless; 
and for the loss he sustained he averred the defendants were liable. 
To enforce this liability an action in trespass was brought against 
them. In their affidavit of defense they averred that the statement 
of claim disclosed no cause of action and asked that this be disposed 
of by the court below as a matter of law, under the provisions of 
section 20 of the practice act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483. It was so 
disposed of by the court below in entering judgment for the de­
fendants.
“There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and 
defendants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must 
arise out of some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they 
made the report with intent to deceive him. The averment in the
62 Burdick’s Law of Torts, p. 352 (note 27).
63 107 A. 783, 264 Pa. 406, 8 A. L. R. 461.
statement of claim is that the defendants were careless and negligent 
in making their report; but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and 
to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they can not be guilty 
of any negligence of which he can complain: Schiffer v. Sauer Com­
pany et al., 238 Pa. 550. This was the correct view of the court below, 
and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.”
The decision of the Landell v. Lybrand case that an auditor is 
not liable to an investor in the shares of stock of the client corpora­
tion for loss resulting from the accountant’s negligent audit is in 
agreement with well-settled principles of common law. No case 
has ever extended the ambit of negligence to include liability to 
third parties in general. However, where two parties make a con­
tract expressly for the benefit of a third person, that is, a donee or 
creditor beneficiary, the law operates to create a privity between 
the promisor and the third party.64 In such circumstances the 
promisor would be liable to the third party for the negligent breach 
of the contract. The principle is well illustrated by the case of an 
abstractor: “Sound reasoning and the weight of modern authority 
sustain the rule of liability for negligence resulting in injury to 
the vendee, where the vendor is under duty, or assumes the obli­
gation, to furnish such abstract for the use of the vendee, and the 
person making the abstract on the vendor’s order has knowledge or 
notice that the abstract is for such use—this on the ground that 
in such circumstances the engagement of the abstractor by the 
vendor is a contract made for the benefit of the vendee, and under 
such engagement the abstractor owes the vendee, who is to use and 
rely on the abstract, the duty of using care and skill in examining 
the records affecting the title and making the abstract.” 65 It is 
well-settled law that the promisor in a valid contract owes no duty 
of care to an incidental beneficiary of the contract. By the great 
weight of authority an abstractor is not liable to a third-party 
beneficiary of the abstracting contract for negligent preparation of 
the abstract, in the absence of a promise by the abstractor to the 
vendor of the land to make the abstract for the benefit of the
64 Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 115 So. 94 (1927); I. P. Hildebrand, 
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Texas, 9 Tex. L. R. 125 (1931).
65 Shine v. Nash Abstract & I. Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928).
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third-party vendee.66 The holding of the Landell v. Lybrand case 
that a public accountant is not liable to an investor or a creditor 
of the client for mere negligence in the audit of the client’s books, 
in the absence of a provision in the auditing contract that the 
audit be prepared for the investor or creditor, finds ample support 
in the more recent case, Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, below.
T he P ublic A ccountant L iable to T hird P arties for F raud
The famous Ultramares case follows the ruling in Landell v. 
Lybrand, supra, which denies liability of the public accountant to 
third parties for mere negligence and defines the scope of fraud 
for which the public accountant may be liable to third parties. 
The opinion was delivered in 1931 by Chief Judge Cardozo of the 
New York court of appeals. The facts of the case follow: 67
A corporation, Fred Stern & Co., Inc., was engaged in the im­
portation and sale of rubber. To carry on its extensive operations 
this corporation borrowed large sums of money from banks and 
other lenders. To obtain the necessary loans in 1924 the Stern 
company employed the defendant auditors, Touche, Niven & Co., 
who had conducted the Stern company’s audits for the three years 
prior to 1923, to audit its books for 1923 and to prepare a balance- 
sheet of the Stern company as of the close of that year. The audi­
tors performed the audit, prepared a balance-sheet and certified 
that the balance-sheet corresponded with the Stern company’s 
records and that in their opinion the balance-sheet presented a cor­
rect view of the financial condition of the Stern company as of 
December 31, 1923. In accordance with agreement, the auditors 
furnished the Stern company with thirty-two copies of the certified 
balance-sheet; the auditors knew that the copies would be used 
to obtain loans; but they did not know, and had no reason to 
believe, that the balance-sheet would be used to obtain a loan from 
the particular plaintiff, the Ultramares Corporation. However, the 
Stern company, with the aid of that balance-sheet, was able to get 
a loan of $165,000, only partly secured, from the Ultramares Cor-
66 Peterson v. Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N. W. 407 (1926).
67 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 74 A. L. R. 1139, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 
N. E. 441.
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poration. The balance-sheet having been found false and the Stern 
company having been declared a bankrupt in 1925, the Ultramares 
Corporation brought an action in a trial court of New York in 
1926 for negligence and fraud against the defendant auditors to 
recover the losses sustained from the loans to the Stern company. 
In the trial court the charge of fraud was dismissed before the 
jury hearing took place. On the charge of negligence the jury 
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff; but the trial judge dismissed 
the verdict. The case was appealed to the New York supreme 
court, where judgment was given the plaintiff on the basis of negli­
gence. The case was then appealed to the New York court of 
appeals which denied to the plaintiff judgment on the basis of 
negligence and granted a new trial on the ground of fraud.
A statement of the character of the audit which involved the 
alleged elements of negligence and fraud is in order. No general 
ledger posting had been performed on the Stern company’s books 
since April, 1923. The defendant auditors assigned Siess, a junior 
member of their staff, to the task of posting journal entries to the 
general ledger. Siess finished his posting on Sunday, February 3, 
1924. The balance of the accounts-receivable account at that time 
was $644,758.17. Later, on that same day, Romberg, an employee 
of the Stern company, who had general charge of the Stern com­
pany’s records, debited the accounts-receivable account with a new 
item of $706,843.07, which represented fictitious sales. Opposite the 
entry Romberg placed a folio reference to the journal, but there 
was no journal entry to support this charge to accounts receivable. 
There were, however, seventeen fictitious sales-invoices designed to 
support this new charge to accounts receivable. These sales-invoices 
were different from the other sales-invoices; they had no shipping 
number and no customer’s order number; they “varied in terms 
of credit and in other respects from those usual in the business.” 
“A mere glance” would have revealed “the difference.” Siess, think­
ing that verification would be made by the staff later, accepted 
and included in the balance of accounts receivable this new debit 
of $706,843.07, entered by Romberg. It happened that neither the 
junior accountant nor any one else of the staff ever investigated 
this new charge to accounts receivable.
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In a statement of facts Chief Judge Cardozo of the court of 
appeals expressed the opinion that an item of $113,199.60, due from 
the Baltic Corporation and charged to accounts payable, ought to 
have encited the suspicions of a reasonably prudent and careful 
auditor, in view of the unsatisfactory explanations of the item given 
by Romberg and Stern. Furthermore, the auditors discovered that 
the inventory of $347,219.08 as stated by the Stern company was 
overstated to the amount of $303,863.20. Chief Judge Cardozo 
thought that the extent of this “discrepancy and its causes might 
have been found to cast discredit upon the business and the books.” 
Finally, the auditors found that the same accounts receivable “had 
been pledged to two, three and four banks at the same time.” 
Chief Judge Cardozo was of the opinion that these assignments 
cast doubt upon the solvency of the business; he thought that, al­
though Romberg made an explanation of the assignments, caution 
and diligence required the auditors to press further their investi­
gation.
The existence of negligence on the part of the auditors was 
found by all the courts concerned with the case. The chief problems 
with which the New York court of appeals was concerned had to do 
with (1) the extension of the defendants’ liability for negligence to 
incidental beneficiaries of the audit contract; (2) the scope and 
meaning of fraud. The portions of the lengthy opinion directly in 
point follow:
“The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law 
to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of 
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. 
Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is 
none. To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited 
the certificate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without 
fraud, since there was notice in the circumstances of its making that 
the employer did not intend to keep it to himself. * * * A different 
question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty to these 
to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a 
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery 
beneath the cover of deceptive entries may expose accountants to a 
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class. The hazards of business conducted on these terms
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are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in 
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. We put 
aside for the moment any statement in the certificate which involves 
the representation of a fact as true to the knowledge of the auditors. 
If such a statement was made, whether believed to be true or not, 
the defendants are liable for deceit in the event that it was false. 
The plaintiff does not need the invention of novel doctrine to help 
it out in such conditions.
“Even an opinion, especially on opinion by an expert, may be found 
to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead 
to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Further 
than that this court has never gone.
“Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to 
many callings other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their 
opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with 
knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the 
public, will become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked 
a statute or a decision, to the same extent as if the controversy were 
one between client and advisor. Title companies insuring titles to a 
tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching auction the 
fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will become 
liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without 
payment of a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, 
but they go little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now. 
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in rela­
tion to the public. Explanations that might seem plausible, omissions 
that might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the employer, 
conducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon 
his creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to 
be suspicious even of one’s principal is owing to investors. ‘Every 
one making a promise having the quality of a contract will be under 
a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under another 
duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite number of potential bene­
ficiaries when performance has begun. The assumption of one relation 
will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, 
inescapably hooked together.’
“Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse­
quences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so 
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its 
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less
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than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement 
nor insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the 
ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the con­
tract and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract 
has been made. We doubt whether the average business man receiv­
ing a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one 
among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything 
more.
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, 
that the balance-sheet was in accordance with the books of account. 
If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because 
they believed it to be true. Hadcock  v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 47 
N. E. 923; Lehigh Zinc Iron Co. v. Barnford, 150 U. S. 665, 
673, 14 S. Ct. 219, 37 L. ed. 1215; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 
147 Mass. 403, 18 N. E. 168, 9 Am. St. Rep. 727; Arnold v. Richard­
son, 74 App. Div. 581, 77 N. Y. S. 763. We think the triers of the 
facts might hold it to be false.
“Correspondence between the balance-sheet and the books imports 
something more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than corre­
spondence between the balance-sheet and the general ledger, un­
supported or even contradicted by every other record. The corre­
spondence to be of any moment may not unreasonably be held to 
signify a correspondence between the statement and the books of 
original entry, the books taken as a whole. If that is what the 
certificate means, a jury could find that the correspondence did not 
exist, and that the defendants signed the certificates without knowing 
it to exist and even without reasonable grounds for belief in its 
existence. The item of $706,000, representing fictitious accounts re­
ceivable, was entered in the ledger after defendant’s employee, Siess, 
had posted the December sales. He knew of the interpolation and 
knew that there was need to verify the entry by reference to books 
other than the ledger before the books could be found to be in agree­
ment with the balance-sheet. The evidence would sustain a finding 
that this was never done. By concession the interpolated item had no 
support in the journal, or in any journal voucher, or in the debit 
memo book, which was a summary of the invoices, or in anything 
except the invoices themselves. The defendants do not say that they 
ever looked at the invoices, seventeen in number, representing these 
accounts. They profess to be unable to recall whether they did so 
or not. They admit, however, that, if they had looked, they would
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have found omissions and irregularities so many and unusual as to 
have called for further investigation. When we couple the refusal 
to say that they did look with the admission that, if they had looked, 
they would or could have seen, the situation is revealed as one in 
which a jury might reasonably find that in truth they did not look 
but certified the correspondence without testing its existence.
“In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already 
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, 
even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sus­
tain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is 
gross. Not a little confusion has at times resulted from an undis­
criminating quotation of the statements in Kountze v. Kennedy, 
supra, statements proper enough in their setting, but capable of 
misleading when extracted and considered by themselves. ‘Misjudg­
ment, however gross,’ it was there observed, ‘or want of caution, 
however marked, is not fraud.’ This was said in a case where the 
trier of the facts had held the defendants guiltless. The judgment 
in this court amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud 
did not follow as an inference of law. There was no holding that the 
evidence would have required a reversal of the judgment if the find­
ing as to guilt had been the other way. Even Derry v. Peek , as we 
have seen, asserts the probative effect of negligence as an evidentiary 
fact. We had no thought in Kountze v. Kennedy, of upholding a 
doctrine more favorable to wrongdoers, though there was a reservation 
suggesting the approval of a rule more rigorous. The opinion of this 
court cites Derry v. Peek , and states the holding there made that 
an action would not lie if the defendant believed the representation 
made by him to be true, although without reasonable cause for such 
belief. ‘It is not necessary,’ we said, ‘to go to this extent to uphold 
the present judgment, for the referee, as has been stated, found that 
the belief of Kennedy * * * was based upon reasonable grounds.’ 
The setting of the occasion justified the inference that the representa­
tions did not involve a profession of knowledge as distinguished 
from belief. 147 N. Y. at page 133, 41 N. E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 360, 
49 Am. St. Rep. 651. No such charity of construction exonerates 
accountants, who by the very nature of their calling profess to speak 
with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between the audit 
and the entries.
“The defendants attempt to excuse the omission of an inspection 
of the invoices proved to be fictitious by invoking a practice known
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as that of testing and sampling. A random choice of accounts is made 
from the total number on the books, and these, if found to be regular 
when inspected and investigated, are taken as a fair indication of the 
quality of the mass. The defendants say that about 200 invoices were 
examined in accordance with this practice, but they do not assert 
that any of the seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were 
among the number so selected. Verification by test and sample was 
very likely a sufficient audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the 
books in the usual course of business. It was plainly insufficient, 
however, as to accounts not entered upon the books where inspection 
of the invoices was necessary, not as a check upon accounts fair 
upon their face, but in order to ascertain whether there were any 
accounts at all. If the only invoices inspected were invoices unrelated 
to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a correspondence 
between the books and the balance-sheet without any effort by the 
auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascertain whether the certi­
fied agreement was in accordance with the truth. How far books of 
account fair upon their face are to be probed by accountants, in an 
effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in 
accordance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of 
judgment and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the 
entries certified as there are there in very truth, there in the form 
and in the places where men of business training would expect them 
to be. The defendants were put on their guard by the circumstances 
touching the December accounts receivable to scrutinize with special 
care. A jury might find that, with suspicions thus awakened, they 
closed their eyes to the obvious and blindly gave assent.
“We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying to the 
• correspondence between balance-sheet and accounts the defendants 
made a statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, 
as a jury might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that is so, they 
may also be found to have acted without information leading to 
a sincere or genuine belief when they certified to an opinion that the
balance-sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business.
“Whatever wrong was committed by the defendants was not their 
personal act or omission, but that of their subordinates. This does 
not relieve them, however, of liability to answer in damages for the 
consequences of the wrong, if wrong there shall be found to be. It 
is not a question of constructive notice, as where facts are brought
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home to the knowledge of subordinates whose interests are adverse 
to those of the employer.”
Chief Judge Cardozo, after much floundering about, in the 
Ultramares case held:
(1) An auditor is liable on the basis of fraud to third parties to 
whom the auditor might reasonably have foreseen loss resulting 
from the auditor’s misrepresentation in making a positive statement 
of facts, even though the auditor believed his statement to be true. 
This ruling, however, was made in view of a set of circumstances 
from which Chief Judge Cardozo seemed to think that a trier of 
facts would be justified in inferring consciousness of misrepre­
sentation on the part of the defendant auditor. In Kountze v. 
Kennedy, which was reviewed in the Ultramares case, the New 
York court of appeals, in circumstances that justified an inference 
of innocence on the part of the defendant, held that fraud could 
not exist without consciousness of wrongdoing. In all of the four 
cases which Chief Judge Cardozo cited to support his proposition 
in the case that a public accountant would be liable in an action 
for deceit for making an honest but false representation of a 
material fact, the defendants had intended that their representation 
should be acted upon by the particular plaintiffs. But in the Ultra­
mares case the defendant did not know that the plaintiff would 
use his audit report. Except for the fact that there must have been 
a consciousness of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant auditor, 
the Ultramares opinion goes further than other courts have gone 
in treating honest misrepresentation as fraud. Courts have uni­
formly restricted the application of the rule that fraud may include 
innocent but false representations to cases where the defendant had 
intended that the representation should be relied upon by the par­
ticular plaintiff. While the scope of fraud as thus restricted would 
not make the public accountant liable to the world in general for 
an honest blunder, yet it would be more logical and satisfactory 
to treat innocent but negligent misrepresentations as negligence 
rather than as fraud. The subject is fully discussed under the title, 
below, “The extension of the ambit of negligence rather than that 
of fraud to cover the public accountant’s liability to third parties 
for innocent but negligent misrepresentation.”
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(2) The public accountant is not liable to third parties for mere 
negligence in making a statement of opinion. This ruling is sound 
and should be followed.
(3) The public accountant is liable to third parties on the basis 
of fraud for conscious misrepresentation in making a statement of 
opinion. Consciousness of misrepresentation may be inferred if the 
grounds supporting the opinion are so flimsy as to lead to the con­
clusion that there was no genuine belief back of the opinion. This 
ruling is also based upon sound principles. It is in agreement with 
the conservative interpretation of the meaning of fraud as laid down 
by the famous English case, Derry v. Peek.68 A full discussion of 
the subject appears under the topic, below, “Meaning of fraud.”
L iability of the P ublic A ccountant to T hird P arties for M is­
representation UNDER THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES A cT
The United States securities act of 1933, as amended in 1934, has 
made the public accountant liable to third parties for both negli­
gence and fraud.
Under this act no “person” is allowed to use the mails or inter­
state transportation facilities to sell a security unless the security is 
properly registered with the securities and exchange commission, 
or exempted from registration by the act. In regard to the civil 
liabilities of the accountant who prepares or certifies the financial 
statements of the “issuer” for the purposes of registration with the 
commission, a number of sections of the securities act of 1933, as 
amended in 1934, are relevant. These sections follow:
“Sec. 2. When used in this title, unless the context otherwise 
requires—
“(1) The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi­
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for 
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral 
rights or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
‘security’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
68 14 App. Cas. 117 (1889).
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or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
“(2) The term ‘person’ means an individual, a corporation, a part­
nership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincor­
porated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof. 
As used in this paragraph the term ‘trust’ shall include only a trust 
where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are 
evidenced by a security.
“(3) The term ‘sale’, ‘sell’, ‘offer to sell’, or ‘offer for sale’ shall 
include every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to 
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest 
in a security, for value; except that such terms shall not include 
preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer and any 
underwriter. * * *
“(4) The term ‘issuer’ means every person who issues or proposes 
to issue any security; except that with respect to certificates of de­
posit, voting-trust certificates or collateral-trust certificates, or with 
respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated in­
vestment trust not having a board of directors (or persons perform­
ing similar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management or unit 
type; the term ‘issuer’ means the person or persons performing the acts 
and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the 
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which 
such securities are issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated 
association which provides by its articles for limited liability of any 
or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, committee or other 
legal entity, the trustees or members thereof shall not be individually 
liable as issuers of any security issued by the association, trust, com­
mittee or other legal entity; except that with respect to equipment- 
trust certificates or like securities, the term ‘issuer’ means the person 
by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used; and except 
that with respect to fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other 
mineral rights, the term ‘issuer’ means the owner of any such right or 
of any interest in such right (whether whole or fractional) who 
creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of public offering.
“Sec. 7. * * * If any accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any 
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, 
is named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration 
statement, the written consent of such person shall be filed with the 
registration statement. If any such person is named as having prepared
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or certified a report or valuation (other than a public official docu­
ment or statement) which is used in connection with the registration 
statement, but is not named as having prepared or certified such report 
or valuation for use in connection with the registration statement, 
the written consent of such person shall be filed with the registration 
statement unless the commission dispenses with such filing as im­
practicable or as involving undue hardship on the person filing the 
registration statement. * * *
“Sec. 8 (a) The effective date of a registration statement shall be 
the twentieth day after the filing thereof, except as hereinafter pro­
vided, and except that in case of securities of any foreign public 
authority, which has continued the full service of its obligations in 
the United States, the proceeds of which are to be devoted to the 
refunding of obligations payable in the United States, the registra­
tion statement shall become effective seven days after the filing 
thereof. If any amendment to any such statement is filed prior to the 
effective date of such statement, the registration statement shall be 
deemed to have been filed when such amendment was filed; except 
that an amendment filed with the consent of the commission, prior 
to the effective date of the registration statement, or filed pursuant 
to an order of the commission, shall be treated as a part of the regis­
tration statement.
“Sec. 11. (a) In case any part of the registration statement, when 
such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time 
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either 
at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
“(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
“ (2) every person who was a director of (or person performing 
similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of 
the part of the registration statement with respect to which his 
liability is asserted;
“(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registra­
tion statement as being or about to become a director, person per­
forming similar functions or partner;
“ (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose 
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with 
his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of
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the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any 
report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration 
statement, with respect to the statement in such registration state­
ment, report or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or 
certified by him;
“(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. If such person 
acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to 
its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of at least 
twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration 
statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be 
conditioned on proof that such person acquired the security relying 
upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or relying 
upon the registration statement and not knowing of such omission, 
but such reliance may be established without proof of the reading of 
the registration statement by such person.
“(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, 
other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall 
sustain the burden of proof—
“(1) that before the effective date of the part of the registration 
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted (A ) he had 
resigned from or had taken such steps as are permitted by law to 
resign from, or ceased or refused to act in every office, capacity or 
relationship in which he was described in the registration statement 
as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had advised the commission 
and the issuer in writing that he had taken such action and that he 
would not be responsible for such part of the registration statement; 
or
“(2) that if such part of the registration statement became effective 
without his knowledge, upon becoming aware of such fact he forth­
with acted and advised the commission, in accordance with para­
graph (1), and, in addition, gave reasonable public notice that such 
part of the registration statement had become effective without his 
knowledge; or
“ (3) that * * * (B) as regards any part of the registration state­
ment purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert or 
purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of 
himself as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of 
the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein 
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
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required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registration statement 
did not fairly represent his statement as an expert or was not a fair 
copy of or extract from his report or valuation as an expert; and 
(C) as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to 
be made on the authority of an expert (other than himself) or pur­
porting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an 
expert (other than himself), he had no reasonable ground to believe 
and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration state­
ment became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that 
there was an omission to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent 
the statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from 
the report or valuation of the expert; * * *
“(c) In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of sub­
section (b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation 
and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall 
be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own 
property. * * *
“(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to recover 
such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount 
paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security 
was offered to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time 
such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall 
have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at 
which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before 
judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing 
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceed­
ing the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the 
value thereof as of the time such suit was brought: provided that, if 
the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages repre­
sents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting 
from such part of the registration statement, with respect to which 
his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not 
be recoverable. * * *
“(f) All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection 
(a) shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes
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liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribu­
tion as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, 
would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person 
who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraud­
ulent misrepresentation.
“ (g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section 
exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public.
“Sec. 13. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability 
created under section 11 * * * unless brought within one year after 
the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such 
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili­
gence. * * * In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce 
a liability created under section 11 * * * more than three years after 
the security was, bona fide, offered to the public, * * *.
“Sec. 14. Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any per­
son acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of 
this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be 
void.
“Sec. 16. The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in 
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at 
law or in equity.
“Sec. 19. (a) * * * No provision of this title imposing any liabil­
ity shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity 
with any rule or regulation of the commission, notwithstanding that 
such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be amended 
or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be 
invalid for any reason.”
Under the securities act every issuer of securities must have filed 
a registration statement of his business before any “person” can 
use the mails or interstate commerce facilities to effect the sale of 
such securities. Among other data the registration statement must 
contain statements of the financial condition of the issuer. If the 
registration statement names an accountant as having prepared or 
certified the financial statements (balance-sheet and profit-and-loss 
statement) of the issuer for registration purposes, the written con­
sent of the accountant for the issuer or other person so to use the 
financial statements must be filed with the securities and exchange 
commission; but if the registration statement does not name the
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accountant as having prepared or certified the financial statements 
of the issuer for registration purposes, then the commission may 
dispense with the filing of the written consent of the accountant 
so to use the financial statements where such filing would be im­
practicable or work hardship upon the person filing the registration 
statement. The rights and obligations arising out of the act do not 
become effective until the lapse of twenty days after the proper 
filing of the registration statement.
If an investor purchases a security after the effective date of the 
registration of such security, he may bring suit against the account­
ant for misrepresentation of any material fact in the financial state­
ments used in the registration statement. The investor may sue the 
accountant upon showing a misrepresentation of a material fact in 
the accountant’s financial statements used in registration and evi­
dence of having purchased the security after the effective date of 
registration. Of course, to recover, the investor must prove loss; 
but he need not prove that the loss resulted from the misrepre­
sentation, nor need he prove that he relied upon the misrepresenta­
tion unless he bought the security after the issuer made generally 
available to security holders financial statements of the issuer’s 
business as of a year or more subsequent to the effective date of 
the registration.
The accountant will be liable to the investor provided the investor 
establishes his cause of action in the manner indicated above unless 
the accountant sustains the burden of proving one of the following 
defenses:
(1) Prior to the effective date of registration the accountant gave 
written notice to the commission that he would not be responsible 
for financial statements filed with his client’s registration statement.
(2) Where the accountant’s financial statements became effective 
with his client’s registration statement, without the accountant’s 
knowledge, upon learning the fact the accountant forthwith re­
quested the commission to withdraw his authority for the accuracy 
of the statements and gave reasonable publication that the financial 
statements became effective without his knowledge.
(3) The accountant had, after reasonable investigation, reason­
able ground to believe and did believe, at the time his accounting
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statements became an effective part of the registration statement, 
that such accounting statements were true, that there was no omis­
sion to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces­
sary to make the statements not misleading.
(4) The financial statements filed with the commission were not 
fair copies of the financial reports which the accountant prepared 
or certified for his client.
(5) Where the accountant’s false representation, contained in his 
client’s registration statement, purported to have been accepted 
from an expert other than himself, the accountant had no reason­
able ground to believe and did not believe, at the time his repre­
sentation became an effective part of the issuer’s registration state­
ment, that the representation of the expert was untrue.
(6) The investor knew the falsity of the accountant’s representa­
tion at the time the investor bought the security.
(7) The action to enforce liability under the act was sought 
more than a year after the investor learned, or could have learned 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the accountant had 
misrepresented the financial condition of the issuer’s business.
(8) The action to enforce liability under the act was brought 
more than three years after the security was offered for sale to the 
public, that is, more than three years after the security was offered 
for sale to the public in accordance with the provisions of the act.
(9) In making the misrepresentation the accountant acted in 
good faith in conformity with some rule or regulation of the com­
mission even though such rule or regulation was, after the effective 
date of the misrepresentation, declared invalid by judicial authority 
or was amended by congress.
(10) The investor’s loss resulted from causes other than the 
accountant’s misrepresentation. If the accountant can prove that the 
loss complained of was due partly to causes other than the account­
ant’s misrepresentation, then the accountant’s liability will be 
mitigated to the extent of such portion of the investor’s loss as was 
due to causes other than the accountant’s misrepresentation.
If the accountant should become liable under the act, he could 
recover contribution from any other person who might also be
L iability for N egligence, F raud and L ibel 83
liable for the same loss under the act, unless the accountant had 
been guilty of fraud and such other person had not.
The amount of recovery provided by the act may be the differ­
ence between the price paid for the security (in no case greater 
than the price at which the security was offered to the public) and
(1) the value of the security at the time the suit was brought, or
(2) the price at which the security was sold before the commence­
ment of the suit, or (3) the price at which the security was sold 
after suit but before judgment, if such damage is less than the 
difference between the purchase price (not exceeding the price at 
which the security was offered to the public) and the value at the 
time of the bringing of the suit. The recovery that may be obtained 
under this act is in addition to any and all other recoveries which 
may be obtained at law or in equity.
To supplement the main provisions of the act relative to the 
liabilities of accountants, some comments upon these provisions 
are appropriate:
The requirement that the accountant’s statements should present 
the true financial condition of the business on the effective date, 
twenty days after such statements have been filed with the com­
mission, clearly should not be enforced literally. The accountant’s 
responsibility should be as of the time he certified to the financial 
condition of the issuer.
The meaning of a misrepresentation of a material fact as con­
templated by the act deserves consideration. The American Law 
Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts has stated that: 
“where a misrepresentation would be likely to affect the conduct 
of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with another 
person, the misrepresentation is material.” 69
In regard to the defenses that may be established under section 
II (b) it should be noted that the act casts the burden of proof 
upon the defendant, contrary to the usual court procedure in tort 
actions. In tort cases at common law the plaintiff in order to estab­
lish his cause of action must, ordinarily, prove that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s loss. This
69 Spencer Gordon, “Accountants and the Securities Act,” The Journal of Account­
ancy, New York, 1933, volume 56, p. 440.
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common-law rule guards against oppression in litigation. It is much 
more difficult to prove a cause of action than it is to defend alleged 
charges, the amount of evidence available and the other conditions 
of proof for the litigants being equal. The act should place upon the 
plaintiff investor the burden of proving his cause of action against 
the accountant. In other words, the investor should be required to 
prove that the negligent or fraudulent conduct of the accountant 
was the direct cause of the investor’s loss before the investor would 
be permitted to obtain judgment against the accountant.
As to the dependence of the accountant’s liability upon the 
reasonableness of his conduct, it should be noted that the reason­
ableness of a prudent man in the management of his own property 
is the standard set by the act. The law would have been more 
definite in respect to the care and skill required of the accountant 
had the framers of the act stated that the defendant accountant 
must have exercised such reasonableness of conduct as a reasonably 
skillful accountant would have exercised if such accountant had 
made the financial statements for his own use in purchasing the 
security.
In providing for the liabilities of accountants and other persons, 
the act makes no distinction between negligence and fraud, except 
in the case of one defendant recovering contribution from another 
person who might have been liable for the same loss under the act. 
Either negligence or fraud, or both, may be involved in the 
liabilities provided in the act. There are inherent differences between 
the two kinds of causes of action, which an act should recognize. 
Fraud involves consciousness of misrepresentation and renders the 
defendant liable for injury to any one of that class of persons 
(investors) whom, the defendant intended, should, and did, rely 
upon his misrepresentations; while negligence merely involves 
innocent but unreasonable conduct and makes the defendant liable 
for injury only to such plaintiffs as those to whom he owed a duty 
of care. The law should require the accountant to state as a matter 
of fact whether or not the balance-sheet and profit-and-loss state­
ment show the true and correct financial position of the issuer’s 
business on the date when the accountant gave his written consent 
to have his financial statements used with the registration statement.
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The law should make the accountant liable on the basis of fraud 
for conscious misrepresentation in the financial statements of the 
issuer to any investor who, as a result of reliance upon such mis­
representation, sustained losses from the purchase of a security of 
the issuer. Only where the accountant intended that particular 
security purchasers should rely upon his statements and where such 
investors did rely upon his statements to their loss in the purchase 
of securities of the issuer should the law make the accountant liable 
to the investors on the basis of negligence for losses resulting from 
the accountant’s innocent but negligent misrepresentation of the 
financial condition of the issuer’s business. If these changes in 
the statute were made, an honest blunder would not render the 
accountant liable to that host of investors who, as a result of reli­
ance upon the accountant’s misrepresentation, happened to sustain 
losses from the purchase of securities. For a detailed discussion of 
the essential differences in fraud and negligence, see: “Extension of 
the ambit of negligence rather than that of fraud to cover the 
accountant’s liability for innocent but negligent misrepresentation,” 
below.
L iability of the P ublic A ccountant to T hird P arties for M is­
representation UNDER THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES 
E xchange A ct of 1934
Under the United States securities exchange act of 1934, designed 
to control the organized security exchanges of the country, securities 
can not be bought and sold in such markets without the proper 
registration of the issuer with the securities and exchange commis­
sion. Among other data required in such registration are balance- 
sheets and profit-and-loss statements of the issuer. The accountant 
who prepares or certifies the accuracy of such balance-sheets and 
profit-and-loss statements may be held liable under the act to 
investors who sustain losses from fraudulent misrepresentation in 
such statements. A portion of the act follows:
“Sec. 18. (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made 
any statement in any application, report or document filed pursuant 
to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, which statement was 
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be 
liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or 
misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have pur­
chased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such state­
ment, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued 
shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that 
such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce 
such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent 
jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require 
an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit and assess 
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either 
party litigant.
“ (b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this 
section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any 
person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to 
make the same payment.
“(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created 
under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery 
of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years 
after such cause of action accrued.”
From the context of section 18 of the securities exchange act, it 
appears that in order for an investor to maintain an action against 
an accountant for misrepresentation of a material fact in the finan­
cial statements of the issuer of securities traded on a national 
exchange, the investor in the security would have to prove that the 
accountant’s statements were false or misleading at the time and in 
the light of the circumstances in which they were made and that 
the investor’s loss was the result of such misrepresentation. The 
accountant may defeat the suit by proving that he acted in good 
faith and had no knowledge of the falsity of the statement, that is, 
that he was not guilty of fraud. The accountant might have been 
negligent, but as long as he was not conscious of misrepresentation 
he would not be liable under the securities exchange act of 1934. 
Furthermore, the accountant could set up an effective defense by 
showing that the action was not brought before the lapse of a year 
after discovery of the cause of action, or that the action was not 
brought within three years after the cause of action arose. The 
accountant’s liability for damages may be mitigated through re­
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covery from other persons liable for the same loss under the act— 
that is, if the accountant has been required to pay the whole 
damage, he can recover contribution from such other persons as 
would be liable for the same loss under the act. In respect to the 
liability of the accountant to investors for conscious misrepresenta­
tion the securities exchange act appears to be just.
VI
EXTENSION OF TH E AMBIT OF NEGLIGENCE RATHER
TH A N  TH AT OF FRAUD TO COVER TH E PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANT’S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 
FOR INNOCENT BUT NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION
M eaning of F raud
In 1887 the supreme court of the United States gave a definition 
of fraud, which is in agreement with the usual meaning attached 
to the word by both eminent legal authority and laymen: “In order 
to establish a charge of this character the complainant must show, 
by clear and decisive proof, first, that the defendant has made a 
representation in regard to a material fact; secondly, that such 
representation is false; thirdly, that such representation was not 
actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be 
true; fourthly, that it was made with intent that it should be acted 
on; fifthly, that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; 
and, sixthly, that in so acting on it the complainant was ignorant 
of its falsity and reasonably believed it to be true.” 70 There have 
been deviations from the conception of fraud as set forth in this 
decision of the supreme court of the United States. In fact, the 
majority of American courts do not adhere strictly to this definition 
of fraud. The deviations in which the public accountant is par­
ticularly concerned involve the knowledge or consciousness of 
wrong on the part of the defendant. The majority opinion in 
America has taken the view that fraud may exist where there is no
70 Southern Development Co. v . Silva, 125 U. S. 247, 8 S. C. Rep. 881, 31 
L. Ed. 678. For a discussion of the nature of negligence, see page 4, ante.
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consciousness of wrong on the part of the defendant, as where the 
defendant has made an innocent but negligent misrepresentation. 
A number of decisions have gone so far as to hold that fraud may 
exist, not only in the absence of knowledge of wrongdoing, but 
also in the absence of negligence, on the part of the defendant. 
According to this theory, mere innocent misrepresentation may 
amount to fraud. It is worth while to devote detailed attention to 
these three views of fraud which will be considered in reverse 
order.
A substantial number of cases has adopted the view that an 
action for deceit for misrepresentation may be upheld where the 
misrepresentation involved no negligence or dishonesty on the part 
of the defendant. A few excerpts from some of these opinions will 
help in forming an understanding of this concept of fraud. The 
supreme court of Massachusetts in speaking of an action for deceit 
in representing a horse to be sound held: 71
“It is not always necessary to prove that the defendant knew that 
the facts stated by him were false. If he states, as of his own knowl­
edge, material facts susceptible of knowledge, which are false, it is 
fraud which renders him liable to the party who relies and acts upon 
the statement as true, and it is no defense that he believed the facts to 
be true. The falsity and fraud consists in representing that he knows 
the facts to be true, of his own knowledge, when he has not such 
knowledge.”
Then, again the Massachusetts supreme court held: 72
“The fraud consists in stating that the party knows the thing to 
exist when he does not know it to exist; and if he does not know it to 
exist, he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he does not. Forget­
fulness of its existence after a former knowledge, or a mere belief of 
its existence, will not warrant or excuse a statement of actual knowl­
edge.”
The same court, in a later decision, held: 73
“Due diligence to ascertain the truth in regard to statements made 
as of matters of fact within one’s own knowledge is not enough to
71 Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195.
72 Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403.
73 Huntress v. Blodgett, 206 Mass. 318.
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relieve the maker of them of liability if they are false and relied upon 
as true, and the person to whom they are made suffers loss thereby.”
The supreme court of Michigan held: 74
“That the doctrine is settled here, by a long line of cases, that if 
there was in fact a misrepresentation, though made innocently, and its 
deceptive influence was effective, the consequences to the plaintiff 
being as serious as though it had proceeded from a vicious purpose, 
he would have a right of action for the damages caused thereby either 
at law or in equity.”
Many other American decisions have gone as far or nearly as 
far as the above cases in holding a defendant liable, irrespective of 
good or bad faith, for making a positive false statement as to which 
he had special means of knowledge.75 The doctrine set forth in 
these cases has been limited “to cover only cases where the profit 
of the misrepresentation inures to the benefit of the defendant, or he 
is a party to a contract with the plaintiff induced by the misrepre­
sentation.” 76 In all of these cases the circumstances were such that 
it could reasonably be inferred that the defendant, though he did 
not intend to deceive, must have intended that his representation 
should be relied upon by the plaintiff. According to Professor 
Bohlen, those courts which have treated honest and careful state­
ments of fact capable of knowledge as fraud have created a new 
type of warranty but have erred in calling the cause of action fraud 
and in allowing action for deceit to give warrantual effect to such 
statements.77
Incidentally, it may be said that public accountants, like other 
professional men, are not insurers of the accuracy of their work. 
In the absence of negligence in making the audit and in preparing 
the audit reports the public accountant would not be liable for 
making an innocent misrepresentation in regard to the financial
74 Holcombe v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396.
75 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law 
Review, 1910-1911, p. 429; Harry M. Harrington, “Torts—Liability for Negligent 
Language,” 12 Texas Law Review, Dec., 1933, p. 67.
76 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law 
Review, 1910-1911, p. 429.
77 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation be Treated as Negligence or 
Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 704, 1932.
90 Responsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
91
condition of his client’s business, unless, of course, he had expressly 
stated in the auditing contract that he would guarantee the accuracy 
of his work.
Some other courts have rejected the idea of treating a breach of 
warranty as fraud, but have held that negligent, though innocent, 
misrepresentation constitutes fraud. In 1903 the supreme court of 
Nebraska held: 78
“We think, however, that the authorities are uniform in holding 
that an action of deceit is an action separate and distinct in its nature 
from an action for breach of warranty, and that it lies in cases where 
there is a warranty as well as where there is none.
“We do not think that it is necessary to show actual knowledge 
of a false representation by the defendant to sustain an action for 
deceit, if the representations were actually false, and induced the 
contract, and were relied upon by plaintiff, to his damage, as being 
true. Under such conditions, defendants can not excuse themselves by 
simply showing that they did not actually know the representations to 
be false, for it was their duty to know them to be true before making 
them.”
A decision similar to this was rendered in 1932 by the supreme 
court of Texas.79 In that case the defendant was a banker and an 
expert in verifying signatures. The defendant verified to the 
plaintiff a signature on a note owned by the banker’s customer and 
thus induced the plaintiff to purchase the note. At the time of the 
transaction the defendant concealed from the plaintiff the fact that 
the defendant received from the seller of the note $450 for securing 
its sale. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The testimony brings him under another well settled rule, which 
is more exacting, that an expert’s opinion as to a matter susceptible 
of knowledge is regarded as a statement of fact, upon which reliance 
may properly be placed and, if it is made scienter, that is, either with 
knowledge of its falsity or in culpable ignorance of its truth, consti­
tutes remediable fraud. * * * The rule is further well established in 
this state that, where affirmative representations of fact are made
78 Hitchcock v. Gothenburg Water Power & Irr. Co., 4 Nebr. (unoff.) 620, 95 
N. W . 638. See also Palmer v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103, 107 N . W . 478 (1906).
79 Wilson v. Jones, 45 S. W. (2d) 572.
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and designed to be acted upon by another and he does so believing 
them to be true when they are false, one making the representations 
is liable, regardless of his knowledge of falsity or intent to deceive.”
In these two cases, as in the other cases of this type, the defendant 
had no knowledge of the falsity of his representations. He was 
negligent; but he had no intention to deceive; he merely intended 
that his representations should be trusted. The facts of these two 
cases are typical of this class of cases. If the public accountant should 
be held liable on the basis of fraud for innocent but negligent mis­
representation, the holding doubtless would be limited to cases in 
which the defendant had intended that his statements should be 
relied upon by the particular plaintiff.
A few decisions in America have followed more closely than do 
the above cases the English rule which restricts fraud to conscious 
misrepresentation. New York, New Hampshire and Minnesota 
courts have rendered a number of decisions in which the inherent 
differences between fraud and negligence were clearly understood.80 
In 1895 the New York court of appeals in the case of Kountze v. 
Kennedy held: 81
“The principle has been obscured by the use by judges of the 
phrase ‘legal fraud’, which has sometimes been interpreted as meaning 
fraud by construction, and as indicating that something less than 
actual fraud may sustain an action for deceit. The gravamen of the 
action is actual fraud, and nothing less will sustain it. The represen­
tation upon which it is based must be shown not only to have been 
false and material, but that the defendant, when he made it, knew 
that it was false, or, not knowing whether it was true or false, and 
not caring what the fact might be, made it recklessly, paying no heed 
to the injury which might ensue. Misjudgment, however gross, or 
want of caution, however marked, is not fraud. Intentional fraud, 
as distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to use 
due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit. The man who 
intentionally deceives another to his injury should be legally responsi­
ble for the consequences. But if, through inattention, want of judg­
ment, reliance upon information which a wiser man might not credit,
80 Harry M. Harrington, “Torts—Liability for Negligent Language,” 12 Texas 
Law Review 67 (1933).
81147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 360, 49 Am. St. Rep. 651.
92 Responsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
misconception of the facts or of his moral obligation to inquire, he 
makes a representation designed to influence the conduct of another, 
and upon which the other acts to his prejudice, yet, if the mis­
representation was honestly made, believing it to be true, whatever 
other liability he may incur he can not be made liable in an action 
for deceit.”
In the Ultramares case, supra, Chief Judge Cardozo said in re­
spect to the public accountant’s liability for fraud in the account­
ant’s statement of opinion:
“Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there 
is none. * * * Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, 
may be found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so 
flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief 
back of it. Further than that this court has never gone. * * * Our 
holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of 
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as 
to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, 
for this again is fraud.”
Actual fraud is made of sterner stuff than an innocent misrepre­
sentation negligently rendered. Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek 82 
held that a statement made “recklessly, careless whether it be true 
or false,” is fraudulent. In Derry v. Peek  and many other cases 
conscious dishonesty is prerequisite to fraud.83 To the average 
lawyer as well as to the layman the word fraud connotes conscious­
ness of the falsity of representation or the lack of genuine belief in 
the truth of a representation. If a person says he knows a state­
ment is true when he merely believes that it is probably true, he 
has not the sort of belief which would remove his case from the 
realm of consciousness of false representation.84
If the scope of fraud be held to include innocent negligence, the 
decisions would run counter to logic and the common understand­
ing of the mass of mankind as to the meaning of fraud. It would 
also follow that an accountant’s liability to third parties for negli-
82 14 App. Cas. 337.
83 Samuel Williston, “Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,” 24 Harvard Law 
Review 430.
84 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence 
or Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 706, 712 (1932).
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gence in rendering service which results in gratuitous statements 
to third parties would be treated like that arising from negligence 
in the course of service performed for compensation, for, if the 
defendant be guilty of fraud, it is immaterial whether the service 
be gratuitous or for compensation. And finally, if the third party’s 
action against the defendant public accountant for mere negligence 
be treated as fraud, the defense of contributory negligence on the 
part of the third party plaintiff will not be available to the defend­
ant, for contributory negligence is never allowed as a defense where 
the defendant is guilty of fraud.
T he N egligence F ormula as a M ode of E xtending the P ublic
A ccountant’s L iability to T hird P arties for M ere N egligence
If the ambit of the liability for mere negligence be extended so 
as to make the public accountant responsible to third parties, it 
will be necessary to define the limits of such liability; and unless 
some limitation be placed upon such liability, an honest blunder on 
the part of the public accountant might subject him to liability to 
an indeterminate number of third persons. No such onerous burden 
should be imposed by the courts so long as the public accountant’s 
fees remain anything like as low as they are today. The public 
accountant’s liability for mere negligence might well be limited to 
those third persons who, the public accountant knows, will use his 
statements as a basis for entering upon transactions with his client. 
Furthermore, it would seem fair for the courts to require on the 
part of the public accountant a less degree of care in rendering 
gratuitous service to third parties than that owed to his client who 
pays for the accountant’s service. And finally, the public accountant 
would have available the defense of contributory negligence.
No case has ever extended the ambit of negligence so as to make 
the promisor of a contract liable to third parties in general, i. e., to 
incidental beneficiaries of the contract. The New York court of 
appeals has rendered two decisions which tend in that direction. 
Glanzer v. Shepard,85 the first of these two cases, was reviewed in 
the Ultramares opinion. In that case the defendant, a public weigher,
85 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
had agreed with the seller of beans to weigh the beans and render 
certified copies of weights to both the seller and buyer. The seller 
paid for the service. The public weigher was negligent in the 
performance of his undertaking; and as a result of such negligence 
the buyer sustained losses. In an action brought by the buyer 
against the public weigher the court held the defendant liable for 
negligence. There was almost a contractual relation between the 
defendant and the third-party buyer of beans. Though the services 
were paid for by the seller, they were for the benefit of both seller 
and buyer. Furthermore, the defendant intended that his repre­
sentations should be relied upon by the particular plaintiff. This 
holding certainly restricts the defendant’s liability for an honest 
blunder in making a positive statement of fact to a determinate lot 
of third parties. If the public accountant’s liability for negligence 
in making positive statements of fact be limited to third parties 
who, the accountant intended, should use and did use the false 
statements, such liability would not exceed that imposed upon the 
public weigher in the Glanzer v. Shepard case.
In the other case, the Celotex Company, a manufacturer of 
insulating material for hot and cold air ducts, negligently made 
false representations to some engineers that the celotex material 
was fit for insulating hot and cold air ducts. The engineers bought 
some of the celotex material from a middleman and used it in the 
reconstruction of a heating system for the owner of a house. The 
engineers represented to the house owner that the material was fit 
for use in the reconstruction. Due to defects in the heating system 
as reconstructed by the engineers the house burned; and the owner 
brought suit against the engineers for negligently recommending 
the use of celotex material in his heating system. The defendant 
engineers made a motion to bring in as party defendant, and to 
take judgment over against, the Celotex Company. While the court 
refused to take judgment over against the Celotex Company, under 
a New York statute designed to prevent circuity of action, because 
of the lack of identity of the Celotex Company’s representations 
and those of the engineers, the court did rule that the Celotex 
Company would be liable to the engineers for the loss resulting
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from the false representations of the Celotex Company. The most 
significant portions of the opinion follow: 86
“* * * In other words, the only representations made by the
Celotex Company were that ‘celotex’ was an insulating material fit 
for the covering of hot air and cold air ducts and was better than 
other insulating materials. The defendants (engineers) do not say 
that ‘celotex’ was recommended to them as fit for insulating the ducts 
and pipes designed and planned by these engineers. The complaint 
says that the engineers claimed that ‘celotex’ was not inflammable and 
was an adequate insulator for hot air ducts and pipes as planned and 
designed by them. * * *
“* * * There is no claim in this complaint that the ‘celotex’ manu­
factured by the company was defective or improperly manufactured 
or inherently dangerous. The cause of action, if any, is rather based 
upon the recent doctrine of negligence in the spoken word and liability 
for carelessness in making statements upon which others were ex­
pected to rely and upon which they did act to their damage. A negli­
gent statement may be the basis for recovery of damage. * * *
“The recommendations relied upon by the defendants in this case 
do not amount to warranties, as there was no sale. No purchases 
were made of the Celotex Company by the defendants or their agents. 
Therefore, any express or implied warranty is not in the case. The 
utmost that has been pleaded are recommendations or representations, 
statements, carelessly and negligently made, upon which recommenda­
tions the engineer defendants acted, it is said, to their loss. We think 
that if the Celotex Company recommended to the engineers ‘celotex’ 
as a fit and proper covering for the duct and pipes as used and 
planned for the plaintiff’s house in New Jersey, or for such a like or 
similar use, and the defendants acted upon the representations and 
statements, and will suffer damage in consequence, that then the 
Celotex Company may be liable for its careless and negligent words 
and representations, if, in fact, they are false and untrue.”
In the Nichols case the misrepresentations were spoken directly 
to the ones injured (the engineers); hence, the court did not de­
termine the manufacturer’s liability, if any, to parties to whom 
such misrepresentations might be repeated by the engineers. There 
was no contractual relation between the engineers and the Celotex
86 Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, 261 N. Y. 118, 184 N. E. 729 (1933).
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Company; but the Celotex Company intended that the engineers 
should rely upon its negligent representations, and the Celotex 
Company expected that it would be benefited, as it was, through 
increased sales from the representations. It would seem that the 
Celotex Company’s liability would not have been different had it 
made those same representations in writing and handed the writing 
to a dealer of the celotex material with the intention that the dealer 
should give the writing to the particular engineers in order to get 
the engineers to rely upon the representations and purchase celotex 
material, as the engineers did. This last situation would be anal­
ogous to the case where an accountant sent his negligent audit 
report to his client with the intention that the client should give 
the report to a particular third person in order that the third person 
might use the report. In this case the auditor would not only have 
intended that the third person should rely upon his report, but 
would have expected a benefit from the third person’s use of the 
audit report, because such use would have been an inducement to 
the client to employ the auditor.
The chief value of the Nichols case to the public accountant 
lies in the fact that “the recent doctrine of negligence in the spoken 
word and liability for carelessness in making statements upon which 
others were expected to rely and upon which they did act to their 
damage” was adopted by the New York court of appeals. With 
such a doctrine courts could keep within the bounds of conservatism 
and establish a rule making the defendant public accountant liable 
to third parties for honest but negligent misrepresentations where 
the statements were intended by the accountant for specific third 
parties even though not delivered directly to them. Where the 
public accountant knew that his client would pass a copy of the 
audit report to a particular third party for that third party’s use, 
and such third party did use the negligent report to his loss, the 
public accountant should be deemed to have intended that the third 
party should rely upon his audit report.
Let us turn now from that phase of the negligence formula which 
limits liability to the particular persons who, the defendant in­
tended, should rely upon his statement, to that limitation of liabil­
ity arising from the fact that the defendant’s service to the plaintiff
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was gratuitous but coupled with a benefit. No court has decided 
whether the defendant is liable for misrepresentation of a financial 
matter given gratuitously but negligently.87 There is a dictum in 
Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, to the effect that there would be no 
such liability. However, in the Nichols case the representations 
were made not purely as a gratuity. The manufacturer expected an 
ultimate benefit from the representations concerning the insulating 
material, in the way of sales through middlemen handling that 
product. Likewise, the public accountant derives an ultimate benefit 
from the use of his statements by third parties. Without the use of 
such statements by third parties clients would have little need of 
employing auditors to prepare statements of their business enter­
prises.
Logically, then, what degree of care should be required of the 
public accountant rendering a gratuitous service coupled with a 
benefit? In the lending of a chattel as a pure gratuity the owner is 
bound only to warn of hidden defects of which he knows. If the 
owner of the chattel is paid for its use by the borrower, the owner 
must exercise reasonable diligence to discover the condition of the 
chattel and is liable for injuries caused by defects of which he 
should have known. It would seem that if the owner should lend 
a chattel as a gratuity but coupled with a benefit, the owner would 
owe some duty to the borrower to discover and report to him 
defects. From this analogy, then, it would appear that the public 
accountant for a gratuitous service coupled with a benefit should 
exercise some care to ascertain the truthfulness of his positive 
statements of fact. The public accountant would not owe to the 
third party for a gratuitous service coupled with a benefit as high 
a degree of care and skill as that owed to his client for “paid-for” 
service; yet, he would owe to such third party a duty to exercise 
some degree of care and skill to ascertain the truthfulness of his 
accounting certificate. It would seem that the public accountant’s 
duty to the third party—to exercise some care in rendering a 
gratuitous service, coupled with a benefit, to determine the accuracy 
of the statements—should apply merely to the public accountant’s
87 F. H. Bohlen, “Should Negligent Misrepresentation Be Treated as Negligence 
or Fraud?” 18 Virginia Law Review 707 (1932).
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positive statements of fact. It would seem that as long as the public 
accountant merely expressed his opinion in respect to the results 
of his audit, he should not owe in the way of ascertaining the 
accuracy of such opinion any duty to third parties for gratuitous 
service even though coupled with a benefit. Thus, where public 
accountants were employed to do less than a detailed audit they 
could free themselves from liability to third parties by merely mak­
ing their certificates in the form of opinion. Unless the public 
accountant can in some way restrict his liability to third parties he 
will be reluctant to undertake any audit less than a detailed audit.
The usual tort defense of contributory negligence would be an­
other antidote to the fear of extending too far the public account­
ant’s liability for negligence, by including a duty owed to third 
parties to exercise care and skill in the preparation of an audit. 
There has been no case holding that where a misstatement, is merely 
negligent the plaintiff is barred by his failure to use obvious means 
to determine its accuracy.88 The reason is probably due to the 
failure of many courts to distinguish clearly between deceit and 
negligence in making a positive statement of fact, for contributory 
negligence has never been a defense to an intentional injury.89 
By restricting the public accountant’s liability to such third parties 
as those who, the public accountant intended, should use the state­
ments; by limiting the degree of care owed such third parties when 
the service was gratuitous but coupled with a benefit, and by 
making available the defense of contributory negligence, it would 
seem that there is no basis for the fear of extending too far the 
public accountant’s liability for mere negligence in making positive 
statements of fact. The public accountant’s liability for an honest 
blunder in certifying merely his opinion as to the results of his 
audit should not extend to third parties. The expression of opinion 
should put third parties on notice that they should be cautious in 
the use of the statements; and at the same time the public account­
ant would be free to undertake audits involving less than a complete 
review of all the records.
88 F. H. Bohlen, “Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty,” 42 
Harvard Law Review 733 (1929).
89 Harry M. Harrington, “Torts—Liability for Negligent Language,” 12 Texas 
Law Review 72 (1933).
L iability for N egligence, F raud and L ibel 99
The recent doctrine of liability for negligence in making state­
ments upon which others were expected to rely and upon which 
they did act to their damage is sound in principle and will probably 
produce the most satisfactory results that can be reached. The negli­
gence formula will take the place of the action of deceit in cases 
based upon honest but negligent misrepresentations. The action of 
deceit will still be available where there is consciousness of wrong­
doing on the part of the defendant. However, it may well be ex­
pected that the courts will be slow in adopting the new doctrine 
of negligence.
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VII
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF TH E PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
FOR FRAUD
C ase L aw on the P ublic A ccountant’s L iability for F raud
An exhaustive search has revealed not a single American case in 
which a public accountant has been held liable in a criminal suit 
for fraud. An English case furnishes a precedent.
In 1931 the central criminal court (Old Bailey) of London, 
England, a court of first instance, tried on criminal charges of 
fraud 90 the chairman and the official auditor of the Royal Mail 
Steam Packet Company.91 Lord Kylsant, the chairman of the com­
pany, was sentenced to imprisonment for one year; and his con­
viction was upheld by the English court of criminal appeal.92 
Morland, the company auditor, was acquitted in the central crimi­
nal court.
The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company case has attracted world­
wide interest. The company was one of the largest and most im­
portant in England; it was a holding company of some thirty-five 
leading shipping companies of the kingdom. The auditor charged 
was a partner of one of the largest firms of accountants in the
90 The criminal charges of fraud were brought under a statute which made it 
a criminal offense for an officer of a company to perpetrate fraud upon shareholders 
or investors of the company.
91 Rex v. Kylsant and Morland, The Accountant, London, 1931, volume 85, p. 
109.
92 Rex v. Kylsant, 48 T. L. R. 62, 23 criminal appeal reports 83.
world.93 Some of England’s greatest legal talent was involved in 
the case. As a matter of furnishing a legal precedent for the ac­
counting profession it is unfortunate that the auditor’s case did not 
reach the English court of criminal appeal. However, the case is 
valuable for the light thrown upon the accountant’s legal duties in 
respect to the form and content of accounting reports and the nature 
of secret reserves. Only that portion of the trial having to do with 
Morland, the company auditor, is given here.
It was alleged in the charges against Morland that he was guilty 
of fraud in certifying false financial statements of the Royal Mail 
Steam Packet Company for the years 1926 and 1927, whereby the 
company chairman, Lord Kylsant, was enabled to sell a large issue 
of the company’s debenture stock to stockholders and the general 
public at a price greatly in excess of their true value.
Quite in harmony with the usual English accountancy practice, 
the statements in question consisted of a balance-sheet in the form 
of an account, with the liabilities and proprietorship appearing on 
the left and the assets on the right side. Just below the balance- 
sheet columns followed the certificates of Lord Kylsant and Mor­
land respectively. Following these certificates was a brief profit- 
and-loss account in which the distribution of profits was placed on 
the left and the incomes on the right side of the account. The 
alleged fraud resulted from the showing of some surplus reserves 
on the right side of this profit-and-loss account under such titles as 
would lead stockholders and the public, it was alleged, into believ­
ing such surplus reserves were current income items for the years 
1926 and 1927. Thus, it was claimed, the chairman, Lord Kylsant, 
was able to show prospective purchasers large operating incomes 
rather than huge losses for the years 1926 and 1927 and to effect 
the sale of a large issue of the company’s debenture stock.
The facts as presented by Sir William Jowitt, attorney-general, 
were in substance as follows:
The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company experienced a period of 
unusual prosperity during the world war. It was during this period
93 Henry Morgan, “The Auditor’s Responsibility in Relation to Balance-sheet and 
Profit-and-loss Accounts,” International Congress on Accounting, 1933, London, 
Gee & Co., p. 11.
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that many reserves were built up and expanded beyond the needs 
for which they were set aside. Among these was a large excess- 
profits reserve which was not needed for taxes after 1921. A war con­
tingency reserve was created to cover possible claims of officers for 
the differences in the salaries the company had been paying regu­
larly and the salaries such officers were receiving while they were 
in the British navy. This claim never materialized. It had been the 
practice of the company during the war to write off excessive de­
preciation charges. Many of the company’s ships were destroyed; 
and the insurance money received for the losses far exceeded the 
book value of such ships. This excess provided another earned- 
surplus reserve account. Another large earned-surplus reserve was 
that for income taxes, the amount of which continued to be aug­
mented after 1921, when losses were being sustained and no taxes 
were being paid to the government, by making deductions from 
dividends and carrying such deductions into the income-tax reserve 
account. An idea of the magnitude of all these earned-surplus 
reserves may be obtained from the fact that their amounts ranged 
from £725,000 to £1,600,000 for 1921.
Said the attorney-general, Sir William Jowitt, “To give the 
R. M. S. P. Co. a good showing in its profit-and-loss account for 
1921, bonus stock was issued by the subsidiary companies over 
several years. There was nothing improper, but it was utilizing 
for one year’s purpose something which in the very nature of things 
did not relate only to that year, except that it was paid in that 
particular period.”
An actual operating loss of £135,000 was sustained in 1922; but 
by including in the profit-and-loss account some non-recurring 
income items a net profit of £725,000 was shown. These non­
recurring income items were made up of a total of £860,000 from 
the special earned-surplus reserves and profit on the sale of steamers.
In the year 1923 there was transferred from the special surplus- 
reserve accounts into the profit-and-loss account total credits amount­
in g  to  £800 ,000  so  as to  tu rn  a n et lo ss in to  a p rofit o f  £779,114 
for the period. This particular item in 1921 and 1922 had been 
called “profit for the year”; but in 1923 it was called “balance for 
the year.”
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A similar showing was made for 1924. Reserve credits amount­
ing to £870,000 were transferred to profit-and-loss so as to change 
an operating loss into a “balance for the year including dividends 
on share in allied and other companies, less depreciation, etc.,” of 
£ 772,829.
During 1925, beside the usual reserves which were transferred to 
profit-and-loss, non-recurring profit resulting from the excess of 
receipts from the winding-up of one of the subsidiaries over the 
holding company’s book value of its investments in the subsidiary 
was shown as a part of the profit-and-loss. The profit-and-loss 
account for 1925 showed “balance for the year, including dividends 
on shares in allied and other companies, adjustment of taxation 
reserves, less depreciation of fleet, as £731,103.”
In 1926 the profit-and-loss account showed as such a credit of 
£150,000 taken from the surplus-reserve accounts. But there was one 
credit entitled, “Balance for the year, including dividends on shares 
in allied and other companies, adjustment of taxation reserves, 
less depreciation of fleet, etc.” of some £439,212. This item of 
£439,212 resulted from a current net loss of £272,000 and a transfer 
of £711,212 from the surplus-reserve accounts. The auditor certified 
that he had compared the statements with the company books, and 
that in his opinion the statements were properly drawn and gave 
a correct view of the state of the company’s affairs as shown by 
the books of the company.
A similar report was prepared by Mr. Morland for 1927.
The prosecution contended that the reports for 1926 and 1927 
were misleading to the average investor and that the auditor who 
approved them was criminally liable for fraud.
Justice Wright’s summing-up is reported in part as follows:
“* * * Then there was the question of the auditor. The law 
required the appointment of an auditor who was the servant of the 
company, and his duty was to report on the accounts which the 
directors were going to present to the shareholders. The law did not 
impose an impossible burden on auditors. It did not make them 
insurers; it did not require skill and vigilance beyond their power, 
but it did require from the auditor a careful examination of the 
accounts and for him to give a certificate saying that the accounts
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had been properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view 
of the state of the company’s affairs, according to the best of his 
knowledge and the information given to him.
“* * * If the accounts on which the dividends were being paid or 
the expenses were being met were being fed by undisclosed reserves, 
it seemed very difficult to see how an auditor could discharge his 
duty of giving a true and accurate view of the state of the company’s 
affairs without drawing attention to that fact, which was vitally 
important. No doubt an auditor in his delicate duties had to use a 
certain amount of discretion, but he had to remember that he was 
under a statutory duty and that he might come under the penalties 
of the law if he failed in that duty in any specific way.
“* * * In the present case the jury would remember that they were 
not dealing with a company to which the companies act applied, but 
with one which was formed as a corporation and had the privilege of 
limited liability, the corporation being governed by the terms of a 
royal charter. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. was a very old one, 
having been formed in September, 1839, and there were certain con­
ditions which governed the keeping of accounts; prior to the annual 
meeting a report had to be prepared and the assets and debts of the 
corporation set out for the purposes of the meeting. The directors 
also had to give such other information to put before the share­
holders as might seem necessary, and the accounts had to be signed 
by one of the auditors of the corporation. That was an obligation 
on the court of directors to prepare and lay before the meeting in 
each year an account of the debts and assets of the corporation and an 
account of the profits made every year. In 1904 it was decided to alter 
certain conditions, because in the old days the auditor was not a 
professional auditor but perhaps a member of the company. Then 
professional auditors were appointed, but that did not alter the 
provision requiring the directors to give an account of the profits 
which had been earned. The law provided that the auditor had to sign 
a certificate stating whether his requirements had been complied 
with and to make a report on the accounts and then to state in that 
report whether in his opinion the report was properly drawn up.
“The profit-and-loss account contains information for the benefit 
of the shareholders. We are not concerned with the question of 
policy, as to whether a dividend is properly or improperly declared, 
but if there is something in the accounts to which the attention of
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the shareholders should be drawn, the question at issue is whether 
that information is correctly given. * * *
“* * * So far as I know, in those charters there is no provision for 
the maintenance of any secret reserve. There may be, but it has not 
been pointed out to me, and I have been unable to discover it. 
The question to be decided here is not whether the two defendants 
or either of them has committed any breach of his duty to the com­
pany, either as chairman or as auditor, but whether he has com­
mitted a breach of this section (meaning section 84 of the larceny 
act of 1861).
“If there has been any breach or negligence of anything for which 
the directors or auditor may be liable to the company, that is a 
matter entirely beyond your (the jury’s) purview or consideration. 
You are not here dealing with questions of civil liability, for civil 
liability can be settled by action for damages. But when a matter 
comes before this court, it comes as a matter of criminal liability; it 
comes before this court because something has been done, some 
breach of the law which goes beyond the purview of civil liability, 
which may not be answered by damages, but which amounts to a 
crime against the state and for which there is provided for the party 
convicted an appropriate sentence by the court. One sometimes hears it 
said in a criminal case that questions of public policy, questions of 
public morality, questions, it may be, of financial purity are involved, 
but these are not questions which you have to decide in arriving at 
your decision. You have to decide on the facts and on the evidence 
in this special case, and therefore those considerations to which I have 
referred are not your considerations.
“The section involves three things, a false written document, knowl­
edge of the falsity—that means the recognition, the understanding, the 
realization of the falsity by the person who publishes it and puts it 
forward—and thirdly, the intent to deceive. The intent to deceive is 
quite a separate thing. You may have a false document, and you 
may have published it knowingly, and yet there may not be circum­
stances which justify the finding that there was an intent to deceive. 
In fact, in one of the sections under the new act—I think it was in 
one of the earlier companies acts as well—you have a definition of the 
offence or misdemeanor, of publishing a false document, knowing it 
to be false, but with no reference to the intent to deceive. It is left 
out, just as in some other criminal offences, the intention is not a 
necessary ingredient.
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“Here the intention to deceive is a necessary ingredient as regards 
a man who deceives shareholders, and in regard to a prospectus to 
deceive a possible investor. * * *
“Here again, in the case of Mr. Morland, the jury must be satis­
fied that the statement which he signed was false, and false to his 
knowledge, was published by him with knowledge of its falsity, 
with an appreciation of its falsity, and with the intention that it 
should deceive the shareholders.
“There were many differences, of course, on any view of the case, 
between Mr. Morland’s position- and that of Lord Kylsant. Mr. 
Morland was an accountant and the auditor of the company. He had 
the accounts put before him, but not until they had passed the court 
of directors. He had nothing to do with the preparation of the 
accounts and nothing to do with the declaration or decision to declare 
dividends. He had nothing to do with the general policy of the 
company. He had no knowledge—except incidentally with regard to 
the Meat Transport—of the subsidiary companies and their position. 
All he knew was the dividends which from time to time he had to 
deal with as representing the profits coming from those companies. 
He had, so far as could be seen, no motive at all for deceitful in­
tention.
“But, of course, it might be said against Mr. Morland that he did 
in fact add the sanction of his name as auditor to a document which, 
taking those two years 1926 and 1927, was false and misleading. As 
he had pointed out in another connection, however, it was not a 
question of whether or not Mr. Morland did something less than 
what could be expected as the full duty of a conscientious, careful 
auditor. He had to come honestly, according to his skill and under­
standing, to the conclusion that the accounts of the company pre­
sented a true state of the company’s accounts. That was what he 
signed—that it was a true and correct view of the company’s affairs. 
If he was not satisfied that he could give that certificate, his duty was 
either to qualify that certificate or to ask to have the accounts altered 
in such a way that he could sign them without qualification. It was 
obvious enough that in the year 1926, when the accounts for 1925 
were being dealt with, he was not satisfied with the position, because 
he thought that some words ought to be added to intimate to the 
shareholders that moneys which were being used were being used 
in order to produce the balance which appeared. That being so, it was 
admitted that without some qualification in some form or another,
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he ought not to give a certificate, and the qualifications which he put 
in were those words which the jury must almost be tired of hearing 
about—adjustment of taxation reserves. Those were the words which 
Lord Plender had turned into plain English.94 Mr. Morland had said 
that that had satisfied his doubts. He thought then that he had done 
enough to cure the defective character of the balance-sheet and 
profit-and-loss account with those words. If he was right in that, if 
he discharged his duty sufficiently and properly, it seemed that in 
any view of the matter, there was an end of the case against him, 
and he was not guilty. If on the other hand he was wrong in this 
sense, that in a civil action against him for not showing due care and 
skill, he would be held liable as a defendant because he had broken 
his duty and had not discharged his office, then again his liability 
would be a civil liability. That was assuming against him that he 
ought to have done something else and taken some more drastic, 
some more effective steps in order to bring to the mind of the share­
holder the true position of the company’s affairs. It might be that 
he did not discharge his duty sufficiently and properly. It might well 
be that an auditor in his position, standing as he did between the 
directors and the shareholders, to protect the interests of the share­
holders against any possibility of their being misled by the directors 
—it might well be that he took an imperfect view, an inadequate view 
of the very grave duties which rested upon auditors.
“The profession of accountancy, as you know, is very distinguished 
and very honourable, and a very essential profession in the com­
mercial affairs of this country. Great trust must be reposed on the skill 
and the judgment and the honor of accountants. It may well be that 
on occasion, through error of judgment, one of them may fail to do 
all that the requirements of his high office demands. But again we are 
not concerned here with any question of civil liability or breach of 
duty. What you have to determine is whether, assuming that Lord 
Kylsant was guilty of the offence, there was any deliberate and con­
scious act on the part of Mr. Morland in carrying out that design by 
putting his hand to a certificate which he knew was not justified by 
the facts and he knew did not correspond with his duty. 9
94 Note: Lord Plender, internationally known public accountant, testifying as an 
expert witness said: “The definition of ‘adjustment’ is this: The difference between 
the sum or sums reserved or set aside to meet maturing obligations whose precise 
ascertainment is not known at the time such provisions are being made, and the 
amount of the actual liability when it is ascertained and settled.”
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“The prosecution alleged that the true and accurate view of the 
state of the company’s affairs was not given. Did Mr. Morland know 
that, and did he give the statement which had been published cur­
rency and validity by means of his certificate, and did he do so with 
criminal and wicked intent?
“Three accountants had said in the witness box that they would 
have signed the certificate in the same form. He supposed that they 
would say that they would do so, in the same circumstances as Mr. 
Morland. It might be so, or not, he did not know. He was quite 
sure that they believed what they had said, but that did not relieve 
the jury of deciding whether the certificate was one which Mr. Mor­
land ought to have signed if he really appreciated his duty. They 
would have to say to themselves did he appreciate that he was doing 
something wrongful, or did he honestly believe that he had discharged 
his duty by putting into the balance-sheet those mystic words?
“Supposing that Mr. Morland honestly thought that that was 
enough, the jury on any view of the case would not find him guilty 
of fraudulent intent. However mistaken a man might be, however 
unfortunate the consequences of his mistake might be, that did not 
constitute a criminal offence or criminal intent.
“He had looked through Mr. Morland’s evidence very carefully 
and he did not know that he could help the jury by going through 
it at any further length. They would recollect that Mr. Morland did 
not dispute that he was not satisfied with the accounts for 1925 in 
the form in which they were presented to him.”
Mr. Morland was acquitted; Lord Kylsant was sentenced to im­
prisonment for one year.
In the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company case it was held that 
a company auditor was not guilty of fraud under an English statute 
providing for criminal punishment of company officers who have 
committed fraud upon stockholders or investors in the company, 
where the auditor had merged surplus reserves into the current 
profit-and-loss account under the caption “Balance for the year, in­
cluding dividends on shares in allied and other companies, adjust­
ment of taxation reserves, less depreciation of fleet, etc.,” and stock­
holders had sustained losses as a result of relying upon the statement 
of profit-and-loss. The court applied the orthodox test of one element 
of fraud, namely, consciousness of wrongdoing and found that the
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auditor did not have, at the time of the preparation of the audit, 
knowledge that laymen would be deceived by the sort of report he 
made.
The court was apparently correct in finding no fraudulent intent 
on the part of the auditor. The court was also correct in the dicta 
holding that the auditor was guilty of negligence. It certainly ought 
to be the duty of an auditor to show plainly on his reports what 
the figures represent.
T he P ublic A ccountant’s Criminal L iability for F raud under 
Statutes
Nearly half of the states of the union have statutes making public 
accountants liable criminally for fraud.95 In Texas the public ac­
countancy statutes limit such liability to certified public account­
ants.96
A public accountancy statute of Arizona is typical of such state 
laws. The Arizona statute follows: 97
“If any person practising in this state under this act as a certified 
public accountant or a public accountant, or who is in the practice of 
public accountancy as a certified public accountant, or a public ac­
countant or otherwise, shall wilfully falsify any report or statement 
bearing on any examination, investigation or audit made by him, or 
under his direction, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
three hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall 
be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of not less than three 
months nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprison­
ment for each time he may so have falsified such report, statement 
or audit.”
The United States securities act of 1933 also provides for the 
criminal liability of accountants and other persons who have been 
willfully guilty of misrepresentation relative to the registration
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95 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
96 Ibid.
97 Laws of Arizona, regular session 1933, chapter 45, section 8.
statement of an issuer of securities. Section 24, which was not 
amended in 1934, reads as follows:
“Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this 
title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the commission 
under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration 
statement filed under this title, makes any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, 
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.”
A public accountant may be criminally liable under the United 
States securities exchange act of 1934 for having willfully made a 
false representation of a material fact in the balance-sheets and 
profit-and-loss statements filed with the securities and exchange 
commission pursuant to the provisions of the act. Section 32 of the 
act reads as follows:
“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title, or 
any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made un­
lawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this 
title, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to 
be made, any statement in any application, report, or document re­
quired to be filed under this title or any rule or regulation there­
under, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any 
material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000, 
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both, except that when 
such person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be 
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this 
section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that 
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.”
As long as the public accountant acts with honest intentions he 
need have no fear of punishment for misrepresentation under the 
tate and federal statutes.
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Chapter 11
LAW AND THE CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT’S 
CERTIFICATE
Issuance of Certified P ublic A ccountant’s Certificate
I n a broad way the statutes of the District of Columbia and the forty-eight states set forth the requirements for the issuance of the certified public accountant’s certificate, namely, the training and 
experience prerequisite to the examination and the fields covered 
in the examination. However, in the main the requirements for the 
certified public accountant’s certificate are left to the discretion of 
the board of public accountancy. In a number of jurisdictions cases 
have arisen in which the courts have defined the powers of the 
board of public accountancy. Under appropriate topics those cases 
are discussed in this chapter.
Among our American decisions only one appeal case deals 
directly and exclusively with the power of the board of public 
accountancy to lay down rules for the issuance of the certified 
public accountant’s certificate. That case arose in 1925 in the ap­
pellate division of the supreme court of New York.1 The court 
upheld the rule of the regents of the University of the State of 
New York 2 requiring applicants for the certified public account­
ant’s certificate to have had at least two years of accounting practice 
under the employ of a certified public accountant. A portion of 
the decision reads:
“The regents have the right to make and interpret their own rules.
The court can not, in construing the regents’ rules, in effect, pre-
1 Davis v. Sexton, 207 N. Y. S. 377, 211 App. Div. 233.
2 Note: Chapter 261, article 57 of the laws of New York, 1929, provides for 
the creation of the board of certified public accountant examiners. This board is 
appointed by the board of regents of the university of the state of New York. 
Though it is the function of the board of certified public accountant examiners to 
carry on the practical conduct of examinations, whatever rules may be established 
by this board are subject to the approval of the board of regents of the university
I I I
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scribe a different rule from that duly enacted by the regents. If the 
conduct of the regents in the application of this rule to the petitioner’s 
case has not been arbitrary and capricious, surely the court can not 
command the issuance of a certificate. The power to fix the profes­
sional requirements has been granted to the regents by the legislature. 
The rule has been uniformly applied. The rule itself as interpreted 
by the regents is not arbitrary and capricious. It has a basis in reason. 
The reason assigned by the regents is that the integrity and high 
standard of the group of public accountants who are to be certified 
by the regents as worthy of this honorable rank in their profession, 
justifies the test of a substantial period of experience as an employee 
of one who has been certified and who will feel a personal and pro­
fessional responsibility as the employer of such candidate. A coem­
ployee has no such direct responsibility for the character and quality 
of the candidate’s work and has no power to select him or discharge 
him. Proper supervision and training of the candidate are more likely 
to be secured if the employer is a certified accountant for the reason 
that ‘he is responsible professionally as well as personally for the acts 
of the candidate and is bound to exercise a much greater degree of 
supervision than would be exercised by any mere employee. His own 
self-interest demands it.’ These are the reasons for the rule assigned by 
the regents in their opposing affidavits. We accept them as true and 
reasonable.”
The fact that the candidate for a certified public accountant’s 
certificate had worked two years under the supervision of two 
coemployees who were certified public accountants, the supreme 
court of New York held was not sufficient to comply with the 
regents’ rule that the candidate must have had two years of practice 
in the employ of a certified public accountant. Neither the rule nor 
the requirement of strict compliance with the rule was unreason­
able in the opinion of the court. The court took the position that 
rules for the issuance of a certificate are technical and should, as 
long as such rules do not appear to the court to be unreasonable 
and arbitrary, be left to the discretion of those responsible for the 
issuance of the certificate. The court, also, required uniformity of 
application of the rules. Were the rules not uniformly applied, per­
sons discriminated against would in effect be deprived of the right 
to pursue an honorable profession, and the favored few would be
given a virtual monopoly on the practice of public accountancy. 
The sanction of such a condition would clearly be violative of the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions.3 The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of 
the United States provides: “Nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
The discrimination could not be upheld under the state’s police 
power since the effect of the discrimination would not be in the 
interest of the public welfare.
While Davis v. Sexton is the only American case dealing with 
the statutory power of a public accountancy board to lay down 
reasonable rules for the issuance of a certified public accountant’s 
certificate, the opinion is consistent with the reasoning set forth in 
other cases dealing with the powers of accountancy boards to carry 
out their duties. The logic of the case is sound; and doubtless the 
case will be followed in future decisions in similar circumstances.
Recognition of a Certified P ublic A ccountant’s Certificate 
Issued by another State or a F oreign Country
The District of Columbia and nearly all the states of the union 
have placed within the discretion of their respective state boards of 
public accountancy the power to register the certificate of any certi­
fied public accountant who is the lawful holder of a certified public 
accountant’s certificate issued under the laws of another state, pro­
vided the state that issued the original certificate grants similar 
privileges to the certified public accountants of the registering state. 
A few states extend that reciprocal recognition to foreign countries.4
Several court decisions have been rendered, defining the public 
accountancy statutes of some of the states, and laying down the 
attitude of the courts toward recognition of the certified public 
accountant’s certificate which has been issued by another state or a 
foreign country.5
3 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
4 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute Pub­
lishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
5 Note: For the power of a board of public accountancy to refuse to register 
certified public accountants’ certificates from other states that do not recognize
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The supreme court of North Carolina in 1926 rendered such a 
decision.6 The plaintiffs in this case, Respess v. Rex Spinning 
Company, were certified public accountants of Georgia but not of 
North Carolina. In Atlanta the plaintiffs entered into an auditing 
contract with the agents of the defendant corporation of North 
Carolina. The plaintiffs assigned a senior accountant and several 
others to the task of preparing the working papers from the records 
at the defendant’s mill in North Carolina. After spending several 
weeks on this job the senior accountant and his staff returned to 
Atlanta with the audit “in the rough with pencil.” The reports 
were made up in Atlanta. The plaintiffs later brought an action to 
recover compensation for their services. The defense was set up that 
the plaintiffs were unlawfully holding themselves out as certified 
public accountants in North Carolina and also were doing business 
in North Carolina without having obtained the legally required 
licence. (It is a well-settled principle in the law of contracts that 
an agreement is unenforceable if made in the course of transactions 
which are prohibited unless the required licence is obtained.) A 
portion of the opinion reads:
“* * * C. S., 7008 et seq. section 7023, provides that if any person 
shall practise in this state as a certified public accountant without 
having received such certificate he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; 
and section 7020 defines a public accountant as one ‘actively engaged 
and practicing accounting as his principal vocation during the busi­
ness period of the day.’ The revenue act, schedule B, imposed on 
public accountants the sum of five dollars as a licence tax for the 
privilege of carrying on their business and made it unlawful for any 
person to carry on any business for which a licence was required 
without having the licence or a duplicate thereof in his actual posses­
sion at the time. Laws 1921, ch. 34, secs. 31, 88; laws 1932, ch. 4, 
secs. 29, 95. * * * It is no doubt true that as a rule a contract will not 
be enforced if it rests upon a consideration which contravenes good 
morals, public policy or the common or statute law. * * *
“To practise a profession or to carry on a business usually signifies 
the regular pursuit of such profession or business as an occupation—
certificates issued by the board see Goldsmith v. Clabaugh (1925) 55 App. D. C. 
346, 6 F. (2d) 94.
6 Respess v. Rex Spinning Company, 133 S. E. 391, 191 N. C. 809.
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to make a practice of it or actively to engage in it customarily or 
habitually. This is not without exceptions. As the legislature may 
prohibit a general practice until prescribed conditions are complied 
with, it may attach the same conditions to a single transaction of a 
kind not likely to occur otherwise than as an instance of general prac­
tice. * * *
“In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs did 
not practise or carry on the business of certified public accountants in 
this state within the meaning of the statutes. To carry on the business 
of a public accountant or to practise as a certified public accountant 
is much more than is implied in the series of detached acts done by 
the plaintiff’s representatives in acquiring information upon which to 
base their report. We are the more inclined to this view because the 
statutes are penal and should be construed strictly against the offender 
and liberally in his favor. * * *”
The question under consideration in Respess v Rex Spinning 
Company was whether the preparation of working papers meant 
the practice of public accounting under the North Carolina statute, 
which prohibited the practice of public accounting without the 
required licence, and the practice of public accounting as a certified 
public accountant without proper registration with the board of 
public accountancy of North Carolina. The court held that a single 
instance, a single audit, would constitute practice of accounting, 
but that preparing merely the working papers in North Carolina 
did not amount to practice of accounting in that state. Every trained 
accountant knows full well that the collection of data known as the 
accountant’s working papers does not require as high an order of 
skill as does the rendition of the audit reports. The working data, 
though indispensable, are only a part of the practice of public 
accountancy.
Only one other American case deals with the question of whether 
the preparation of working papers constitutes practice of public 
accounting, Haskins & Sells v. Kelly, 93 P. 605, 77 Kan. 155. The 
Haskins & Sells v. Kelly case held that merely preparing working 
papers in Kansas was not doing business in that state. Doubtless 
the courts in similar circumstances will follow these precedents in 
the future.
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The public accountancy statutes of the remaining states and the 
District of Columbia are similar to those of North Carolina in 
requiring a certified public accountant of another state to register 
as such with the public accountancy board of the state into which 
the accountant comes to practise as a certified public accountant. It 
follows from the decision that the preparation of working papers 
only does not constitute the practice of public accounting, that under 
the present statutes of the states and the District of Columbia a 
certified public accountant of one state may, without obtaining 
recognition of his certificate from the board of public accountancy 
of another state, be permitted as a certified public accountant to 
prepare working papers, and nothing more, for clients in such other 
state. This privilege would not be altered by the fact that after the 
certified public accountant returned to his office in the state where 
his certificate was registered he made up the audit reports and 
certified them in the capacity of a certified public accountant.
The matter of recognition and registration of a certified public 
accountant’s certificate was set forth in 1927 for the state of 
Louisiana in the case of Thoman v. State Board of Certified Public 
Accountants as follows: 7
“(Quoting from the Louisiana statutes) ‘The state board of certi­
fied public accountants may, in its discretion, register the certificate 
of any certified public accountant who is the lawful holder of a certi­
fied public accountant’s certificate issued under the law of another 
state, * * * provided that the state issuing the original certificate 
grants similar privileges to the certified public accountants of this 
state. * * *’
“All that we mean is that the board must treat alike all applicants 
similarly situated and may not arbitrarily discriminate between them.
“Relator alleges that he is the lawful holder of a certificate as 
certified public accountant issued to him by the state of Mississippi; 
that the state of Mississippi recognizes and registers similar certificates 
issued by the state of Louisiana; that he presented his said certificate 
to the defendant board and made application to it to recognize and 
register the same; that the board denied his said application without 
giving any reason for its said refusal; wherefore he prays that a
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mandamus issue commanding said board to recognize and register his 
said certificate.
“* * * Moreover, defendant * * * stands squarely on the proposition 
that relator has no right of action because the board may ‘in its 
discretion’ refuse to register any such certificate for any reason or 
for no reason at all. And that proposition, as we have said, is un­
sound.”
In 1931 the supreme court of Louisiana in reviewing the retrial 
of Thoman v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants further 
defined the powers of the state board of public accountants: 8
“* * * On the other hand, we have no right to substitute our 
judgment for that of the board of certified public accountants, as to 
whether the relator is worthy of a C.P.A. certificate. All that we 
have to decide in such cases is whether the board discriminated 
arbitrarily against the applicant for a certificate, or exercised its 
discretion fairly and impartially. Whether the board’s judgment was 
exercised wisely or unwisely is not for us to decide. * * *”
Thoman v . State Board of Certified Public Accountants holds that 
a statute which gives power to the board of certified public account­
ants to register, in its discretion, certified public accountants of 
other states is limited to reasonableness. The statute, in itself, was 
held valid; but the board was not allowed, in the application of the 
statute, to refuse to register a certificate on purely arbitrary and 
whimsical grounds under the cloak of acting within its discretion.
In reviewing acts of administrative boards, courts inquire into 
the reasonableness, and not the wisdom, of such acts. Under the 
police powers of a state statutes may expressly or impliedly grant 
authority to the public accountancy board to refuse to recognize all 
certified public accountants’ certificates issued in another state. 
Such a policy on the part of the board might be unwise because of 
retaliations; yet, because of the reasonableness, and the uniformity 
of the application of the rule, courts would not interfere.
The Thoman case is in accord with the weight of authority on 
the rule that under the due process and equal protection clauses of
8 172 La. 262, 134 So. 85.
L aw and the C. P. A.’s Certificate 117
our constitutions an administrative board can not perform its duties 
in an arbitrary and discriminative manner.9
Another Louisiana case, Eberle v. State Board of Certified Public 
Accountants,10 decided in 1930, deals with the powers of a public 
accountancy board to refuse to register a certified public account­
ant’s certificate issued by another state. In this case the plaintiff, 
a resident of New Orleans, held a certified public accountant’s 
certificate from the state of Mississippi, and made application for 
the registration of his certificate with the defendant board of 
Louisiana. The defendant board refused to register the certificate 
on the ground of moral unfitness of the applicant. Mandamus pro­
ceedings were instituted to compel the defendant board to register 
the certificate. The supreme court held:
“* * * The legislature has seen proper to create the board and to 
vest it with the power to determine to its satisfaction whether the 
applicant for a certificate as a certified public accountant, or simply 
as a public accountant, possesses the required qualifications, including 
the qualifications of good moral character. When the qualification of 
the applicant as to good moral character is regularly determined, and 
in determining it he is not deprived of his legal rights or of the law 
of the land, the ruling of the board is final, and its finding of fact 
must be considered correct, for it is not the courts that are vested 
with the power to determine whether in truth the applicant’s char­
acter is good, but it is the board that is vested with that power, and 
it is only upon legal questions involved that the appeal lies to the 
courts. Under the clear wording of subsection 1 of section 2 of the 
act, unless the applicant satisfies the board of his good moral char­
acter, he is not entitled to the certificate.”
Quite in agreement with the Thoman case, Eberle v. State Board 
of Certified Public Accountants held that moral unfitness of the 
applicant was a sufficient reason for refusing to register a certificate 
issued in another state. The power to determine facts, such as the 
moral fitness or the skill of the applicant, is a prerogative of the 
board rather than of the court. The courts will not interfere with 
actions of the board as long as the ruling of the board does not
9 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
10 171 La. 318.
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deprive the applicant of his constitutional rights. The holding of 
the Eberle case is consistent with the other cases in point.
An important case, James v. State Board of Examiners of Public 
Accountants,11 relating to the registration of a certified public ac­
countant’s certificate came before the supreme court of South Caro­
lina. In this case the plaintiff, a non-resident of South Carolina, was 
a certified public accountant of Georgia, Tennessee and North 
Carolina. The plaintiff made application to have his certificate 
registered with the state board of examiners of public accountants 
of South Carolina. His application was rejected mainly because the 
plaintiff did not maintain an office in South Carolina. In regard to 
the plaintiff’s petition to compel the state board of examiners of 
public accountants to issue plaintiff a certificate the court held:
“Our examination of the statutes fails to disclose any requirement 
contained therein that a non-resident certified public accountant, 
properly qualified in all other respects to practise the profession, must 
maintain an office in this state. It appears, therefore, that the respond­
ents have placed an additional requirement upon non-residents which 
is not in harmony with statutory provisions. We do not regard this 
additional requirement as a reasonable one. A certified public ac­
countant may do his work without the necessity of maintaining an 
office of his own in South Carolina. In fact, his work is most usually 
done at places of business of his clients.
“The purposes of the statutes under consideration, as we view 
them, were to protect real certified public accountants from the com­
petition of persons engaged in accounting business who were not 
certified public accountants, and to protect the people generally from 
having audits made by persons who were not certified public ac­
countants when it was desired to have such audits by only that class 
of accountants. We find nothing in the law which would justify us in 
holding that a non-resident certified public accountant, duly qualified 
in all respects to practise his profession in our state, must actually 
maintain an office in South Carolina. If the statute had a requirement 
of that kind therein, it might result in a holding that the enactment 
contravened the provisions of the constitution of the United States 
for the reason that it discriminated against citizens of the United 
States who happened not to be residents of this state. * * *”
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James v. State Board of Examiners of Public Accountants held 
that the requirement that a non-resident certified public accountant 
must maintain an office in South Carolina in order to qualify for 
registration as a certified public accountant in South Carolina was 
unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminative. This decision is unques­
tionably fair. If public accountants doing interstate business could 
not gain recognition of their certificates in other states without 
maintaining offices in such other states, interstate practitioners 
would have an unreasonable burden placed upon them. The re­
quirement laid down by the board was certainly unreasonable and 
arbitrary, and hence violative of the due process and equal protec­
tion clauses of our constitutions.12 The opinion is in harmony with 
the well-recognized rulings on the point.
Had the requirement that non-resident accountants maintain 
offices in South Carolina in order to obtain recognition of their 
certificates been statutory rather than a rule of the public account­
ancy board, doubtless the statute would have been held invalid for 
the same reasons that the administrative rule was not upheld.
Illegal Issue and Illegal A ssumption of the C ertified P ublic 
A ccountant’s C ertificate or M embership in  an 
E stablished A ccounting F raternity
In both England and the United States the law is well established 
that a person can not falsely hold himself out as being a certified 
public accountant or a member of a professional accounting 
organization.
In the English case, Society of Accountants and Auditors v. 
Goodway and London Association of Accountants, Ltd.,13 the 
chancery division held:
“So far as I am aware, there is no case, and no case has been cited 
to me, in which the question has been decided whether an incor­
porated body, such as the society here, can be regarded as suffering 
a legal injury by reason of a person who is not a member of that body 
representing himself to be a member of it; but a case of that nature 
did come before the court of session in Scotland in Society of Ac-
12 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
13 (1907) W. N. 45, (1907) 1 Ch. 489.
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countants in Edinburgh v. Corporation of Accountants, Ltd., 20 R.
750. * * * The plaintiffs were three chartered societies of accountants 
in Scotland, one in Edinburgh, one in Glasgow and one in Aberdeen. 
Their members were accustomed to use as their professional designa­
tion the letters ‘C. A.’ after their names, indicating ‘chartered ac­
countants.’ It was established that those letters, when used after a 
person’s name, denoted that the person so using them was a member 
of one or other of those three societies. The defendants were a limited 
company called the Corporation of Accountants, and (and this was 
the point) used the letters ‘C. A.’ as an abbreviation of ‘corporate 
accountant.’ The lord ordinary and the lords in the inner house 
unanimously came to the conclusion that the chartered societies were 
entitled to prevent the defendants from using the letters ‘C. A.’ or 
any similar designation which would lead people to believe that they 
were members of one or other of those chartered societies.
“* * * In the case before me there seems to be little difficulty in 
coming to that conclusion, for the reason that it is established by 
evidence that membership of the society confers a status, a valuable 
privilege, on its members. It is, therefore, a matter of pecuniary 
interest to the society that it should have as many members as 
possible. Obviously the possession of this definite status arising from 
the fact of membership is an inducement to persons to become mem­
bers, and anything which would reduce the value of that status would 
tend to remove some of the inducements which would actuate persons 
in becoming members of the society. Looked at in that way, it seems 
to me that the society has a pecuniary interest in preventing persons 
who are not its members, and are not entitled to the status which 
its membership confers, from representing that they are its members 
and are entitled to that status. It seems to me, therefore, both on 
the authority of the case to which I have referred and on principle, 
that the unauthorized use of the designation ‘incorporated accountant’ 
representing, as on the facts I think it does, that the person using 
it is a member of the society, does inflict a legal injury on the society, 
in respect of which it is entitled to relief.”
In the Society of Accountants and Auditors v. Goodway and 
London Association of Accountants, Ltd., case the chancery division 
of England upheld an injunction to restrain an accountant from 
using a title which would lead the public to believe that he was a 
member of the Society of Accountants and Auditors when, in fact,
he was not. The reason given for the court’s decision was purely 
on the grounds of protecting the financial interests of the Society 
of Accountants and Auditors. The chief income of this society was 
derived from membership fees. Hence, practice such as the false 
assumption of membership in the society would make less desirable 
membership in that honorable body and in that way reduce the 
volume of membership fees. It was impossible to make an accurate 
measure of damages in the continuous false assumption of member­
ship in the Society of Accountants and Auditors, hence equity pro­
ceedings became available.
In 1918 the chancery division of England in the case of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales v. Hard­
wick 14 upheld an injunction to prevent an accountant who had 
been expelled from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Eng­
land and Wales from representing himself through the use of 
letter-paper headed “Honors, final, Institute of Chartered Account­
ants” to be a member of that professional accountants’ organization. 
The injunction in this case was sustained in order to protect the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants from damage resulting from 
the expelled member’s representing to the public that he was still 
a chartered accountant.
While the injunctive process against persons falsely assuming 
the certified public accountant’s degree or membership in a profes­
sional accountants’ organization has never been sought in the 
American appeal courts, the controlling principles in the two Eng­
lish cases are sound; and it is most probable that the injunction may 
be granted in similar circumstances in our American courts, 
wherever it can be shown that the criminal statutes on the point 
do not afford an adequate remedy.
The statutes of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
make it a criminal offense for a person who has not received a 
certified public accountant’s certificate from the state board of 
public accountancy or who has had his certified public accountant’s 
certificate revoked to hold himself out to the public as a certified 
public accountant by the use of the letters, “C. P. A.,” “C. A.,” or
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similar letters, or by any other device.15 The penalty is generally a 
fine, not exceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisonment for one 
year, or both.
The passage of these statutes forbidding the unfair assumption of 
the certified public accountant’s designation was not accidental. 
The illegal issuance of the certified public accountant’s degree was 
flagrantly practised by the National Association of Certified Public 
Accountants, Incorporated, Washington, D. C. In 1923 the story of 
the debacle was graphically revealed by Chief Justice Smyth of the 
District of Columbia court of appeals in the case of the National 
Association of Certified Public Accountants v. United States 16 as 
follows:
“In its brief the corporation admits it was formed under section
599 of the code of the district. This section authorizes citizens of the
United States, a majority of whom being also citizens of the district, 
who desire to associate themselves for benevolent, charitable, educa­
tional, literary, musical, scientific, religious or missionary purposes, 
and societies formed for mutual improvement or for the promotion 
of the arts to form a corporation by filing in the office of the 
recorder of deeds a certificate in writing, which shall state the name 
adopted, the term for which the corporation is organized, its par­
ticular business and objects, and the number of its managers for the 
first year of its existence. There is nothing in the section which says 
that the corporation thus formed shall have the power to confer 
degrees, or admit its members to degrees, or to issue to its members 
a certificate pertaining to degrees. No mention whatever of the degrees 
is made in it. The certificate, however, which was filed by the organ­
izers of the corporation, provides that when the members of the 
corporation shall present ‘satisfactory evidence of knowledge in the 
theory and practice of accounting, and shall have satisfactorily passed 
the prescribed qualifying examination of the association’, the cor­
poration shall have power ‘to admit said members to the degree of 
certified public accountant, and to issue to such members the associa­
tion’s formal certificate to that degree pertaining.’ The corporation 
claims the right to do these things, and admits that it has done them 
in many instances.
15 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute Pub­
lishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
16 292 F. 668, 53 App. D. C. 391.
“According to the bill the corporation admitted one of its members 
to the degree of certified public accountant (usually indicated by the 
letters ‘C.P.A.’) on his own unsupported statement as to his qualifica­
tions, without any instruction or examination by the corporation or 
any of its representatives. Persons residing in California, desiring 
to test the methods employed by the corporation, presented to it an 
application for a certificate as a certified public accountant in the 
name of one Duarfy. The certificate was issued on the recommenda­
tion alone of persons wholly unknown to the corporation. Later it 
developed that Duarfy existed only in the minds of those who had 
arranged the test. In other words, he was a fictitious person. Other 
instances are given in which the corporation granted degrees without 
any examination or test of the applicant. All these allegations are 
admitted by the answer. In no place does the answer assert that any 
other or different test of an applicant’s fitness for a degree was em­
ployed by the corporation. * * *
“It is urged that, because the corporation provided, in the certificate 
which it filed with the recorder of deeds, that one of its purposes 
was to admit members to the degree of certified public accountant 
and to issue certificates to that effect, the corporation has the power 
to do these things. But this can not be admitted. By making the 
statement in the certificate it did not acquire a right not granted by 
the section. It might have taken less than the section gave, but not 
more. The section measures the maximum power which a corpora­
tion organized under it can exercise. * * *”
The injunction against the issuance of certified-public-accountant 
certificates by the National Association of Certified Public Account­
ants was upheld for two reasons:
(1) In America a corporation has no powers but those expressly 
conferred on it, and such incidental powers as may be reasonably 
necessary to carry those expressly granted into effect.17 Even a 
power granted in a charter, not expressly provided in a statute, will 
not be upheld, unless such power is reasonably necessary to carry 
out the powers expressly conferred by statute. In this case the power 
to grant degrees was not expressly conferred by the statutes under 
which the defendant was incorporated. Furthermore, it was not 
reasonably necessary for the defendant to confer degrees in order
17 Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71, 82, 25 L. Ed. 950.
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to carry out the powers expressly authorized by the statutes under 
which the defendant corporation was created.
(2) Even where a corporation has a power expressly granted by 
statute the corporation will not be permitted to abuse such power. 
Selling degrees for ten dollars each, as was done in this case, would 
certainly be an abuse of the power to confer educational degrees.
The two controlling principles upon which the case was decided 
have been evolved to protect the public from corporate abuses. 
These principles are supported by the great weight of American 
authority.18
A short time before the District of Columbia court of appeals 
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the National Associa­
tion of Certified Public Accountants from conferring degrees, the 
supreme court of New York permanently enjoined the National 
Association of Certified Public Accountants from conferring cer­
tified public accountants’ or similar degrees in the state of New 
York, and laid down the following rule in the case, People v. 
National Association of Certified Public Accountants:19
“It is entirely clear from sections 80 and 81 of the general business 
law above quoted, that no person may hold himself out as a certified 
public accountant, or use the abbreviation ‘C.P.A.’ or any similar 
words, letters or figures to indicate that the person using the same 
is a certified public accountant, except upon the authorization of the 
regents of the university of the state of New York.
While at common law an injunction may not be granted in the 
interest of the public welfare where a criminal statute prohibits the 
wrongful act, in the present case the National Association of 
Certified Public Accountants was enjoined from conferring degrees 
under a New York statute which provides for the use of the in­
junctive process to restrain an unlawful act. The court definitely 
established that it is a misdemeanor under the statutes of New York 
not only for anyone except the regents of the University to confer 
the certified public accountant’s certificate, but also for anyone to 
hold himself out as a certified public accountant in New York 
except upon the authorization of the regents of the university
18 Independent Medical College v. People, 55 N. E. 345, 346, 182 Ill. 274.
19 197 N. Y. S. 775, 204 App. Div. 288.
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(board of certified public accountant examiners under authority of 
the regents of New York university). It was stated by the court 
that the activities of the National Association of Certified Public 
Accountants were in opposition to the educational policy of New 
York. It is apparent that to permit a foreign corporation or anyone 
else to practise the abuses exemplified in the operations of the 
National Association of Certified Public Accountants would foster 
the perpetration of deceit upon the uninformed public. The holding 
of this case is based upon reason and justice and is supported by a 
number of cases involving similar facts.
In 1923 a member of the National Association of Certified Public 
Accountants advertised himself in the city of New York as a “Cer­
tified public accountant, (N. A.).” In a criminal prosecution of this 
member, the court of special sessions of the city of New York 
held that such an act renders the wrongdoer punishable for 
misdemeanor.20
During the year 1924 two cases came before the Texas court of 
criminal appeals, in which the defendants were charged with un­
lawfully advertising themselves as certified public accountants.21 
The defense in each case was that the defendant was a member 
of the National Association of Certified Public Accountants, In­
corporated, Washington, D. C. The convictions were upheld.
In view of the fact that over twenty-five hundred persons obtained 
their certified public accountant’s degree from the National Asso­
ciation of Certified Public Accountants chiefly through the payment 
of a ten dollar fee, it is surprising that not more cases arose for 
litigation.22
Another case involving the false issue of the certified public 
accountant’s certificate came before the supreme court of North 
Carolina. The North Carolina state board of accountancy shortly 
after the world war adopted the practice of holding its regular 
certified public accountants’ examination in Raleigh and two weeks 
later holding a duplicate examination in Washington, D. C. for the 
convenience of North Carolinian applicants who were in Wash-
20 People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474, 40 N. Y. Cr. R. 448.
21 Henry v. State, 260 S. W. 190, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 67. Crow v. State, 260 S. W. 
573, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 98.
22 Nat. Ass’n. of C. P. A.s v. U. S., 292 F. 668, 53 App. D. C. 391.
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ington. As a matter of fact, North Carolinians traveled from 
Raleigh to Washington to take the duplicate examination. The 
supreme court of North Carolina in this case, McCullough v. 
Scott,23 enjoined the state board of accountancy from holding its 
certified public accountants’ examination outside the state of North 
Carolina. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The state in the lawful exercise of its police power has created 
the state board of accountancy and required examinations of applicants 
to safeguard the public against incompetent accountants. Every citizen 
of the state is in a certain sense injured when the duties of the board 
are performed in such a manner as to let down the bars and lower the 
standards of the profession. There is an especial injury to properly 
accredited members of the profession who have met the conditions im­
posed by law, in the manner prescribed by law. Poor Richard says, 
‘He who hath a trade hath an estate.’ A man’s profession is his 
capital. The state has set standards for entrance into this profession, 
and those who have entered in the manner prescribed by law are 
entitled to the protection of the state to the extent, at least, that they 
shall not be unjustly discriminated against by admission of others into 
the profession in any other way than that prescribed by law.”
In McCullough v. Scott the court based its judgment largely on 
three principles:
(1) That the state board of accountancy was a quasi-public cor­
poration and was prevented from holding its examinations in 
Washington under a state statute which makes ultra-vires acts of 
corporations illegal.
(2) That the giving of examinations was not a mere incidental 
or ministerial duty such as might be delegated by the state board 
of accountancy to others, but was a judicial or quasi-judicial duty 
required to be performed by the members themselves. Hence, the 
board was not permitted to hold its examinations outside North 
Carolina for the reason that by well-settled law the place of sitting 
of a court must be limited to the territory of its jurisdiction.
(3) That the act of the board in letting down the bars to the 
issuance of certificates was detrimental to the interests of the public 
and the certified public accountants who had met the legal require-
23 109 S. E. 789, 182 N. C. 865 (1921)
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ments for their certificates. It is well-settled law that an abuse of 
discretionary power of a public officer, resulting in favoritism to a 
few and discrimination against others is contrary to the due process 
and equal protection clauses of our constitutions.
The principles set forth in the present case are supported by the 
great weight of authority.24
Another case, State v. De Verges,25 involving the false assump­
tion of the certified public accountant’s certificate, arose in Louisi­
ana. The supreme court of that state in 1923 held:
“It is important to note that the law does not purport to prevent 
or punish the practising of accountancy without a licence or certifi­
cate from the board, but only the holding of one’s self out to the 
public as possessing the certificate which it is authorized to issue 
under the provisions of the act, the practising as a certified public 
accountant, and the using of the abbreviation ‘C.P.A.’, or similar 
letters or designation, to deceive the public into believing that the 
person so acting is a certified public accountant under the law, with­
out first undergoing the examination by the state board of accountants 
as required by said statute and otherwise complying therewith. In 
other words, any one is at liberty to practise as an accountant, not­
withstanding this law, so long as he does not represent himself to be a 
certified public accountant, as defined thereby, or use the abbreviation 
‘C.P.A.’ or similar letters or device to indicate that he is a certified 
public accountant.
“It is true that neither morals, health nor safety of any one is 
jeopardized by the practising of this profession, public accounting, 
however incompetent a person may be, but the power of the state in 
matters of this sort is not confined to professions involving such con­
sequences. It may also act whenever the general welfare requires to 
protect the public in the skilled trades and professions against igno­
rance, incompetence and fraud.”
State v. De Verges held that the state was in the lawful exercise 
of its police power in prohibiting the false assumption of the certi­
fied public accountant’s designation. In the interest of public welfare 
a state is empowered to protect the public from ignorance, incom­
petence and fraud resulting from the false assumption of the 
certified public accountant’s title.
24 Willoughby on the Constitution, volume II, sec. 759.
25 95 So. 805, 153 La. 349, 27 A. L. R. 1526.
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L iability of a P ublisher W ho F alsely A dvertises O ne as a 
C ertified P ublic A ccountant
Only one American case, Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Publishing 
Company,26 deals with the publisher’s responsibility for falsely ad­
vertising a person as a certified public accountant. This case, decided 
by the New York supreme court in 1922, set forth dicta to the 
effect that under the New York penal law relating to untrue and 
misleading advertisements a publisher is an accessory to a misde­
meanor if he publishes, after notice, an advertisement which falsely 
represents one as a certified public accountant.
This New York case was not a criminal action. Had it been, the 
publisher, who printed the advertisement falsely representing the 
accountant as being certified, doubtless would have been held crim­
inally liable.
The public accountancy statutes of the District of Columbia and 
all of the states of the union are silent on the liability of a pub­
lisher who prints a false advertisement of a public accountant. It is 
probable, however, that the general statutes covering false advertise­
ments would in most of the other jurisdictions of our union, as 
in the state of New York, make it a misdemeanor for a publisher 
to advertise falsely for any one the certified public accountant’s title.
In the present case a public accountant certified in New York 
sought to enjoin the defendant publisher from publishing the false 
advertisement. The court refused to uphold the injunction because 
the plaintiff had not showed any financial loss as a result of the 
false advertisement. It is a fundamental rule in equity that an in­
junction restraining a criminal act will never be given merely be­
cause the act would be a crime.27 Protection of the public from 
crimes by punishment under the criminal law is the normal and 
usual means by which organized society guards against the anti­
social conduct of its members. But where the criminal law will 
not afford an adequate relief a court of equity will enforce the 
injunction.
Though the legal principles upon which the case is founded are 
sound, it seems that the judge underestimated the financial loss that
26 195 N . Y. S. 37, 118 Misc. Rep. 789.
27 W alsh on Equity, sec. 39.
may come to bona-fide certified public accountants as a result of 
competitors’ falsely holding themselves out as certified public ac­
countants. Proof of substantial competition between the plaintiff 
and the accountants whose false advertisements were printed should 
be sufficient grounds for restraining the publisher from continuing 
the false advertisements. It is quite conceivable that a fine assessed 
upon the publisher may not be sufficient to cause him to discontinue 
the printing of the false advertisements.
The court’s interpretation of the New York penal law making 
it a misdemeanor to publish untrue and misleading advertisements 
is correct. But courts in the future should allow the injunction to 
prevent the publication of advertisements falsely representing per­
sons as certified public accountants where the only evidence of 
financial loss sustained by the plaintiff is proof of substantial com­
petition between the plaintiff and the accountants falsely advertis­
ing themselves as certified in the area of competition.28
C ancellation of a C ertified P ublic A ccountant’s C ertificate
All the states and the District of Columbia provide in their 
statutes for the cancellation of the certified public accountant’s cer­
tificate by a governmental body of properly constituted authority. 
Most of the states vest that power in the board of public account­
ancy, a few in the state university, some in the courts of competent 
jurisdiction and others in the governor.29 The usual provision is for 
the revocation to be effected upon proof of bad moral character, 
dishonesty, conviction of crime, incompetency or unprofessional 
conduct.
Court decisions have upheld the statutes empowering the state 
board of public accountancy to revoke certified public accountants’ 
certificates. In 1922 the supreme court of Alabama was asked to 
grant an injunction in the case of Lehmann v. State Board of 
Public Accountancy 30 to prevent the Alabama state board of public
28 Note: For a treatm ent of the ethics of professional advertising by the public 
accountant, see, on pages 226 and 227, sections 11 and 12 of the “rules of profes­
sional conduct of the American Institute of Accountants.”
29 Certified Public Accountant Laws of  the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
30 94 So. 94, 208 Ala. 185. (Affirmed by United States supreme court, 44 S. Ct. 
128, 263 U. S. 394, 68 L. Ed. 354.)
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accountancy from hearing charges preferred by other public ac­
countants against one Lehmann, a certified public accountant. The 
injunction also sought to prevent the board of public accountancy 
from cancelling Lehmann’s certificate. The court held:
“* * * Hence there is no equity in the bill, for the reason that a 
court of equity will not enjoin a board or commission vested with 
quasi-judicial and administrative authority from acting as to matters 
within their jurisdiction and power merely because it is apprehended 
that they may decide erroneously. This is not a bill to restore to 
complainant his right to a certificate or licence of which he has been 
unlawfully deprived, nor to compel the issuance to him of a licence 
or certificate to which he is entitled, but it is, essentially, a bill to 
prevent the hearing of charges preferred against complainant.”
In Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy the court 
held that by the same authority—police power—under which the 
state made provision by statute for the issuance of the certified 
public accountant’s certificate the state was justified in making 
provision by statute for the cancellation of certificates so issued. 
The court held that the complainant accountant could not accept 
the benefits of the public accountancy statute without bearing the 
burdens or inconveniences imposed by it. The court further held 
that the board of public accountancy is a quasi-judicial body whose 
function it is to pass judgment upon the revocation as well as upon 
the issuance of a certified public accountant’s certificate. It should 
be remembered that in a case such as Lehmann v. State Board of 
Public Accountancy the decision of the board is subject to review 
by the courts of the particular jurisdiction, and if the board is 
found to have acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, the courts will 
overrule the board’s judgment.
That a state may enact and enforce statutes for the cancellation 
of certified public accountants’ certificates and that a public account­
ancy board may sit as a judicial or quasi-judicial body are well- 
established laws.
The supreme court of Alabama in the case of Miller v. Alabama 
State Board of Public Accountancy 31 laid down the law that in 
a trial to revoke a certified public accountant’s certificate members
31 98 So. 893, 212 Ala. 619 (1925).
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of the state board of public accountancy can not act both as pros­
ecutors and as judges. A portion of the opinion follows:
“For the sake of brevity, we summarize the grounds of disqualifica­
tion as follows: That appellees as individuals and also as members of 
the social organization known as the Alabama Society of Certified 
Public Accountants, of which they are members, contributed money 
to the prosecution of the charges against appellant, then pending be­
fore the board; that they had been active, personally and profession­
ally, against appellant and were biased and prejudiced against him; 
that they had theretofore taken an active part in procuring his ex­
pulsion from said Alabama Society of Public Accountants, and which 
expulsion appellees, sitting as members of the board, without notice 
to appellant, had determined was sufficient cause for revocation of the 
certificate; that ‘one or more’ members of the board had stated that, 
in the hearing of this proceeding against appellant, the board would 
revoke his certificate, irrespective of any proof or defense, and that, 
so far as the board was concerned, ‘such certificate now stood as 
revoked.’
“That the rule of disqualification applicable to judges extends also 
to every tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is 
established by the decided weight of authority. * * *
“* * * Under the averments appellees are charged with a direct 
interest in the proceedings against him and are both prosecutors and 
judges in the same cause. The averments, for the present purposes, 
being considered as admitted, we think, very clearly place appellees 
within the influence of the rule of disqualification.”
It is a well-established principle of common and constitutional 
law that a person who is personally interested in the outcome of a 
trial is incapacitated to sit as a judge in the trial.32 Even the lay­
man’s sense of justice would be averse, it would seem, to permitting 
the members of a quasi-judicial board of public accountancy to 
sit as judges in a case which the members had been actively 
prosecuting.
In the Miller v. Alabama State Board of Public Accountancy 
case it was argued by the defendant board that the doctrine of neces­
sity should cause the court to refuse the mandamus petition to 
compel the board members to recuse themselves from sitting as
32 15 R. C. L. 526.
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judges in the trial. It is an established rule of law that the dis­
qualification of judges must yield to the demands of necessity, as, 
for example, in cases where, if applied, it would destroy the only 
tribunal in which relief could be had. But in the Miller case no 
great necessity for a speedy settlement of the controversy existed, 
since the public was not primarily concerned and the appellant 
(accountant) could continue the practice of his profession until the 
legislature made provision for the appointment of new members 
of the board to sit in the trial.33
For the reasons given above, the court was justified in overruling 
the lower court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the petition for 
a writ of mandamus. In other words, the court rightly held that 
the board members in the admitted circumstances would be dis­
qualified to sit in the trial.
T he Reissuance of a Certified P ublic A ccountant’s Certificate 
W hich H as Been C ancelled
The states differ in their laws relative to the reissuance of the 
certified public accountant’s certificate after the certificate has been 
lawfully cancelled. The statutes of Florida, Mississippi, New York 
and Rhode Island specifically empower the boards of public ac­
countancy 34 of those states to issue a new certified public account­
ant’s certificate to a person whose certificate has been lawfully 
revoked.35 The requirements of reissuance are left largely to the 
discretion of the board of public accountancy. No cases testing these 
statutes have arisen.
The statutes of the great majority of the states and the District 
of Columbia do not specify directly the powers of the board of 
public accountancy to reissue a certified public accountant’s cer­
tificate which has once been lawfully cancelled. One court deci­
sion, Wright v. Alabama Board of Public Accountancy, arising 
under such a statute denied such power to the board.36
33 15 R. C. L. 541.
34 The board of certified public accountant examiners through power vested in 
the board of regents of New York university, in the case of the state of New York.
35 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1930.
36 123 So. 33, 219 Ala. 632 (supreme court of Alabama, 1929).
“The statute clearly confers no authority on the board, either ex­
pressly or by necessary implication, to reinstate one whose certificate 
has been cancelled for unprofessional conduct, or to revive and restore 
to life a certificate so revoked and cancelled; and, if such certificate 
was restored to the petitioner, it would confer no authority on him to 
practise as a certified public accountant.”
In Wright v. Alabama Board of Public Accountancy the only 
reason given by the court for refusing to compel the board to re­
issue the cancelled certificate was that the power to reissue a cer­
tificate cancelled for unprofessional conduct was not either expressly 
or impliedly conferred by statute. The court implied in its opinion 
that, if the legislature had conferred the power of reissue of a 
cancelled certificate upon the board, the court would have upheld 
the statute.
Doubtless occasions may arise in which it would be just for an 
accountant to have reissued to him his certificate which was can­
celled for a cause that no longer exists. It is probable that the courts 
in states where statutes provide for the reissuance of certificates 
cancelled for unprofessional conduct will uphold such statutes.
Restriction of T he Practice of P ublic A ccounting to P ersons
W ho H old T he Certified P ublic A ccountant’s Certificate
Oklahoma,37 Illinois38 and Tennessee39 have enacted public 
accountancy laws restricting the practice of public accounting to 
certified public accountants; and the supreme court of each of those 
states has declared such restrictive laws to be contrary to the four­
teenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. The 
Illinois case, Frazer v. Shelton, reads in part as follows:
“* * * Throughout the history of the law in relation to accountancy 
in this and other states there runs a distinction between a public 
accountant and a certified public accountant. * * * The act under con­
sideration here not only does not destroy that distinction, but, on the 
other hand, accentuates it. In the states of Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, North Carolina and Tennessee acts have been passed pro-
37 State v. Riedell, 233 P. 684, 109 Okla. 35, 42 A. L. R. 765 (1924).
38 Frazer v. Shelton, 150 N. E. 696, 320 Ill. 253, 43 A. L. R. 1086 (1926).
39 Campbell v. McIntyre, 52 S. W. (2d) 162, 165 Tenn. 47 (1932).
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viding for the registration of accountants, both as certified public 
accountants and as public accountants. In none of these states, except 
Tennessee, is one prohibited from practising accountancy, but the cer­
tificate as certified public accountant is by the act taken as evidence 
of investigation and certification of certain qualifications which are 
not so signified by the certificate as public accountant. No one in the 
four states mentioned is denied the right to do accounting for as 
many persons as will employ him. Numerous states have likewise 
provided that certain audits and investigations shall be made by 
certified public accountants. In Massachusetts the legislature in 1921 
passed an act authorizing certified public accountants, approved by 
the state commissioner of banks, to make audits of savings banks. 
Mass. gen. laws 1921, chap. 168, section 17. In Pennsylvania it is 
provided that certain school districts may employ certified public 
accountants to audit their books. Pa. laws 1925, p. 382, sections 2603, 
2623. In Michigan, finance companies operating under declarations of 
trust are required to be examined by the state banking commissoner, 
who in turn is authorized to accept the report and audit of a certi­
fied public accountant in place of such examination. Mich. pub. acts 
1925, p. 461.
“* * * In 1924 congress created the United States board of tax 
appeals * * *, authorized to adopt rules pertaining to the conduct of 
its business. An examination of those rules discloses that the only 
accountants authorized to appear and practice before those boards are 
certified public accountants. * * *
“The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is 
an inalienable right. That right is one of the blessings of liberty and 
is accorded as a privilege to the citizens of the United States by the 
preamble to the federal constitution and by the declaration of inde­
pendence, under the language ‘pursuit of happiness.’ The right of a 
citizen to pursue ordinary trades or callings upon equal terms with all 
other persons similarly situated is a part of his right to liberty and 
property. * * * ‘Liberty’, as used in the constitution, embraces the 
free use by all citizens of their powers and faculties subject only to the 
restraints necessary to secure the common welfare. The right to con­
tract is both a liberty and a property right. * * *
“It is, of course, well established that the right to liberty, property 
and the pursuit of happiness is subject to the reasonable exercise of the 
police power of the states. The end to be secured by the exercise of 
the police power is the furtherance of the public health, comfort,
safety or welfare, and, unless an act restricting the ordinary occupa­
tions of the citizen can be shown to fall within the police power 
such act is void, as violating the right of the citizen to liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. Whether or not the regulation of an occupation 
has in it the elements of protection to the public health, comfort, 
safety or welfare is a matter not always easy to determine. The 
question is here presented: Does the business of accounting affect the 
public health, comfort, safety or welfare? Unless it does, its restric­
tion is not permitted under the constitution. It is readily seen that 
the profession of law, by reason of its influence on the safety of the 
rights of property and liberty, does affect the public welfare; that the 
science of medicine, surgery and other treatment of human ills or the 
prevention of disease directly affects the public health; and that the 
manner of construction of buildings may well be said to affect the 
public safety. What is there in the business of accounting upon which 
the exercise of the police power may be based? Any act of account­
ing, as distinguished from bookkeeping, when for more than one 
employer, is deemed by this act to be public accounting and may 
not be engaged in without the prescribed certificate. The statute in 
this case is not limited to those who would do an accounting business 
with municipalities or other public agencies; therefore the necessity 
for police regulation must appear, if at all, by reason of the relation­
ship of an accountant to private business concerns by which he is 
employed, and thereby to the public welfare. An ‘accountant,’ as 
that term is defined by standard lexicographers, is one who is skilled 
in, keeps or adjusts accounts. ‘Accounting’ is defined as the act or 
system of making up or stating accounts. It is readily seen that an 
incompetent accountant may render an inaccurate report and cause 
his employer to make a business error. This creates no effect upon the 
public, however, unless the relationship existing between the public 
welfare and the private business so affected is so close as to establish 
that influence. Assuming that an audit shows a business failure, such 
failure, while by no means desirable, does not ordinarily affect the 
public welfare, and, if it did, it is not the work of the accountant, 
but the condition of the business, that bears such influence. In order 
to say that private business must, in the interest of public welfare, 
employ one certified by the state, it must appear that the effect of an 
audit of that business is a matter of public welfare and not of private 
concern. If it is the latter, the audit has no element of public welfare
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in it, and a law prohibiting or licensing the business of one who 
makes such audit is but an unwarranted regulation of private busi­
ness and the right to contract. To say that private business must 
submit to an audit on stated occasions goes no further, in principle, 
than to say that private business may not employ whom it chooses 
to make such audit. While restrictions of such a character are im­
posed upon public-utility corporations by reason of the interest of the 
public therein, no law, so far as we are advised, has gone to the extent 
of attempting to so regulate purely private business. The business of 
accounting for private employers has in it none of the elements of a 
public utility. Laws passed by various states on this subject have 
authorized the conferring of degrees upon accountants who pass an 
examination or have provided for the issuance of certificates of qualifi­
cation. These laws have been passed in the interest of those engaged 
in the business and for their protection and advantage rather than 
in the interest of the public welfare.”
The holdings of the three cases on state statutes restricting the 
practice of public accounting to accountants who are certified were 
fundamentally the same. The conclusions of the opinions were to 
the effect that restrictive legislation, (1) deprived the uncertified 
public accountants of the liberty to choose and practise a common 
occupation; (2) infringed upon the right of private business inter­
ests to choose accountants to perform their auditing service; (3) was 
not justified by police power in that the public welfare was not 
promoted by such legislation.
(1) Let us consider the first of the three controlling principles 
of these cases. It is unquestionable that the courts were correct in 
their statement of our constitutional guaranties of liberty and prop­
erty. In 1872 the minority of the United States supreme court in 
the famous slaughter-house cases 40 defined property to mean not 
merely physical things one might own, but one’s trade, calling or 
the occupation which he pursues. The minority opinion also held 
that liberty includes one’s right of choice, his right to choose a 
calling, occupation, trade, or the direction in which he would 
exercise his labor. The principles laid down in the minority holding
L aw  and the C. P. A .’s Certificate 137
4016 Wall. 36.
of the slaughter-house cases were later made laws in the Minnesota 
rate case 41 and in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.42
No one would argue that restriction of the practice of public ac­
counting to those who are certified is not depriving uncertified 
public accountants of liberty and property without due process of 
law unless such restriction is justified as being in the interest of 
the public welfare.
(2) In regard to the courts’ consideration of the right of a busi­
ness to choose its auditors, it should be said that their statements 
of the law relative to one’s right to enter into legitimate contracts 
are correct. The Allgeyer case also held that the liberty mentioned 
in the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution 
includes the right of a person to enter into all contracts which may 
be proper, necessary and essential in the pursuit of his livelihood 
or vocation.
It can not be doubted that, under the well-settled constitutional 
law of the United States, the denial to private business interests 
of the right to choose the public accountants with whom they 
would contract is a deprivation of the liberty of such business 
operators.
(3) The statutes restricting the practice of public accounting to 
certified public accountants are invalid in that they deprive persons 
of liberty and property without due process of law, unless such 
statutes are justified by a lawful exercise of the police power re­
served to the states.
The police power of the state is the indefinite power reserved to 
the state under the federal constitution to control men and things 
so as to protect the public peace, safety, morals, health and welfare. 
The interpretations of the police power change as each tomorrow 
offers different social, political and economic conditions.43
During the first seventy-five years of our national history the 
individualism of Adam Smith dominated political and legal think­
ing. The police power of the state was greatly over-shadowed by 
the prevailing public opinion to let every man find his own life,
41134 U. S. 418 (1890).
42 165 U. S. 578 (1897). 
43 F. Harold Essert, What is Meant by Police Power? 12 Neb. L. B. 208-221.
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liberty and property, and seek protection for them as best he could, 
with the least possible interference by the state.43 In an effort to 
preserve this individualism the fourteenth amendment was made 
a part of the constitution. However, following the civil war the 
growth of population, the rise of urban life, and the industrializa­
tion of business made a greater degree of social control imperative. 
The changed social and economic conditions were reflected in the 
United States supreme court’s allowing in the slaughter-house44 
and the granger 45 46cases a greater exercise of the police power of 
the state. Until the present moment the police power of the state 
has continued to be broadened in its application to meet the 
changed political, social and economic conditions.
In a recent case, Home Building and Loan Association v. Blais­
dell,46 Chief Justice Hughes of the United States supreme court 
wrote the opinion which upheld the right, under the police power, 
of Minnesota to delay the foreclosure of real-estate mortgages. 
Holding that while emergency does not create power, emergency 
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power, Chief Justice 
Hughes said, “It is manifest from this review of our decisions that 
there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the 
necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between in­
dividual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent 
contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly in­
creasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of 
our people and the complexity of our economic interests have in­
evitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in 
order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity. Where, 
in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individual 
or of classes were involved, and that those of the state itself were 
touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental 
interests of the state are directly affected; and that the question is 
no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, 
but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic 
structure upon which the good of all depends.”
44 16 Wall. 36.
45 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
46 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
In view of the business events that have transpired during the 
depression, in view of the widespread losses sustained by the in­
vesting public due in no small measure to inadequate and incom­
petent accounting reports, used as the bases for the sale of securities 
to hundreds of thousands of investors in every part of the nation, 
some means of securing more efficient public accounting services is 
vital to the safeguard of “the economic structure upon which the 
good of all depends.”
The federal government has realized the great importance of the 
public accounting profession to the general public welfare in plac­
ing upon public accountants, in the securities act of 1933 47 and 
the securities exchange act of 1934,48 heavy penalties for preparing 
or certifying financial statements known by such accountants to be 
false. In fact, the United States government extends to certified, 
and denies to uncertified, public accountants the privilege of prac­
tice before the board of tax appeals.49
47 See page 76 of this treatise.
48 See page 86 of this treatise.
49 Note: Rules of Practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, revised 
to Feb. 1, 1931, rule 2, admission to practice: “A register will be maintained by 
the board in which will be entered the names of all persons entitled to practise 
before the board. Corporations and firms will not be admitted or recognized.
“The following classes of persons whom the board finds, upon consideration of 
their applications, to be citizens of the United States, of good moral character and to 
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others may be admitted to practice 
before the board:
“ (a) Attorneys-at-law ***
“ (b) Certified accountants duly qualified under the law of any state or territory 
or the District of Columbia.
“An application under oath for admission to practice shall be addressed to the 
United States board of tax appeals, Washington, D. C., and must state the name, 
residence address and office address of the applicant, the applicant’s connection as 
a member or an associate of any firm of attorneys or accountants, the name of 
any professional societies of which applicant is a member, and the time and place 
of his admission to the bar, or qualification as a certified public accountant. The 
application of an attorney-at-law shall also state whether the applicant has ever 
been suspended or disbarred from practice as an attorney in any court or before 
any department or agency of the United States. The application of a certified public 
accountant shall also state whether applicant has been suspended or expelled 
from any professional society or society of certified public accountants, whether 
his right to practise as a certified public accountant has ever been suspended or 
revoked in any jurisdiction and whether applicant has ever been suspended or 
disbarred from practice before any department or agency of the United States. 
Such application shall be accompanied by a certificate of the clerk of the court 
in which the applicant is admitted to practice to the effect that he has been 
so admitted and is in good standing; or a certificate by the proper state, terri-
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The requirements for the issuance of the certified public account­
ant’s certificate and the responsibilities attached to a continuous 
holding of the certified public accountant’s certificate constitute a 
great step in the direction of securing for private businesses and 
the investing public alike honest and skillfully prepared accounting 
reports.
The cases, Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 208 
Ala. 185, 94 So. 94, State v. De Verges, 153 La. 349, 95 So. 805, 
People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474, and Henry v. State, 97 Tex. 
crim. rep. 67, 260 S. W. 190, cited as authority for holding invalid 
the restrictive statute merely stated that the statutes with which 
those cases were concerned dealt only with the false assumption of 
the certified public accountant’s certificate and not with the restric­
tion of the practice of public accounting to those certified. It can 
not be correctly said that these cases cited went further than to 
imply dicta to the effect that restrictive legislation for public ac­
countants is invalid.
In view of the present political, social and economic conditions 
demanding greater control of private business, it is probable that 
the United States supreme court would uphold a statute restricting 
the practice of public accounting to those certified.
torial or district authority to the effect that the applicant is a certified public 
accountant in good standing, duly qualified and entitled to practise in such state 
or territory or the District of Columbia. Each applicant shall take an oath in 
the form prescribed by the board.
“The board may, in its discretion, deny admission, suspend or disbar any 
person who, it finds, does not possess the requisite qualifications to represent 
others or is lacking in character, integrity or proper professional conduct. An 
attorney or a certified public accountant who has been admitted to practice may 
be disbarred only after he is afforded an opportunity to be heard.
“The board shall have the right at any time to require a statement, under 
oath, of the terms and circumstances of any contract of employment of an 
attorney or a certified public accountant with the taxpayer he represents.”
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C hapter III
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNT­
ANT’S EXPERT TESTIMONY IN COURT
G eneral N ature of E xpert T estimony
Before entering upon consideration of the law relating specifi­cally to the expert testimony of public accountants, some atten­tion may well be devoted to the general nature of expert testimony.
Whether or not one is an expert witness is a matter of degree.1
Expertness is a result of experience. Between the extremes of a 
baby with practically no experience and a highly trained technician 
there are a great many degrees of expertness. Every one who takes 
a witness stand has acquired many experiences in life; he has 
formed concepts which make it possible for him to reach decisions 
as to the matter that reacted upon his senses, about which he is 
testifying. If the experience is one common to mankind, the wit­
ness is presumed to be able to understand the meaning of what 
he saw, heard, smelled, tasted or felt and can give to the court his 
shorthand interpretation of his sensations, that is, his mental re­
action to the happening at the moment of the experience. Though 
the witness can not express his judgment on the main issue before 
the trier of facts, he, in common with all mankind, must interpret 
his sensations in the light of his past experience. If his experience 
has been that common to mankind, then the witness is presumed 
to be qualified to testify on an inferential fact which came into his 
experience. In a sense, he is an expert; but he is not the sort of 
expert who is required to have preliminary evidence of a knowledge, 
skill and technique not common to mankind.
An expert witness, in the sense the term is generally used, means 
one who possesses peculiar knowledge, wisdom, skill or information
1 Wigmore on Evidence, volume I, section 555. McKelvey on Evidence, pp. 230-
271.
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in respect to a subject-matter under consideration. The knowledge 
and technique of the expert witness must be such as is acquired 
only by study, investigation, observation, practice or experience, 
which does not fall to the lot of mankind in general. The witness 
is said to be expert because he can present and interpret inferential 
facts involving a science or an art not known to the average juror. 
The expert witness is used in order to make the material under 
review intelligible to the jurors who are presumed to have had 
only the experience of men moving in the ordinary walks of life. 
The jurors utilize the expert’s knowledge of facts and interpreta­
tions for the same reason that the business man or layman seeks the 
advice and aid of persons who possess special skill and technical 
knowledge.2
The qualifications of the witness to produce expert testimony 
should be shown by the witness’s statements in response to the 
questioning of the proponent’s counsel. The right of cross- 
examination of the witness to determine his qualifications to testify 
as an expert may be claimed by the opponent. The determination 
of the competency of the witness to testify as an expert is always 
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Appeal courts will not over­
rule the trial court’s discretion in such matters except in extreme 
cases of abuse, as where it is shown that the trial judge was 
prejudiced.3
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E nglish L aw  R elative to the A dmissibility of an A ccountant’s 
E xpert T estimony
A careful search through the issues of the English professional 
accountants’ organ, The Accountant, published in London, for the 
years 1893 to 1933, inclusive, revealed several strong articles on the 
technique of rendering service as an expert witness in accountancy 
but not a single reference to any English statute or court decision 
on the subject. Likewise, an exhaustive search through the English 
digests of law revealed not a single case or statute on the scope of 
the admissibility of an accountant’s expert testimony. A request
2 W igmore on Evidence, 1923, volume I, sections 555 and 556. McKelvey on 
Evidence, pp. 230-271.
3 22 Corpus Juris, p. 526, sec. 610.
was sent to the editor of The Accountant for a statement of the 
English law with respect to the admissibility of the expert testimony 
of an accountant. The editor of The Accountant graciously set 
forth the English law on the subject in a letter, dated November 
24, 1933. A portion of the letter reads as follows:
“In reply to your letter of November 6th, your question is a 
little difficult to answer as, so far as we are aware, the scope of the 
evidence which an accountant is permitted to give has never been 
legally defined, nor has there been any case on this point. As a matter 
of practice, however, an accountant’s evidence is always admissible on 
any question of practice relating to the audit or presentation of 
accounts or on such matters as professional charges.”
A merican L aw R elative to the A dmissibility of an A ccountant’s 
E xpert T estimony
No law in American jurisprudence relating peculiarly to ac­
countants is so well defined and settled as that concerning the ad­
missibility of the testimony of an expert accountant. More than 
three score of cases have included rulings on the admissibility of 
an expert accountant’s testimony. One case dates as far back as 
1854; other cases were spread sparingly from that date to 1920; 
then from 1921 until 1934 a great many decisions arose clarifying 
the law on the accountant as a witness.
The case rulings on admissibility of the accountant’s testimony 
have grown out of both criminal and civil actions; and in these 
rulings no distinction is made between civil and criminal actions.
T he A dmissibility of A ccounting R ecords as E vidence
The admissibility of an accountant’s statements and schedules 
and also his expert testimony must necessarily be predicated upon 
the admissibility of the accounting records themselves as evidence 
in court. The law relative to the admissibility of accounting records 
has evolved through a steady process of growth; and to obtain a 
proper understanding of its present status it is necessary to follow 
this growth.
As early as 1600 in England traders and handicraftsmen estab­
lished the custom of recording in their books (parties’ account-
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books) evidence of sales made on account. Quite often the trader 
or handicraftsman failed to give customers credit for their pay­
ments and used their bookkeeping records to prove in court the 
claims against the customers who in fact had already settled their 
debts. These records were regularly admitted as evidence in court, 
whether the entries were made by the owner or by one or more 
of his clerks and whether the entrant were living or dead. To cor­
rect this abuse a series of statutes was passed in the reign of 
Charles I. The statutes virtually prohibited the admission of parties’ 
account-books, i.e., books prepared by the litigant himself, as 
evidence.4 The statutes were based on the theory that a man should 
not be permitted to make evidence for himself. It was not until the 
nineteenth century that parties’ account-books, that is, books pre­
pared by the litigant himself, were, by statute, made admissible 
evidence in England.5
However, in the eighteenth century the English courts held that 
records prepared by servants or clerks who swore under oath that 
they prepared the records in the usual course of business for their 
master were admissible evidence. The decisions also provided that, 
in case the clerk or servant had died, proof that the records were 
prepared by such clerk or servant in the usual course of the business 
rendered the records admissible evidence. A little later, in the nine­
teenth century, the general scope of the rule was enlarged so as to 
cover all entries made “by a person, since deceased, in the ordinary 
course of business,” whether a person wholly unassociated with the 
owner or the clerk of the owner or the owner himself. This rule is 
universally recognized in England today.6
In the American colonies laws were passed making parties’ 
account-books inadmissible evidence where the entries were made 
by the party himself, unless such party swore to the accuracy of the 
entries under oath. Such statutes made it possible for small traders 
to produce evidence in court, even though such traders were them­
selves incompetent to take the stand, by merely swearing to the 
genuineness of the records. The parties’ account-books subject to a
4 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1518. 
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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great many limitations are still admitted in American courts under 
the parties’-account-books doctrine.
The practice of admitting as evidence a litigant’s accounting rec­
ords prepared by third persons, such as clerks, servants or strangers 
since deceased was established by the American courts in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, following the English decisions on 
the point. This rule for the admissibility of a litigant’s records pre­
pared by a third person in the regular course of the litigant’s busi­
ness as evidence in court, rather than the rule of the parties’ account- 
books, is generally applied today in American cases wherever the 
question of the admissibility of accounting records arises.
It is worth while to consider the nature of the doctrines of the 
parties’ account-books and the third person’s entries in the regular 
course of the litigant’s business.
While in the early English law the admission of account-books as 
evidence was objected to on the ground that a man should not be 
allowed to make evidence for himself, in more recent times the 
usual objection to such evidence is that accounting records are past, 
extrajudicial, hearsay data. However, modern courts generally hold 
that accounting records constitute an exception to the hearsay rule 
of evidence. The reasons for making this exception to the hearsay 
rule are given below separately for the doctrine of regular entries 
in general and the doctrine of parties’ account-books.
The regular entries in general are accepted as admissible evidence 
because of necessity and the circumstantial guaranty of trustworthi­
ness.7 Where the entrant is unavailable the records themselves may 
be admissible because the records are the only testimony available 
from the entrant.
The entrant is deemed unavailable to testify in case of: (a) 
death; (b) insanity; (c) illness effectively preventing attendance; 
(d) absence from the jurisdiction. It is held by some courts that, 
on the ground of inconvenience, it is not necessary in a large 
business to have all the employees who had anything to do with 
the transactions under consideration testify, but that, instead, the 
records verified by one employee may be admitted as evidence.
7 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1521-1535.
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Practical inconvenience as an excuse, subject to the judge’s dis­
cretion to require the entrant’s production for cross-examination 
where the nature of the dispute renders it desirable, should be the 
guiding principle for courts to follow. In fact, statutes provide for 
the admission of corporation books, banker’s books, hospital books, 
and common carrier’s books as evidence without the verification 
of those who had to do with the records.
Beside necessity there is the circumstantial guaranty of trust­
worthiness which justifies the admission of regular entries in gen­
eral, which, of course, are not subject to cross-examination. The 
courts agree that: (a) the habit of making entries with regularity 
insures, in some degree, accuracy and honesty—it is easier to enter 
transactions correctly than to falsify them; (b) the entrant generally 
realizes that his errors or misstatements will eventually be disputed 
by customers or others with whom his employer deals; hence, the 
entrant will be inclined to make his entries correct; (c) the proba­
bility of censure from his employer is a strong deterrent to the 
entrant against his making erroneous records.
The circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness may be over­
come by proof of a motive to prepare false records.
The entries offered as evidence must relate to the business and 
must have been made in the regular course of the business—they 
must be a part of the system of entries. A single, isolated entry 
made after the books have been closed is not admissible. Whether 
or not an entry has been made in the regular course of the business 
is a matter for the trial judge to determine. An entry to be ad­
missible must have been made at or near the time of the occurrence 
of the transaction. In the usual course of a business the entries are 
prepared contemporaneously with the transaction. In making the 
entries there is no limitation as to the mode of written expression. 
A mark or sign that is interpretable as having a definite meaning 
will suffice. The absence of an entry where an entry ordinarily 
would have been made had there been a transaction should be 
interpreted to mean that no transaction occurred. While in some 
jurisdictions the original memoranda of the transactions have been 
required as evidence, generally the original records, the journals, 
are all of the records that courts require as evidence. Some courts
have allowed the ledger to which were posted the journal entries 
as evidence where the journals could not be produced.
The parties’ account-books were made admissible evidence in 
exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and the circum­
stantial guaranty of trustworthiness.8 Though, under modern rules 
of evidence, the justification of the admission of the parties’ account- 
books as evidence on the ground of necessity is not plausible, the 
rule admitting such books as evidence persists in exception to the 
hearsay rule. The parties’ account-books were made admissible in 
the colonial and state courts of America to meet the needs of the 
early small traders who kept their own accounts and were not 
competent to give evidence under a rule of evidence then existing, 
which prevented an interested party from testifying in a trial.
The great limitations upon the use of the parties’ account-books 
(often called parties’ shop-books   in legal discussion) as evidence 
may be recognized after a presentation of a few of the restrictive 
rules. The trader’s own entries of cash payments or loans were not 
admissible because the trader could have notes or other memo­
randa of such transactions. A few courts have admitted such evi­
dence under the parties’-account-books doctrine, while many other 
courts have admitted this sort of evidence, that is, entries of cash 
payments and loans recorded by the owner himself, under the 
doctrine of entries made in the regular course of the business, as 
explained above. Under the latter doctrine the regularity of the 
entries during the usual course of the business is the basis of the 
trustworthiness of the entries and is the justification of their ad­
mission. Under the parties’-account-books rule entries of a guaranty 
for the performance of a third person have been held inadmissible 
where the third person’s evidence was available. Under the parties’- 
account-books rule an entry of a special contract was not admissible 
evidence where the special written contract itself was available. 
Also, in certain occupations the parties’ account-books were not 
admissible evidence where better evidence could be obtained. For 
instance, it was deemed that pupils afforded better evidence than 
the schoolmaster’s records. Finally, the admission of the parties’
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8 W igmore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1536-1561.
account-books was limited to small transactions and transactions 
not in violation of good morals.
The rules involved in the parties’ account-books doctrine were 
and are extremely rigid.9 Under such rules the parties’ account- 
books may be admissible even though witnesses of the transactions 
are available, and they may not be admissible even though wit­
nesses of the transactions are not available. The admissibility of the 
records is not dependent upon the actual necessity of the particular 
case, but upon the question whether or not the case falls within the 
requirements of the doctrine of the parties’ account-books.
In addition to the description of the parties’-account-books doc­
trine already presented, a consideration of some other characteristics 
of the doctrine is desirable. The circumstantial guaranties of trust­
worthiness of the party’s entries in his own books are based upon 
the belief that regularity of habit, difficulty of falsification and fair 
certainty of detection will balance or outweigh his tendency to 
falsify his records for self-interest. Under this doctrine it is required 
that the entries be contemporaneous with the transactions—that 
the books present an honest appearance. In some states the supple­
tory oath that the books were correctly kept is still required by 
statute; while in other jurisdictions cross-examination of the litigant 
who prepared the books is allowed to take the place of his supple­
tory oath. Finally, under the parties’-account-books doctrine courts 
interpret an omission of an entry to mean that no transaction 
occurred.
Under modern legislation removing the disqualification of wit­
nesses on account of interest in the issue, a party to a suit has been 
made competent to testify in his own behalf; 10 hence, there no 
longer exists the necessity of introducing the party’s account-books 
prepared by himself. The party produces infra-judicial evidence 
himself; he is subject to cross-examination and uses his records 
merely to refresh his memory. In taking the witness stand the party 
is not now subject to all the delimitations surrounding his account 
books as was the case when he had to offer his own account-books
9 W igmore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1536-1561.
10 W igmore on Evidence, vol. III, secs. 1559, 1560.
A dmissibility of A ccountant’s T estimony 149
as evidence because of the fact that he was not permitted to testify 
in his own interest.
Though it remains possible under American law, as a result of 
tradition, to admit as evidence parties’ account-books, it is generally 
not wise to do so because of the many rigid limitations placed upon 
such evidence. The usual course of practice is to use the parties’ 
account-books merely to refresh the memory of the party witness 
and thus avoid the inconveniences concomitant with the account- 
books doctrine. Records prepared by persons unavailable are ad­
missible under the doctrine for entries prepared in the regular 
course of business, which has already been described.11
In the preceding pages the discussion has been concerned with 
the admission of the party’s records as evidence to support his own 
case. The extent to which a party’s records may be used as evidence 
against him or to support the cause of the opponent in the suit 
deserves consideration. Let us now in this consideration shift the 
point of view, the owner of the records becoming the party- 
opponent and the one seeking such records as evidence becoming 
the party.
During the eighteenth century the chancery of England regularly 
enforced what was known as a bill for discovery to require a party- 
opponent to produce to the court for inspection any documents 
containing evidence which bore on the party’s case. The party was 
not permitted to inspect any portion of the documents not directly 
supporting the party’s case. In other words, the party was not 
allowed to inspect such portions of the documents as bore solely 
upon the party-opponent’s case. It is apparent that it was impossible 
in many cases to separate the information into the two classes of 
data. But such was the theory of the rule; and the rule was applied 
regularly in equity trials.
The common-law courts would not enforce the discovery of the 
party-opponent’s records. However, a litigant in a common-law 
court could obtain either production or access for inspection of 
his opponent’s records by filing with the chancery a bill for dis­
covery. This process was long, tedious and expensive. At present 
statutes in England and America have extended to the litigant in a
11 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sections 1517-1561.
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civil action the same privilege of discovering the genuineness and 
contents of his opponent’s records as may be obtained in an equi­
table proceeding. This privilege is allowed after the issues are 
joined either before or during the trial. Under authority granted 
by the statutes the court compels either the production or access for 
inspection of the party-opponent’s records usually through a sub­
poena or the traditional order for discovery utilized by the chancery. 
Before the records are submitted to the party for inspection, the 
court determines what information may be sought by the party in 
establishing his own case.12
The party-opponent is exempt from disclosure of his records 
where his records contain self-incriminating evidence or certain 
trade secrets. The matter of privilege for an accountant’s working 
papers would follow the principles governing the admissibility of 
confidential communications between accountant and client. (See 
page I75.)
As a result of centuries of legal conflict the principle that a 
witness is entitled to immunity from the production of self- 
incriminating evidence has become well established in the common 
and constitutional law of England and America. This privilege 
merely protects one from the disclosure of his privately owned rec­
ords by means of a legal process against him as a witness. If through 
a subpoena or any other order of the court in a process treating 
one as a witness it is sought to compel an ordinary witness or a 
party-witness to produce his privately owned accounting records 
the tendency of which is self-incriminatory, the witness may have 
full protection in refusing to give up custody of the records. By 
virtue of the testimonial process the witness would at any time be 
liable to take oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the 
accounting records. The oath in such circumstances would violate 
the privilege of immunity from self-incriminating testimony. 
Hence, the courts deny such evidence produced through any testi­
monial compulsion. But, on the other hand, if the accounting 
records are obtained, not through a testimonial process, but through 
any means, legal or not legal, the records may be used to incrimi­
nate the ordinary witness or the party-witness, provided the proof
12 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, secs. 1857-1861, and volume IV, sec. 2219.
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of their identity, authenticity or other circumstance affecting them 
is made by other persons, without any employment of the accused’s 
oath or testimonial responsibility.13
Records of the government and accounting records of corpora­
tions and banks are not deemed privately owned records of the 
officers of such institutions and can be produced in court, where 
removal from the institution is not prohibited by statute, even by 
testimonial process to afford evidence against accused officers. Even 
where removal is prohibited by statute, courts will enforce the 
testimonial process to gain access to the records of such institutions. 
It has been held that where it can be shown that records nominally 
belong to a corporation but in reality belong to an officer of the 
corporation such records may be withheld by an accused corporate 
officer against a testimonial process.14
Courts in England and America generally allow to a limited 
degree freedom from disclosure of private trade secrets. The private 
secrets which are protected by the privilege of non-disclosure in 
court may be the chemical and physical composition of substances, 
the mechanical structure of tools and machines, names of customers 
and the subjects and amounts of expense. In order that the freedom 
from disclosure of trade secrets may be obtained the exigency of 
secrecy must be made particularly plain to the court. Generally, the 
privilege is allowed only when the disclosure of the secret facts is 
merely a subordinate means of proof as compared to the other 
available evidence in the case. Often the disclosure is restricted to 
the judge or his delegate; and in this way a fair degree of pro­
tection is obtained. Where full disclosure of trade secrets appears 
to the judge as being indispensable to the ascertainment of truth, 
revelation is generally required. The principles governing the 
privilege of trade secrets apply to the production or access to 
accounting records as well as to other documents and testimonial 
evidence.15
13 Note: A much criticized minority holding has broken away from the long- 
settled fundamentals, and has held that the party whose documents were obtained 
by illegal search has a right to obtain their return by motion before the trial, 
Weeks  v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914), Flagg v. U. S., 233 Fed. 
481 (1916). The Flagg case applies specifically to books and papers.
14 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. IV, secs. 2250-2265.
15 Wigmore on Evidence, vol. IV, sec. 2212.
152 R esponsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
A dmissibility of A ccountant’s T estimony 153
A dmissibility of an E xpert A ccountant’s Statements and 
Schedules of V oluminous and M ultifarious Books
In 1854 the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts held, as ad­
missible, evidence consisting of summary statements of accounting 
records in the case of Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v. 
Dana 16 in the following language:
“The defendant further objects that schedules, made from the 
original papers and documents previously proved in the case, showing 
certain data and results obtained therefrom, and verified by the wit­
ness by whom they were prepared, were improperly admitted. But it 
appears to us that questions of this sort must necessarily be left very 
much to the discretion of the judge who presides at the trial. It would 
doubtless be inexpedient in most cases to permit ex-parte statement 
of facts or figures to be prepared and submitted to the jury. It should 
only be done where books and documents are multifarious and 
voluminous, and of a character to render it difficult for the jury to 
comprehend material facts without the aid of such statements, and 
even in such cases they should not be admitted, unless verified by 
persons who have prepared them from the originals in proof, and 
who testify to their accuracy, and after ample time has been given 
to the adverse party to examine them and test their correctness. Such 
was the course pursued in the present case, and there can be no doubt 
that, in a trial embracing so many details and occupying so great a 
length of time as the case at bar, during which a great mass of 
books and documents were put in evidence, it was the only mode of 
attaining to an intelligible view of the cause before the jury.”
In the Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v. Dana case 
the court held that, because of the need of presenting to the jury 
an intelligible view of multifarious and voluminous accounting 
records, summary statements and schedules of such records were 
admissible as evidence provided the persons who prepared the 
statements and schedules verified their accuracy and provided the 
adverse party had ample time and opportunity to examine and 
test the accuracy of the summaries. Apparently there is no Ameri­
can authority in conflict with the principle of this case. Much of 
the language of the case has been appropriated in more than a
16 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 83.
score of the cases cited in the succeeding pages of this chapter. A 
holding almost identical was rendered in 1930 by the Ohio court of 
appeals.17 Without question the principle of the above case may 
be accepted as established law.
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In 1899 the rule in Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation v. 
Dana, supra, was broadened by the supreme court of California 
in the case of Crusoe v. Claris 18 so as to make admissible the tes­
timony of an accountant who has summarized the records in ques­
tion.
The American courts are uniform in holding that an accountant’s 
expert testimony is admissible. A clear justification of the rule was 
set forth in 1932 by the supreme court of Mississippi in the case of 
Crawford v. State 19 as follows:
“An elemental requirement in the production of evidence is that 
it shall be intelligible to the triers of the facts and to the person 
being tried; and the further requirement is that it shall be definite 
and that the right of cross-examination shall be preserved. Moreover, 
the production must be in such a state of preparation as to expedite 
the trial and prevent trespasses upon the time of courts and juries. 
It follows, therefore, that, when intricate accounts and voluminous 
business records are to be inquired into and the facts upon particu­
lar issues said to be disclosed by said records are to be adduced in 
proof, it must be done by way of the previous preparation, by a 
competent person, of definite ana pertinent schedules, tabulations, or 
other suitable and practical compilations, and the person who has 
made the compilations must be introduced as a witness, so that the 
records in evidence may be explained and the pertinent parts thereof 
definitely and cogently pointed out, and so that cross-examination 
may be permitted to search into the soundness of the compilations or 
schedules and of a reasonable compliance with the foregoing require­
ments, a pile of books of account will prove no more in law than, as a 
practical matter, they have disclosed in a concrete and definite form 
to the minds of those who are to determine the issue or issues, and
17 McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 172, N. E. 561, 35 Ohio App. 443.
18 50 P. 700, 127 Cal. 341.
19 138 So. 589.
this, save in rare cases, could reasonably be, in actual and dependable 
substance, but little more than nothing.”
In Crawford v. State the court gave as a reason for making ad­
missible the expert accountant’s testimony as to the content and 
meaning of intricate and voluminous accounting records the need 
for the jury to obtain an understanding of the accounting mate­
rial. It is apparent to the layman that accounting records are unin­
telligible to the average juror, and that without an explanation of 
such records the average jury would be left without a proper 
understanding of the inferential facts of the case. Necessity is the 
justification of the rule. The rule is uniformly accepted in American 
courts.
T he  P arol-evidence R ule and the E xpert A ccountant’s 
T estimony
The parol-evidence rule renders inadmissible any evidence the 
effect of which is to vary the terms of a written instrument or to 
change, cut down or alter the effect of the instrument.20 The rule 
applies to written instruments which give evidence of voluntary 
relations between two or more parties—relations which may be 
created, defined, transferred or extinguished by expressed will of 
the parties. Among examples of such voluntary relations are sales, 
contracts, negotiable instruments, wills, releases and deeds.
Generally, contracts are expressed in writing to avoid the indefi­
niteness and misunderstanding which often accompany oral agree­
ments. In the writing of a contract there is generally a greater 
amount of deliberation and consideration than is found in the mak­
ing of oral contracts. Hence, the courts are disinclined to disturb 
the condition of matters embodied in a written contract. The courts 
generally refuse to admit evidence tending to show that the parties 
had intentions different from those revealed by the writing itself. 
This rule, however, is so narrowly circumscribed by exceptions 
that it has well nigh ceased to be a rule of law. The rule is little 
more than a convenient way of saying that the party to a valid 
contract should live up to his agreement.
20 McKelvey on Evidence, fourth edition, pp. 475-491.
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Oral evidence may be introduced to show that a contract is not 
what it appears from the writing to be. Since, after all, the binding 
effect of an agreement is dependent upon circumstances external to 
the writing itself, oral evidence may be used to invalidate the 
agreement on account of fraud in the execution of the agreement, 
failure of consideration, duress, undue influence or a mistake as 
to the identity of the subject matter involved. Where the full tenor 
of an agreement does not appear from the writing, collateral oral 
testimony may be offered to show fully the parties’ intentions. 
Such incompleteness of the instrument must appear from either the 
writing itself or the surrounding circumstances. Any collateral oral 
agreement modifying or rescinding a written agreement, if made 
subsequent to the written agreement, may be proved in court. Where 
a business custom enters into and becomes a part of a contract, 
such custom may be proved by oral testimony if the writing is 
silent as to the custom. It has been repeatedly held that where 
technical language, signs or abbreviations have been employed in a 
written contract expert witnesses may give explanations and in­
terpretations of the instrument so that the jury may acquire an 
understanding of the intentions of the parties to the agreement.21
The American courts are uniform in holding that the testimony 
of an expert accountant does not come within the parol-evidence 
rule. The supreme court of North Carolina in 1928 definitely stated 
the position of the American courts in the case of State v. Maslin 22 
as follows:
“Several exceptions relate to expert testimony which was admitted 
to elucidate certain entries in the books of the bank. The objection is 
that the entries were free from ambiguity and that parol evidence 
was not admissible in explanation. The principle that as a rule parol 
evidence can not be received to contradict, alter or modify the terms 
of a written instrument which speaks for itself has no application 
here. The evidence was offered for the purpose of tracing sundry 
entries on the books through a series of transactions which tended 
to show that funds had been taken from the trust account and else­
where applied. It is hard to see how the jury could have understood
21 McKelvey on Evidence, fourth edition, pp. 475-491.
22 143 S. E. 3, 195 N. C. 537.
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the significance of these entries without the aid of expert testimony, 
or how they could have taken the books and satisfactorily have traced 
any of the funds while making up their verdict. The entries were not 
changed; their meaning was explained. There was no invasion of 
the province of the jury by the expression of an opinion upon a fact 
in issue. * * *”
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California has provided by statute that the expert testimony of 
an accountant is an exception to the rule that the only evidence of 
the contents of a writing is the writing itself. That statute was 
quoted in part by the supreme court of California in 1930 in the 
case of Johnstone v. Morris 23 as follows:
“* * * Section 1855 of the code of civil procedure provides in part:
‘There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the 
writing itself, except in the following cases: * * * 5. When the original 
consists of numerous accounts or other documents, which can not be 
examined in court without great loss of time, and the evidence sought 
from them is only the general result of the whole.’
“Although it is true that Mr. Dolge did not do all of the actual 
checking required, we do not deem that essential to permit the sum­
mary to be introduced. He testified very clearly that his report was 
made from the original tags, cheques, and books of account, and 
that he had personal knowledge of the same. The tags, cheques and 
books were all made available to appellant, and could all have been 
introduced into evidence, but it was to prevent such a time-wasting 
and lengthy procedure that section 1855, subdivision 5, of the code of 
civil procedure was passed. * * *”
In each of the two cases, State v. Maslin and Johnstone v. Morris, 
supra, the court admitted as evidence the expert accountant’s 
explanations of the accounting records under consideration. This 
is in harmony with the well-settled law which permits oral testi­
mony to explain technical matters included in written agree­
ments.24 The rule is enforced to give to the jury a proper under­
standing of the written data in the shortest and easiest way possible.
23 292 P. 970.
24 McKelvey on Evidence, 4th ed., pp. 487-490. Quigley v. De Haas, 98 Pa. 299.
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of H earsay or P rimary E vidence
If A, while on the witness stand, testifies as to what he heard 
B, who is not a witness or a party to the suit, say in regard to fact 
X, which is the subject of proof, A’s assertion is hearsay evidence. 
Hearsay evidence is testimony of something that has been said or 
written by a person who is not a witness or a party to the suit. 
The general rule followed by courts in respect to hearsay evidence 
is to reject such evidence because it has not been tested by cross- 
examination. A fundamental rule of law in England and America 
is the requirement that all evidence be purified by the process of 
cross-examination. The cross-examination allowed to the opposing 
party is designed to reveal the errors, inconsistencies and false­
hoods of the testimony of the witness. The right of cross-examina­
tion is thought by some eminent jurists to be the greatest legal 
engine ever invented to test the trustworthiness of evidence and to 
discover the truth.25
However, the test of cross-examination may be dispensed with 
where the necessities of the case require evidence from witnesses 
who are unavailable and where the circumstances are such as to 
make it sufficiently clear that the evidence is free from inaccuracy 
and untrustworthiness. If a witness is unavailable by reason of 
death, absence from the jurisdiction or any other cause acceptable 
to the court, the court is presented with the alternative of receiv­
ing the statements of the witness without the test of cross-examina­
tion or failing to utilize the knowledge of the witness. In a situa­
tion of this sort the court is always confronted with the problem 
of determining whether in the interest of truth it would be better 
to reject or to receive such information untested by cross-examina­
tion. If in addition to the necessity of receiving statements from an 
unavailable witness there is some degree of trustworthiness more 
than the ordinary to be expected of the statements, the statements 
may be admitted as evidence. Courts have not attempted to obtain 
uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness which various circum­
stances presuppose. The courts take the view that common sense
25Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1367.
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and experience have from time to time pointed out certain circum­
stances as practically adequate substitutes for the test of cross- 
examination wherever there exists a necessity of the information 
in the case.
In permitting exceptions to the hearsay rule, courts have not 
applied the principles of necessity and trustworthiness of the in­
formation with equal strictness 26—sometimes one, sometimes the 
other, has carried the greater importance in the decision. Any at­
tempt to give a thorough survey of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule of evidence would involve a whole volume. For present pur­
poses it will not be necessary to do more than merely to enumerate 
some of the exceptions and to apply the two principles, necessity 
and trustworthiness, to the cases in which it was held that a public 
accountant’s expert testimony is an exception to the hearsay rule 
of evidence.
Matters of family pedigree may be proved by written or oral 
statements handed down from father to son. Statements made by 
witnesses in other trials where the parties and the issues in dispute 
were the same as those in the case in which it is sought to intro­
duce the statements form an exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay 
statements have uniformly been admitted to prove matters of pub­
lic interest, such as the location of territorial boundaries and the 
incorporation of a governmental subdivision. Where any act such 
as a crime or tort has occurred and declarations relevant to the act 
were made spontaneously at the time when the act occurred, the 
declarations are admissible evidence. The term, res gestae, applied 
to this last situation means that the acts speak for themselves. 
Books and documents of a public nature, in which are recorded facts 
to be preserved for public reference, are admissible evidence by 
common and statutory law. Since the 18th century courts have held 
that private accounting records form an exception to the hearsay 
rule of evidence. The necessity for the use of such evidence arose 
from the unavailability of a witness because of death, absence from 
the jurisdiction, incompetency or inconvenience. The fact that the 
entries were made in the regular course of the business, it was 
thought, justified the belief that the entries were trustworthy as a
26 W igmore on Evidence, volume III, secs. 1420-1427.
result of the circumstances in which they were normally recorded. 
The habit of doing accurate work, the fact that it is easier to record 
the truth than to falsify, the consciousness of the entrant, while 
recording, that his erroneous or false entries will eventually come 
to light have been held to be circumstances which will afford suffi­
cient assurance of the trustworthiness of the records and be an 
effective substitute for the test of cross-examination.27
Let us now pass to a consideration of the accountant’s expert 
testimony in its relation to the hearsay rule. The supreme court of 
Louisiana in 1921 held in the case of State v. Perry 28 as follows:
“The fourth bill was taken to a witness being allowed to testify that 
on the date when the deposit in question was received the bank was 
insolvent. The objection was that the books of the bank were the 
best evidence.
“The witness was testifying as an expert accountant, giving the 
result of his examination of the books of the bank. This kind of 
evidence is an exception to the rules of hearsay and primary evi­
dence. * * *”
While courts require that the best evidence available, and not 
secondary or hearsay evidence which may be substituted for the 
best or primary evidence, be used in a trial, yet, in the case of State 
v. Perry, the court was in agreement with sound principles of law 
in holding that the admission of the expert accountant’s testimony 
was an exception to the rules of hearsay and primary evidence. 
Granted that the accounting records themselves in a given case are 
admissible evidence, the expert accountant’s testimony as to the 
content and meaning of the records may be admissible evidence as 
a result of necessity for the use of such testimony and as a result 
of the circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness. It is necessary 
to accept the testimony of an expert accountant in order to convey 
to the lay jury an understanding of the records constituting infer­
ential facts which bear upon the main issue of the case. A sufficient 
assurance of trustworthiness of the accountant’s expert testimony 
is obtained from the fact that an accountant is normally in the 
habit of doing his work accurately, the fact that it is easier to make
27 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sections 1360-1810.
28 90 So. 406, 149 La. 1065. See also Hankins v. State, 213 N.W. 344.
160 R esponsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
an honest review than a false one, the consciousness on the part of 
the accountant that the accuracy and honesty of his report will be 
tested by cross-examination of him personally and probably by a 
review of the records by the opposing party. Hence, the public ac­
countant’s expert testimony can not be precluded by the hearsay 
rule of evidence.
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C ustody of Records
In respect to the custody of records about which the accountant’s 
expert testimony is offered there are three distinct classes of deci­
sions. The universally accepted rule is that the records must be 
in custody of the court so as to afford the opposing party an 
opportunity to cross-examine the accountant witness by means of 
a comparison of his testimonial statements with the records them­
selves. This requirement is dispensed with where the trial judge is 
satisfied that the records should not be removed to the court-room 
because of the great public and private inconvenience that would 
ensue therefrom and also where the books have been lost before 
the trial takes place. While many cases have required that the 
court have custody of records as a prerequisite to the admission of 
expert testimony concerning the books, only two cases are quoted 
here. The decision in the first case, Ruth v. State,29 rendered by the 
supreme court of Wisconsin in 1909, reads in part as follows:
“It is urged by the accused that the court committed prejudicial 
error in admitting the evidence of the experts respecting the state of 
the account between the Arcadia and Winona banks, and the condi­
tion of the accounts of the Arcadia bank. The claim is that these 
experts were permitted to testify that items of book entries were 
shown to be incorrect by means of summary statements and tables 
which they had taken and made from the book accounts of the books
29 140 Wis. 373, 122 N. W. 733. Similar decisions are as follows: Brown v. First 
National Bank, 113 P. 483, 49 Colo. 393; Young v. State, 103 S. E. 804, 25 
Ga. App. 562; Herberg v. State, 222 S. W. 559, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 439; State v. 
Williams, i n  A. 701, 94 Vt. 423; Camp v. State, 122 S. E. 249, 31 Ga. 737; 
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123, 147 Md. 71; People v. Hatfield, 208 N. W. 682, 
234 Mich. 574; Pierce Pet. Co. v. Osage Coal Co., 271 P. 675 (Okla.); McNaugh- 
ton v. Presbyterian Church, 172 N. E. 561, 35 Ohio App. 443; State v. Olson, 
287 P. 181 (Utah); Bush v. Board of Education of Clark County, y /  S. W. (2d) 
849, 238 Ky. 297; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mayor and Council of Wil­
mington et al., 157 A. 208 (Delaware).
of both banks, without introducing in evidence all of these books and 
the entries on which such statements were based, and without produc­
ing any evidence tending to show that the book entries and accounts 
of the Winona bank were correct and true. The practice of per­
mitting expert accountants to examine long book accounts and to 
give in summary form the results thereof for the information of 
the court and jury is approved as practical and proper in the trial 
of causes involving the examination of long book accounts. A proper 
administration, of course, requires that the opposing party shall 
be afforded the time and opportunity to test the correctness of the 
evidence, and for this purpose to have access to the books and the 
use of them for the purposes of cross-examination. In so far as this 
practice was adopted in the case, we find nothing in the record 
showing that the evidence of the experts on this subject was improper. 
The claim that the failure to offer in evidence all of the account 
books of the Arcadia bank which was covered by this evidence 
operated to defendant’s prejudice is not shown, for it appears that 
all such books were brought into court, were identified and were 
accessible to the defendant and his attorney.”
A slight variation from this decision may be noted in the second 
case, Stephen v. United States,30 decided in 1930 by the circuit 
court of appeals, ninth circuit, which held that the expert ac­
countant’s testimony relative to accounting books was admissible 
where the records were kept in the prosecution’s possession in the 
building, but not in the court room, where the trial was conducted. 
A portion of the opinion reads:
“* * * The prosecution had in some manner acquired possession of 
these books of account and records, approximately 250 volumes, and 
for convenience kept them in two rooms in the building where the 
trial was had. * * * Ordinarily the party offering such testimony 
should be required to produce in court or to make available for his 
opponent’s use the documents and books used by the witness, but 
even that rule is not universally followed and where recognized it 
is subject to exceptions. * * *”
The reason for requiring production of documents31 before 
the tribunal rather than permitting merely oral testimony as to
80 41 F. (2d) 440.
31 Note: Accounting records come within the definition of documents. 2 Words 
and Phrases (2nd series) 167; Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, section 1223.
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their contents, under the so-called best or primary evidence rule, 
has been based upon the experience of courts that generally wit­
nesses do not carry accurate recollections of documents.32 It has 
been found that the human memory serves as a rather poor medium 
through which to portray the contents, nature of paper and hand­
writing, and the signatures of written documents. Hence, the 
courts have been rigid in their requirements that the documents 
themselves be produced in court. While accounting records must 
necessarily be explained to the court by an expert, it is vital to a 
correct showing of the truth of the case that the opponents be 
allowed to test the trustworthiness of the accountant’s expert tes­
timony through an examination of the records. It is apparent that 
the most immediate check upon the witness’ testimonial statements 
is made possible where the books are in the court room. Further­
more, it may easily be possible that an exhibition of the records 
before the jury will reveal the character of the handwriting and 
the books themselves so as materially to aid the cause of truth­
finding. Where the books are stored under the custody of the court 
in a room adjoining the court room or in the building in which 
the trial is conducted, the opportunity to test the accountant’s tes­
timony may easily be afforded to the opposing party.
This sort of situation would seem to suffice as a means of test­
ing the trustworthiness of the expert testimony. It has uniformly 
been conceded by courts that the opportunity of cross-examination 
by the opposing party, even though the opportunity be not availed 
of, will answer sufficiently the requirement that evidence be tested 
by cross-examination.33 Moreover, the records under the court’s 
custody in a room adjoining the court room or in the building 
in which the trial is conducted could be conveniently made avail­
able for an inspection by the jury itself.
The second type of cases which deal with the custody of records, 
about which the expert accountant’s testimony is offered, has dis­
pensed with the requirement of the custody of the records by the 
court as a prerequisite to the admission of the accountant’s testi­
mony concerning the books, where the removal of the books to the
32 W igmore on Evidence, volume II, sec. 1179.
33 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1371.
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court-room would work great public and private inconvenience. 
Two cases of this type are included herein, the first of which, 
Pioneer Lumber Co. v. Van Cleave34 decided in 1925 by the St. 
Louis court of appeals, Missouri, reads in part as follows:
“* * * We recognize the rule that, where the results of an examina­
tion of many books, papers or records are to be proved, and the 
necessary examination of such documentary evidence can not be con­
veniently or satisfactorily made in court, it may be made by an expert 
accountant or other competent person, and the results thereof be 
proved by him, provided the books, papers, or records themselves 
are properly in evidence or their absence satisfactorily explained. * * *”
The other case dispensing with the requirement of custody of the 
books by the court because of the public and private inconvenience 
of their removal is State v. Matfyns,33 which was decided in 1930 
by the supreme court of Missouri. A portion of the opinion follows:
“* * * In Citizens' Trust Co. v. Ward, 195 Mo. App. 223, 190
S. W. 364, a witness was permitted to testify to the condition of bank 
books and records which were not introduced in evidence and so far 
as the opinion discloses were not even in the courtroom, and it was 
held that no error was committed.”
The determination of the sufficiency of preliminary facts offered 
as explanation of the absence of the books about which expert 
testimony is presented is within the discretion of the trial judge.
Where production of the records would work great public in­
convenience, as in the case of accounting records kept by banks, 
railroads, express companies, telephone and telegraph companies, 
insurance companies and hospitals, courts have accepted expert 
testimony concerning the records without requiring the presence 
of the records before the tribunal. In a few jurisdictions statutes 
excuse the production of corporation books where an accountant’s 
expert testimony relative to the books is offered in court.36 The 
statutes are doubtless intended to excuse production of accounting 
records because of inconvenience; but the statutes are fallacious in
34 279 S. W. 241.
35 34 S. W. (2d) 1.
36 Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1177-1230.
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that they discriminate in favor of incorporated enterprises. Actual 
inconvenience of production, and not the form of legal organiza­
tion, should be the basis of excusing absence of the records. Though 
the cases have extended the privilege of non-production of records 
on account of inconvenience only to public officers in some in­
stances and to business enterprises affected with a public interest, 
it would seem that the exigencies of modern private businesses also 
would justify in many cases the non-production of accounting rec­
ords on the ground of inconvenience. It is not infrequently true 
that a private business has a vast network of branches or subordi­
nate units at which records reflecting the financial and operating 
conditions of each unit are kept. At the head office summary con­
trol records of the entire organization are usually kept. To require 
production of all the original records of such a concern would be 
highly impracticable. It is questionable, too, whether the opposing 
party would be able during the course of a trial to check a wit­
ness’s statements against such records even though the records were 
in the courtroom. Even an expert accountant employed by the op­
posing party probably would not find time during the course of 
the trial adequately to test the expert testimony of the proponent 
against the records where many books were involved. A better 
plan would be to require that the opposing party be given ample 
opportunity to examine the records prior to the trial. The data 
obtained in such examination might well serve the purposes of 
cross-examination. Such a mode of cross-examination would prove 
far more effective than the exhibition of a maze of records before 
a lay jury in an attempt to invalidate the testimony of an expert 
accountant who had based his statements upon a great amount of 
auditing experience.
In the past few years a public realization of the importance of 
private business enterprises to the general public welfare has devel­
oped. Drastic means of social control have been set up for the pur­
pose of promoting the public welfare through the medium of 
private business. The closing down, stopping or even hampering 
the operations of a private business by requiring the removal of 
the accounting records to a court-room may easily cause consider­
able public and private inconvenience. Hence, trial judges should
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allow the introduction of expert testimony concerning the absent 
records of a private business where, in the particular circumstances, 
the removal of the books from the business would work an unrea­
sonable amount of inconvenience to the business and to the public.
The third class of cases (dealing with the court’s custody of 
records about which expert testimony is offered) dispenses with 
the requirement of the court’s custody of the records as a prerequi­
site to the admission of such evidence where it is shown that the 
records have been lost. Two cases setting forth this opinion are 
presented here. The supreme court of Oregon in 1929 in the case 
of Hubble v. Hubble 37 held that where the expert bookkeeper and 
auditor examined an automobile dealer’s books and the books were 
subsequently destroyed, the accountant was permitted to testify 
as to the content of the records. In 1932 the circuit court of appeals, 
third circuit, in the case of Kay v. Federal Rubber Company 38 
admitted testimony of an accountant who had examined an auto­
mobile-tire dealer’s books which were destroyed before the time 
of the trial. The decision reads:
“Error is assigned to the admission, under objection, of the testi­
mony of an accountant, who had examined the books of the bank­
rupt. The ground alleged is that, since some of the books were not 
produced or could not be found, his testimony was based upon in­
complete records. The court rightly held that that fact went to the 
value, and not to the admissibility, of the accountant’s deductions. 
While an adverse party is entitled to have the best evidence produced 
against him, there is nothing in the record in this case to show that 
the books produced were not the best evidence available.”
Failure to produce accounting records on account of loss has 
been held to be not a bar to the admission of an accountant’s 
expert testimony relative to the accounting records. The question 
of proof of loss of the records deserves consideration. The suffi­
ciency of the proof of loss of documents 39 has been concerned 
in court decisions not only with loss in the narrow sense of the 
word but with loss through destruction. Strictly speaking, destruc-
37 279 P. 550.
38 60 F. (2d) 454.
39 Note: The principles governing the production of  documents apply to 
accounting records. Accounting records constitute one kind of documents.
tion means termination of existence, while loss means merely the 
inability of discovery. The moment destruction becomes question­
able at all, as when not proved by eye-witnesses of a burning, the 
inquiry is raised whether the search for the documents has been 
sufficient. The proof of a loss usually carries the implication that 
the thing not found has ceased to exist and thus resembles the 
case of destruction. Thus, naturally the sufficiencies of proofs of 
destruction and loss are inextricably woven together; and courts 
have sought to determine the amount of search necessary to show 
loss in the broad sense of the word. While there are conflicting 
opinions, the doctrine expounded by many classical cases, thought 
to be correctly decided by most eminent authority, holds that there 
is not and can not be any universal or fixed rule to test the suffi­
ciency of the search for documents alleged to be lost.40 The suf­
ficiency of the search to prove loss depends upon the circumstances 
of each case. The search must have been made with such diligence 
as was reasonable in the circumstances. The party proving the 
documents must have used all reasonable means to obtain them. It 
necessarily follows that the determination of the sufficiency of the 
search and the sufficiency of the proof of loss of the documents 
should be left entirely to the discretion of the trial court. This 
principle is supported by the weight of authority.
The deliberate loss or destruction of documents brought about 
by the proponent in order to destroy the best evidence will operate 
as a bar to the admission of testimony as to the content of the 
documents. However, if the documents were destroyed in the ordi­
nary course of business and without any intent to conceal evidence, 
courts generally, after explaining to the jury the circumstances of 
destruction, have allowed testimony relative to those documents. 
The circumstances of destruction, though apparently innocent, may 
affect the value of the evidence.
Where documents are detained by the opponent, the proponent is 
excused from production as a prerequisite to the offering of testi­
mony concerning them. It is apparent that the reason for excusing 
non-production is the inability of the proponent to obtain the 
documents. In order that the proponent may be excused from the
40 W igmore on Evidence, volume II, secs. 1193, 1194.
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production of documents, on the ground that they are being with­
held by the opponent, he must offer proof of control of the docu­
ments by the opponent, demand or notice to opponent for the 
documents for use in the trial and failure of opponent to produce 
such documents. An admission by the opponent that the records 
have been lost or destroyed will make any further proof of loss 
unnecessary.
Briefly, accounting records must generally be produced in court 
in order to serve as a test of the trustworthiness of the accountant’s 
expert testimony; but the production of the accounting records may 
be excused where production is not feasible, as in cases of great 
inconvenience resulting from the removal of the records from the 
place of business, loss of the records or detention of the records by 
the opposing party.41
A uthenticity of Records
That accounting records must be properly authenticated as a 
prerequisite to the admission of an expert accountant’s testimony 
concerning them is a well-settled rule of law. The principle is 
presented in the case of Le Roy State Bank v. Keenan’s Bank 42 
which was decided by the appellate court of Illinois in 1928. A 
portion of the opinion follows:
“* * * While the results of the examination of voluminous docu­
ments, writings, records and books may be proved by expert account­
ant or other competent person who has made the examination, the 
documents, records or books upon which the examination is based 
must be of such a character as to be themselves admissible in evi­
dence. The oral evidence is admissible because the voluminous charac­
ter of the instruments of evidence precludes their examination in 
court, and the testimony to results reached by their examination is 
merely a statement of what those instruments show. It was, therefore, 
necessary that the books and papers which the expert accountants 
examined should themselves have been competent evidence. In order 
to render an account-book admissible in evidence, it is essential that 
proof as satisfactory as the transactions are under the circumstances 
41Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1177-1230.
42 169 N. E. 1, 337 111. 173. In accord: Hubble v. Hubble, 279 P. 550; Brook­
field Co. v. Mart, 4 P. (2d) 311; Stephens v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 440.
reasonably susceptible of, shall be given that the entries made are 
correctly recorded. * * * Where the testimony of a witness who made 
the entries is not available, it is competent to establish the authenticity 
of the book by other evidence. The only evidence produced of the 
authenticity of the books which the accountants examined is the 
testimony of the cashier of the Le Roy bank. He did not become 
cashier until three months after the making of the contract and the 
transfer of the assets to that bank. He did not make all the entries in 
the books. He did not testify, and could not testify, to the correct­
ness of all those entries. Entries were made by the assistant cashier 
and other persons whose names were mentioned in the cashier’s testi­
mony, but they were not called to show that the entries were correctly 
made, and there was no testimony that they were not available. 
Exhibit A-20, which was used in reaching the results arrived at by 
the accountants, was in large part not a book of original entry, but 
was, so far as more than half of the period which it purported to 
cover was concerned, copied from other books to whose authenticity 
and correctness no one testified. For these reasons the books were 
not admitted in evidence. The conclusions of the accountants, how­
ever, based on these books, which were not so verified as to make 
them competent evidence, were received and were made the basis of 
the judgment which was rendered (in the lower court). * * * Since 
the books were not shown to be competent evidence, the statement 
of the conclusions reached by a consideration of them was not com­
petent evidence and should not have been admitted.”
The holding of the Le Roy State Bank  v. Keenans Bank case 
that the admissibility of an accountant’s expert testimony concern­
ing accounting records is dependent upon the authenticity of the 
records themselves is well-established law. The court in this case 
also enunciated the rule that the authenticity of the book entries 
may be established by testimony of a witness who made the entries, 
or, if the entrant be not available, by other evidence. The dispute 
involved largely only those records which were prepared prior to 
the time the cashier became associated with the records. Hence, 
doubtless the court was correct in holding that the cashier was 
disqualified to verify the genuineness of the bank books, espe­
cially in view of the fact that the persons making the entries could 
have been offered to testify concerning the entries on the books.
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The philosophy upon which the decision is based is in agreement 
with the well-recognized principles of law on the point.
Because of the great variety of situations that arise in regard to 
the inferential facts tending to prove to the satisfaction of the 
trial judge the admissibility of evidence, quite often no general or 
universal rules governing the proof of admissibility can be estab­
lished. Hence, in many situations the determination of the proof 
necessary to justify the admission of evidence is left entirely to 
the discretion of the trial judge. However, in the case of the au­
thentication of documents, situations have had enough in common 
to justify some general rules applicable to the establishment of 
the validity of instruments, i.e., the proving of the genuineness or 
authorship of the documents.
Some of the general rules applicable to the authentication of 
documents (including accounting records) are presented here.43 
A writing, of itself, is evidence of nothing and therefore is not, 
unless accompanied by proof of some sort, admissible as evidence. 
There must be some evidence of the genuineness of the writing 
before the writing can be used as a basis for testimonial evidence. 
Only a reasonable certainty in the proof of the genuineness of 
the accounting records should be required; it is not necessary that 
the proof should be conclusive; prima-facie evidence that the rec­
ords are genuine is sufficient to warrant their reception. Certain 
modes of indicating the genuineness of documents, including ac­
counting records, are uniformly accepted as sufficient to determine 
their admission as evidence. Each of the following methods of 
proof of admissibility of evidence has been held sufficient in itself 
to justify the placing of evidence before the jury: (1) Testimony of 
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the entries and the 
transactions upon which the entries were based; (2) circumstantial 
evidence, that is, handwriting of the entrant, or age of records 
under certain conditions.
There have been some variations from the rule that a witness 
in order to verify accounting records must have personal knowledge 
of both the transactions and the entries. It has been held repeatedly 
that the cashier of a bank who oversees all transactions and tests
43 Wigmore on Evidence, volume III, sec. 1530.
170 R espo n sibilities  a nd  R ights o f  A cco untan ts
the accuracy of the books is competent to testify as to the authen­
ticity of the bank books. It has also been held that a supervising 
officer who has general knowledge of the transactions and entries 
is competent to verify the records. It has also been held that the 
authenticity of accounting records can be proved by testimony of 
the bookkeepers who had not personal knowledge of the transac­
tions. In such rulings the courts take the position that the produc­
tion on the witness stand of a numerous host of salesmen, shipping 
clerks, teamsters, foremen or other subordinate employees would 
generally be improper. While it can not be said that the testimony 
of one who has only general knowledge of the transactions and 
the books or of one who has knowledge of the entries but not of 
the transactions, may prove sufficiently the authenticity of account­
ing records is the generally accepted rule, it is to be hoped that 
courts in the future will uniformly follow this practical rule.44
Where the keeper of the records is deceased, authentication of 
the bookkeeping records can be effected by proving the keeper’s 
handwriting in the records.45 It is probable that a verification of 
the genuineness of accounting records through proof of handwrit­
ing would be permissible where the bookkeeper has become insane 
subsequent to the making of the entries or where he is absent from 
the jurisdiction.
Proof of the genuineness of account books is made conclusive by 
a judicial admission of the opponent. A judicial admission by the 
opponent is an agreement before the trial judge after the issues are 
joined, either before or during the trial, that the opponent will not 
dispute the authenticity of the records. While in American courts 
the use of the judicial admission of the opponent is rarely available 
to the proponent of the records, the practice of dispensing with 
trouble and expense of producing evidence of the genuineness of 
accounting records where the opponent has no reasonable grounds 
to object to their authenticity is to be commended to trial judges 
and litigants alike.
44 W igmore on Evidence, volume III, section 1530.
45 W igmore on Evidence, volume III, section 1530; Delaney v. Framingham Gas, 
Fuel and Water Co., 202 Mass. 359, 88 N. E. 776 (1909).
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The fact that the opponent has destroyed or suppressed the ac­
counting records is uniformly treated as sufficient evidence of exe­
cution to go to the jury.
In many jurisdictions of the United States it is provided by 
statutes that if the documents are named in the pleading as the 
foundation of the claim or defense, proof of genuineness is not 
required unless the opponent denies authenticity of the records on 
oath either in the formal plea or in a separate affidavit.46
While the cases are rare, wherever the courts have ruled on the 
point they have uniformly held that account books, in common with 
other documents, may be authenticated by age. However, the ruling 
of authentication by age requires that the records be at least thirty 
years old, that there must have been a natural custody of the 
books, and that the books must be unsuspicious in appearance. 
Courts have presumed that witnesses who had personal knowledge 
of the records and transactions have ceased to exist after the lapse 
of thirty years from the time of the making of the entries. Even 
where there are living witnesses who had personal knowledge of 
the transactions and records and are available, courts have not 
required the testimony of such witnesses.47 The custody of the 
ancient books must have been natural. The fact that books have 
come from a place where it normally would be expected that the 
books should be kept tends to remove presumptions of fraud and 
strengthens the belief in their genuineness. Custody by the party 
offering account books for a period of more than thirty years has 
been held to have been a proper custody.48 Again, books kept 
in custody for more than thirty years by a manorial steward were 
held to have been in such custody as was necessary to enter the 
account books as evidence under the ancient documents rule in an 
action brought by the feudal lord of the estate.49 While no clear 
marks of suspicion of improper execution of account books have 
been accepted, courts ruling upon the point have required that the 
records must show no appearance of fraud. It should be clearly
46 W igmore on Evidence, volume V, section 2596.
47 22 Corpus Juris, p. 946, Sec. 1165.
48 Bertie v. Beaumont, 146 English reports 105 (1816).
49 Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 106 English reports 975 (1821).
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understood that the authenticity of account books can not be estab­
lished by the ancient-documents rule unless the books have been 
in existence thirty years or more, have been kept in proper custody 
and present an honest appearance.50
A Certified P ublic A ccountant’s Certificate N ot a P rerequisite 
to Q ualification as an E xpert W itness in 
M atters of A ccounting
The supreme court of Oklahoma in 1928 in the case of Bell v. 
Tackett 51 relative to the accountant’s qualifications to testify as 
an expert held, in part, as follows:
“Counsel objected to this evidence in the trial court, after showing 
that the witness was not a certified accountant, under sections 10922 
to 10928, article 10, chapter 87, C. O. S. 1921 (restricting the 
practice of public accounting to certified public accountants). We de­
cline to hold that such evidence of a person, otherwise qualified, 
would be incompetent by such failure to comply with said statutory 
provisions, inasmuch as said sections have heretofore been held un­
constitutional by this court in the case of State v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35, 
233 P. 684, 42 A. L. R. 765.”
The court held in Bell v. Tackett that a public accountant is not 
required to have a certified public accountant’s certificate in order 
to give testimony as an expert accountant. This ruling is in har­
mony with the general practice of trial judges in permitting an 
expert to testify even though the expert does not belong to a particu­
lar class or profession. Though a trial judge may take into account 
the fact that an expert has a particular degree or diploma, the 
judge is not bound to permit the expert to testify because the 
witness holds a degree or diploma. It is equally true that a trial 
judge may permit an expert to testify as such even though the 
expert does not possess a particular degree or diploma. Whether 
or not the witness has acquired special skill relating to the particu­
lar subject-matter under review is the controlling fact trial judges 
consider in the exercise of their discretion in determining the quali-
50 W igmore on Evidence, volume IV, sections 2128-2160; 22 Corpus Juris, 
sections 1138-1178.
51 272 P. 461, 134 Okla. 164.
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fications of the witness to testify as an expert. The matter of 
determining the qualifications of the witness to testify as an expert 
is nearly always left to the discretion of the trial judge.52
Credibility of W itness
In 1931 the Kentucky court of appeals held, in the case of Bush 
v. Board of Education of Clark County 53 as follows:
“* * * It is argued by counsel for appellants that the evidence was 
not competent on another ground, that is, that Gustetter was an inter­
ested party, and that he had been in possession of the tax books for 
several months before he completed his audit, and that their verity 
was thereby destroyed. It is also testified to that he made contra­
dictory statements, and that he offered to settle with Bush without 
making any report. He denied all of these statements except that he 
was interested, but none of these things rendered him incompetent 
as a witness. They only went to his credibility.”
The Bush v. Board of Education of Clark County case ruled that 
the fact that the accountant witness was contradictory in his testi­
mony or that he was interested in the ultimate issue of the con­
troversy did not preclude the admission of his testimony but af­
fected merely the trustworthiness of his testimony. This case, while 
apparently the only American one of its kind affecting the testi­
mony of an accountant, is in accord with the well-settled principles 
of law involved.
The credibility of a witness is concerned with the probative 
effect which may be attached to his testimony. In seeking to show 
contradictions by cross-examination or by other proof, testimonial 
or circumstantial, the ultimate aim is to persuade the tribunal that 
the witness has completely erred in regard to the particular facts 
which the witness has sought to establish. It is the truth of the 
contradicting evidence as opposed to the truth of the witness’ 
assertions that constitutes the probative end. It is the function of 
the tribunal, not to dismiss consideration of relevant assertions 
that have been contradicted, but rather to ascertain the relative
52 22 Corpus Juris, p. 536, section 624; Wigmore on Evidence, volume I, sec­
tions 555-561.
53 37 S. W. (2d) 849, 238 Ky. 297.
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trustworthiness of the conflicting assertions of the opposing 
parties.54
The disqualification of a witness to testify On account of his 
being an interested party became a universal rule of law in Eng­
land by the seventeenth century, and later it was adopted in 
America. A century after its adoption a very definite decline in 
the application of the rule appeared in the English and American 
law. Today the disqualification has everywhere disappeared except 
in the case of testimony of the survivor of a transaction with a 
decedent, when offered against the deceased’s estate. The theory 
of the rule of disqualification on account of interest was based 
originally on the belief that the interested party would be apt to 
falsify in behalf of his own interest, and that the jurors, inclined 
to base their verdict on the number of witnesses testifying under 
oath rather than on the quality of evidence, would render a false 
verdict. The reason for the rule no longer exists. The modern 
courts take the position that interested witnesses often testify hon­
estly, and that, even if the witness attempts to falsify, through the 
medium of cross-examination the trustworthiness of the testimony 
of the interested witness is effectively established before the jury. 
The jury should not be denied the benefit of valuable information 
which tends to prove or disprove either directly or inferentially 
the main fact in issue merely because the information offered comes 
from a witness who is an interested party in the suit.55
Confidential C ommunications Between P ublic A ccountant 
and Client
Only one case in England and America is concerned directly in 
establishing the common law governing the confidential communi­
cations between public accountant and client. The opinion in that 
case, In re Fisher 56 decided in 1931 by the federal district court, 
S. D. New York, follows:
“It appears that the witness William Bernstein acted as bankrupt’s 
accountant for a number of years, and, after his admission to the bar, 
also acted as bankrupt’s attorney. Upon the basis of the privilege
54 Wigmore on Evidence, volume II, sections 1000-1004.
55 W igmore on Evidence, volume I, sections 575-578.
56 51 F. (2d) 424.
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arising from the attorney-client relationship, he has refused to answer 
questions relating to bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence 
monthly account sheets made by accountants in his employ in course 
of auditing bankrupt’s books.
“There is no privilege with regard to communications made to 
accountants. The information given to the witness and to the ac­
countants in his employ for the purpose of making financial state­
ments and doing other work characteristically performed by account­
ants is not privileged, despite the fact that the witness may also have 
rendered legal advice on the basis of such data. * * *
“Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege 
of the client and not the attorney. * * * For this reason the attorney 
can not claim privilege where the client has already disclosed the 
substance of the communication. * * * Nor can he claim privilege 
where the communication was made with the understanding that it 
was to be imparted to third parties.
“In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testi­
fied with respect to the matters contained in his books and records. 
And the income-tax returns and financial statements drawn up from 
the communications made by bankrupt to the witness were obviously 
intended to be communicated to others.
“For these reasons, the witness should be directed to testify with 
regard to the bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the 
monthly work sheets made by the accountants.”
This case, In re Fisher, was in accord with well-settled law in 
holding that the privilege of non-disclosure of confidential com­
munications between the attorney and client was for the benefit 
of the client and not the attorney. The privilege of confidential 
communications can be granted an attorney only on motion of his 
client. However, the accountant’s chief concern with In re Fisher 
is the fact that the court refused to allow the privilege of confi­
dential communications in the accountant-client relation. This re­
fusal to allow to the accountant immunity from disclosure of his 
client’s confidential communications is contrary to sound common- 
la w  p r in c ip les  an d  sh o u ld  n o t b e  fo l lo w e d  in  fu tu re  d ec is io n s.
It is well to review the common-law principles involved in the 
privilege of confidential communications.57 From the early six-
57 Wigmore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2285-2329.
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teenth to the later eighteenth century in England the privilege of 
refraining from producing confidential information on the witness 
stand was universally allowed in the common-law courts in the 
trial of civil cases. The practice was justified on the ground that 
the court ought to respect the word or pledge of a man of honor. 
The decline of the extension of the privilege to refuse to give confi­
dential testimony naturally followed from its obstructive effects 
upon the cause of justice. By 1800 the privilege to keep secret 
confidential matters was confined to attorneys, jurors, public officers 
and husband and wife. Courts no longer concerned themselves 
with the preservation of the honor of the witness but rather sought 
to preserve the life, liberty and property of the person who con­
fided the secret to the witness. In the attorney-client relation it was 
the interest of the client, not the honor of the attorney, for which 
the courts made confidential information privileged. Hence, the 
courts allowed, and still do allow, the privilege, not on the attor­
ney’s motion, but only on the request of the client. Certain broad 
principles were laid down by the common law for the purpose 
of determining the type of relationship which ought to be blessed 
with privileged information. By common law four conditions were, 
and are, required to make a relation eligible for the privilege of 
keeping secret confidential information. (1) The communications 
must have been made in the belief that they would not be dis­
closed. (2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
promotion and continuation of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which society wishes to encourage.
(4) The injury that would result from the disclosure of the con­
fidential communications must be greater than the benefit which 
would accrue from the correct disposal of litigation.
The attorney-client relation meets all four requirements of the 
privilege of confidential communications. Practically all the com­
munications between client and attorney are made in confidence. 
Were it not for the belief that his communications would be kept 
secret, the client would not give his attorney full information. 
Though an attorney often does enable a guilty person to escape 
punishment, for the sake of the innocent the secret relation of the 
attorney and client should be encouraged. The injury resulting
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from the attorney’s failure to get from his client incriminating in­
formation may easily outweigh the benefit which would be obtained 
from a revelation of the secret information coming from the 
accused. If the attorney’s confidential information were available 
to the prosecution, the prosecutors would fall into the practice of 
producing the secret communications of the accused rather than 
substantiating his convictions with other proof.
It is not necessary to show in detail the application of the four 
principles to both petit and grand jurors.58 It is apparent to the 
reader that the communications between jurors are confidential and 
must be confidential for a full and satisfactory relationship. The 
community fosters the relationship. Certainly disclosures of jury 
proceedings would intimidate jurors from exercising freedom of 
judgment, resulting in an injury to justice much greater than the 
benefit that might be derived from disclosures of the communica­
tions in other trials.
The relation of public officers with persons in matters of state 
secrets meets all the tests for the allowance of privileged informa­
tion required by common law.59 The subject is almost as broad as 
the governmental activities. For the purpose of illustrating the 
application of the common-law principles of privileged communi­
cations, let us consider the case of an informer who conveys secret 
information to a detective. Were the detective not permitted to keep 
inviolate such information, it might easily be dangerous to the 
informer. The relation between detective and informer would cease 
to exist. To be sure, the community is interested in fostering the 
relation of detective and secret informer so as to discover crime. 
And, lastly, the injury growing out of the loss of the information 
would exceed the benefit to be derived from the disclosure of the 
informer’s identity. The rule is well-established law, but is limited 
to the identity of the informer. Furthermore, a trial judge may 
compel the disclosure of the identity of the detective’s informer 
where the trial judge deems that such information is necessary to 
prevent the failure of justice.
58 Wigmore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2346-2364.
59 Ibid., secs. 2367-2379.
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It must be apparent that as between husband and wife many 
communications are confidential, and that the confidentiality of such 
communications is a vital element entering into the perpetuation 
of the marital relationship.60 As a matter of public policy society 
fosters the institution of marriage. It is generally agreed that the 
detriment that would follow disclosure of marital secrets would 
outweigh the benefits that would result from such disclosure.
The physician-patient relationship has been held by common law 
not to meet the four tests.61 Failure to meet any one test removes 
the relationship from the scope of privileged communications. 
Courts have taken the position that most of the patient’s commu­
nications are not made in the belief that they will be kept secret. 
In the second place, the patient would come to a physician even if 
he knew the nature of his communications and ailments would be 
disclosed to others—so the courts have ruled. In the third place, 
society is certainly interested in promoting the relation of physician 
and patient. Lastly, the injury that would result from disclosure 
would be insignificant as compared to the benefit that may be 
obtained from medical testimony. Judges have thought that the 
patient would not be concerned about disclosures except in cases 
of abortion and venereal diseases; and in those cases generally the 
patient does not deserve secrecy. Though the privilege of secret 
communications has been denied to the relation of physician to 
patient by common law, the privilege has been extended by legis­
lation in many states.
The public accountant-client relation meets all four requirements 
of the common law for privileged communications. In practically 
every audit there are communications of a confidential nature made 
by the client to the public accountant; and in some instances the 
public accountant gives confidential information to his client. With­
out the belief that the secrets of his business—his lists of customers, 
present and potential, his plan of organization, his costs of opera­
tions, his secret processes—would be held in confidence, the client 
would cease to employ the services of public accountants, for the 
very existence of his business may be dependent upon these secrets.
60 W igmore on Evidence, volume V, secs. 2332-2341.
61 Ibid., secs. 2380-2391.
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In the third place, the community unquestionably is interested in 
fostering the relation of accountant and client. If not, why has 
the community enacted laws promoting the standards of accounting 
practice? And in the fourth place, the detriment resulting from 
the disclosure of the client’s secrets might easily be far reaching. 
In many instances the very existence of a business is dependent 
upon its superior organization, its peculiar knowledge of its mar­
ket, its low cost of production or other characteristics not known 
to competitors. The revelation of these secrets might easily destroy 
the business itself. The knowledge that such secrets might be 
revealed would deter entrepreneurs from originating promotions. 
The stifling effect of disclosures would be enormous and doubtless 
would exceed the benefit that might accrue to the administration 
of justice through the public accountant’s revelation of secrets 
peculiar and vital to the business.
In the case In re Fisher, supra, the court did not take the trouble 
to analyze the accountant-client relation to determine whether that 
relation fulfills the requirements of common law for privileged 
communications. It is true that accounting statements are designed 
for exhibition to others generally and would not, therefore, consti­
tute a communication in confidence. The working papers of the 
accountant are not designed for presentation to others. The work­
ing papers generally contain confidential matters never revealed in 
the financial statements. The working papers, as well as other com­
munications made in confidence, meet all the requirements for 
privileged information.
Until the courts have overruled In re Fisher and have held that 
the common-law doctrine of privileged communications applies to 
the public accountant-client relation, it is necessary to resort to 
legislation. Nine states have enacted statutes making confidential 
communications in the accountant-client relation privileged. Those 
statutes logically fall into three classes. In the first type are in­
cluded the public accountancy laws of Arizona, Iowa,62 Louisiana,62 
M ic h ig a n ,62 an d  T e n n e sse e .62 T h e  A r iz o n a  sta tu te  fo llo w s .63
62 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc.
63  Laws of Arizona, regular session of 1933, chapter 45, section 9.
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“Certified public accountants and public accountants practising in 
this state shall not be required to divulge, nor shall they voluntarily 
divulge, any information which they may have received by reason of 
the confidential nature of their employment. Information derived 
from or as a result of such professional source shall be deemed con­
fidential, provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be 
taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal 
or bankruptcy laws of this state or of the United States.”
This type of statute means, then, that in criminal and bank­
ruptcy trials the confidential communications between public ac­
countant and client are not privileged. The statute helps a little, 
in that the privilege is extended to all trials except criminal and 
bankruptcy cases.
In the second class are statutes of Florida and Illinois.62 The 
Florida statute enacted in 1931 reads as follows: 64
“All communications between certified public accountants and pub­
lic accountants and the person, firm or corporation for whom such 
certified public accountant or public accountant shall have made any 
audit or other investigation in a professional capacity, and all in­
formation obtained by certified public accountants and public account­
ants in their professional capacity concerning the business and affairs 
of clients shall be deemed privileged communications in all courts of 
this state, and no such certified public accountant or public account­
ant shall be permitted to testify with respect to any of said matters, 
except with the consent in writing of such client or his legal repre­
sentative.”
The type of statute exemplified by the Florida law, supra, re­
quires complete immunity from disclosure of confidential commu­
nications between public accountant and client in all courts within 
the jurisdictions of such state laws.
The third type of law granting immunity to secret communica­
tions made in the accountant-client relation is found in Colorado. 
The Colorado statute reads as follows: 65
“A certified public accountant shall not, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
64 H. B. Skillman, 1934 Cumulative Supplement to the Compiled General Laws 
of Florida, chapter 50, section 3935 (13).
65 Session Laws of Colorado, 1929, chap. 185, sec. 1(6), p. 644.
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to him in person or through the media of books of account and 
financial records, or his advice, reports or working papers given or 
made thereon in the course of professional employment, nor shall a 
secretary, stenographer, clerk or assistant of a certified public account­
ant be examined without the consent of the client concerned concern­
ing any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such 
capacity.”
The chief distinguishing characteristic of this Colorado statute 
is the fact that it applies to certified public accountants and not 
to public accountants in general. In 1931 the supreme court of 
Colorado in the case of Hopkins v. People 66 held that where a 
county or a county court employs a certified public accountant to 
audit the books of a third party there does not exist that accoun­
tant-client relation between the certified public accountant and the 
third party necessary to make the certified public accountant’s 
information from the audit confidential under the Colorado stat­
ute. While the supreme court of Colorado did not find it neces­
sary to determine the validity of the statute in order to decide 
the case, the court impliedly approved the statute in holding that 
the case did not come within the statute. This type of statute 
should meet with the hearty approval of certified practitioners. It 
should be an inducement to clients to select certified public ac­
countants to do their audits.67
P reparation of a P art of A udit by A ssistants N ot a Bar to 
A dmission of E xpert A ccountant’s T estimony
That a public accountant’s testimony is not rendered inadmis­
sible by the fact that a part of the examination of the records was 
performed by assistants of the public accountant provided the pub­
lic accountant has personal knowledge of the accuracy of the audit 
was set forth in 1930 by the supreme court of Missouri in the case 
of State v. Matkins 68 as follows:
“Craig’s testimony shows that he was assisted in making the audit 
by his employee Gibson, that he was personally present about two 
66  1 P. (2d) 937.
67 Note: For the public accountant’s liability to his client for damages sus­
tained from the negligent disclosure of confidential communications, see page 60.
68 34 S. W. (2d) 1. In accord: Johnstone v. Morris, 292 P. 970 (1930); AEtna 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Wilmington, 157 A. 208 (1931).
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weeks of the time the work was in progress, and that it was all done 
under his direction, and in substance that he had familiarized him­
self with the records and the results shown by the audit and knew 
the audit to be correct. We think he was competent to testify to the 
result of the examination. * * *”
The cases enabling a public accountant to give expert testimony 
from audits made by assistants where the accountant has super­
vised the audit and personally knows the audit to be correct repre­
sent the weight of authority. In fact, an exhaustive search has 
revealed no adverse ruling with respect to the matter.
The cases allowing an expert accountant’s testimony based upon 
an audit performed by his assistants are founded upon reason. It 
would in many audits be impossible for the accountant to perform 
all the work of the review. If the jury is to have the benefit of 
summaries, the work of assistants must be accepted as the founda­
tion of the accountant’s testimony. The circumstances of the assist­
ant’s performance of an audit tend strongly to establish the accu­
racy of their work. The accountant knows full well that his success 
as a practitioner is dependent in no small degree upon the quality 
of service obtained from his employees. He, therefore, selects his 
assistants so as to obtain only those helpers who will render honest 
and efficient service. On the other hand, the members of the ac­
countant’s staff are aware of the fact that the individual success 
of each in a large measure will be in proportion to the excellence 
of the service he gives to his employer. The fact that the ac­
countant directed and supervised the audit is further assurance 
that the audit correctly shows the condition of the records. Hence, 
the accountant’s testimony based upon the audit prepared in such 
circumstances should be a trustworthy showing of the condition 
and contents of the accounting records under consideration.
A n  E xpert Bookkeeper’s T estimony A dvisory, N ot B inding
In 1915 the court of appeals of Georgia held in the case of Citi­
zens Bank of Tifton v. Timmons 69 that:
“Where a witness duly qualified as an expert general bookkeeper 
and as a bank bookkeeper, it was not error to admit his testimony,
69 84 S. E. 232, 15 Ga. App. 815. In  accord: U nited  States v. Porter, 9 F. (2d) 
153.
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based upon an inspection and examination of the books of a bank, as 
to the meaning, interpretation or construction of an account in evi­
dence appearing on such books then under examination, measured 
by the rules, methods and usages generally prevailing among com­
mercial bookkeepers and bank bookkeepers. Such testimony is ad­
visory merely, and is not binding upon a jury, though they can not 
arbitrarily disregard it; but the weight and value to be attributed to 
it is for determination by them.”
This decision needs little comment. If the jury were bound by 
the opinion of the expert witness, the jury would in effect be 
deprived of its function of fact finding. Under the safeguards 
surrounding the selection of jurors it is presumed that the jurors 
are free from bias and partisanship. The expert witness, usually 
called by a party to the suit, is subject to influences tending toward 
bias. His pecuniary subservience to a party in the suit could cer­
tainly disqualify him as a juror.70 For this reason, courts will not 
compel the jury to render its verdict in accordance with an expert’s 
opinion.
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Conclusions of an E xpert A ccountant
The principles evolved by the courts with respect to the admis­
sibility of an expert accountant’s conclusions drawn from his audit 
fall naturally into two groups: (1) The expert accountant’s testi­
mony must be confined to a statement of the facts shown by the 
books. (2) The expert accountant may state to the court his opin­
ion as to value.
Let us first consider the fundamental common-law rule which 
requires that the expert accountant confine his testimony to a state­
ment of the bare facts shown by the books.71 An adequate concept 
of this principle must be based upon a proper understanding of its 
development. Prior to the eighteenth century there had been little 
thought on the opinion of a witness in England and America. It 
was during that century that the word “opinion” came to mean 
to the legal mind a conclusion of a lay-witness who had no facts 
to contribute, no knowledge, no personal acquaintance with the
70 35 Corpus Juris, p. 321, Section 337.
71 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, secs. 1917-1929.
man or the land or the loan or the affray about which he was 
speaking. This sort of evidence was neither objected to nor ex­
cluded. The court and jury merely ignored it in forming the ver­
dict. However, during the nineteenth century the conclusions of a 
lay-witness who had not observed the facts of the case were for­
mally rejected by the courts on the ground that the conclusions 
were merely superfluous. In the opinion of the courts, jurors as 
laymen were quite as capable of forming opinions as to facts in 
issue as were the lay-witnesses who had not personally observed 
the happenings in dispute. The courts took the position that the 
jurors should not be confused by diverse opinions of lay-witnesses 
who had not personal knowledge of the facts. To admit such opin­
ion evidence was thought to infringe upon the time of the jury. 
This rule is still followed uniformly in England and America with 
respect to the opinion of a lay-witness who was not a personal 
observer of the facts of the case. On the other hand, if the witness 
had personal knowledge of the facts in the case as a result of the 
exercise of his own senses, he was allowed to state such facts and 
then express his opinion based upon his observations. However, 
in stating the facts the witness was required to know the truth of 
his testimony. He was not permitted to say that he thought, be­
lieved or was of the opinion that certain alleged facts of the case 
were true or untrue. Such is the law in England today; but in the 
United States a witness is generally required to present before the 
jurors only the bare facts which he observed. In America the lay- 
witness is permitted to state to the jury his impressions and 
opinions of his observations only where the facts were such as 
could not be described to the jury.
An expert witness may testify in both England and the United 
States on matters under the consideration of the court even with­
out having had personal observation of the facts of the case. In 
response to hypothetical questions, he can offer expert opinions 
on matters that can not ordinarily be interpreted by the jury. The 
expert witness through study and experience knows facts not avail­
able to the lay-jurors, and, using his observations of scientific facts 
as a basis, he can interpret and draw conclusions such as are indis­
pensable to a proper understanding of the case on the part of the
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jurors. In the United States if the expert witness need only pre­
sent the bare facts obtained from his investigation in order that 
the jury may grasp an understanding of the case, the court will 
not allow the expert witness to offer his opinion. If the jury can not 
interpret the bare facts of the investigation, then the court will 
permit the expert witness to state his conclusions. The purpose of 
the rules is to afford the jury a proper understanding of the truth 
of the case.72
The admissibility of opinionative testimony of public accountants 
has come before the courts of the United States in at least a dozen 
instances. Several opinions giving different effect to the rule that 
the expert accountant’s testimony is limited to a statement of the 
bare facts shown by the records are presented in the following 
excerpts. The general principle that the expert accountant’s testi­
mony must be confined to a statement of the facts shown by the 
books was set forth in a syllabus by the supreme court of Georgia 
in 1923 in the case of Payne v. Franklin County,73 as follows:
“Error is assigned because the court, over objection, permitted a 
witness, who was an auditor for Franklin county, and who had made 
an audit of the books and accounts of the treasurer, to testify, in 
answer to the question, ‘From having made an audit of all the books, 
papers, and documents in evidence, I will ask whether or not you did 
find any shortage as a result of your examination,’ as follows: ‘As a 
result of the first examination we found a deficit of $20,368.21.’ The 
objection was that the question called for a conclusion of the witness, 
and that the answer was a mere conclusion, and that as an expert 
accountant he was not authorized to give his conclusion or general 
opinion. Such evidence was admissible to aid the jury in their in­
vestigation, the question as to what are the proper deductions to be 
made from the entries in the books and papers being at last solely 
for the jury.”
In harmony with the Georgia case, supra, the supreme court 
of Michigan in 1931, in the case of Thompson v. Walter,74 con-
72 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, sections 1917-1929.
73 116 S. E. 627, 155 Ga. 219. In accord: People v. Hatfield, 208 N. W. 682, 
234 Mich. 574.
74 234 N. W. 144, 253 Mich. 126. In accord: Diamond A lkali Co. v. Henderson 
Coal Co., 134 A. 386, 287 Pa. 232. See also: Kersh v. State, 153 So. 284 (1933).
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fined the province of the expert accountant’s testimony to a state­
ment of facts shown by the books. A portion of the opinion reads:
“The auditor could not testify from his examination, in advance, 
of the books, what they would show, if introduced in evidence. It is 
the books, the contents of which may be summarized, which must be 
present in court, and introduced in evidence, and the witness may 
testify to what the books show. He could not invade the province of 
the jury, who were to pass upon and determine the facts. The audi­
tor could not testify to anything beyond what was shown from an 
examination of the books themselves, but he could testify as to his 
compilations, computations and conclusions therefrom or the aggre­
gate amount of any specific items shown thereby. The process of 
binding component facts into a more concise and general statement 
is a mere mechanical process.”
In 1925 the St. Louis court of appeals in the case of Pioneer 
Lumber Co. v. Van Cleave75 presented clearly a little different 
aspect of the controlling principle of the preceding cases, in re­
quiring that the accountant-witness do not express his opinion as 
to the ultimate issue of the case. The opinion reads in part:
“* * * but we have found no authority, nor have we been cited 
any, which has extended the rule to the extent of permitting such 
accountant witness, after having testified to the results of his examina­
tion, to express his opinion as to the ultimate issue in the case. In 
receiving the opinion of a witness the danger is ever present that the 
jury may substitute such opinion for their own, and the courts will 
not require parties to encounter this danger unless some necessity 
therefor appears. Accordingly, where all the relevant facts be intro­
duced in evidence, and the jury are competent to draw a reasonable 
inference therefrom, opinion evidence should not be received.
“Courts, as far as practicable, exclude the inference, conclusion, 
or judgment of a witness as to the ultimate fact in issue to provide 
against the mischief of invasion of the province of the jury. 22 
Corpus Juris, 499. The instant case clearly falls within that class in 
which all of the books and documentary files were in court, and the 
relevant facts contained in them introduced in evidence, and con­
sequently permitting the opinion of the accountant with reference 
to the sole question in issue in the case, was obviously an invasion 
75 279 S. W. 241.
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of the province of the jury. Therefore, in considering the demurrers 
at the close of the case, we exclude from consideration the opinion 
evidence of the said accountant witness as to his opinion of the 
ultimate issue in the case.”
In 1927 the supreme court of Alabama in the case of Edwards v. 
State 76 followed the general principle of the preceding cases and 
the great weight of authority on the subject and helped to define 
precisely the scope of the accountant’s expert testimony. In this 
case it was held that the accountant-witness could not explain 
transactions under dispute, because he had not personal knowl­
edge of the transactions. The accountant was permitted to explain 
only the books’ showing of the transactions. A portion of the opin­
ion follows:
“* * * It was, of course, competent for the auditor to give evidence 
of what he found upon the books and of the cheques themselves, 
but, it not being contended that he had any personal knowledge of the 
transactions, he could not properly explain them and state what they 
represented, it being manifest that such evidence was predicated solely 
upon the conclusion or opinion of the witness.”
The excerpts given above represent the well-established authority 
on the admissibility of the accountant’s expert testimony. The gen­
eral rule running through all the cases confines the province of 
the expert accountant’s testimony to a statement of what the books 
show. The accountant can not express his opinion as to the ultimate 
issue in the case. Where the auditor does not have personal knowl­
edge of the transactions under consideration—and he generally does 
not—he can not explain the transactions nor state what they repre­
sent; he can merely state what the vouchers and journals show 
such transactions to be. The auditor can not testify: “I think, I 
believe, I am of the opinion that, or I conclude that certain trans­
actions took place, or that certain facts in issue are true or untrue.” 
On the other hand, the auditor is permitted to state to the court: 
“The books show certain transactions to have taken place. The 
records show a shortage in inventory. The books show that cash 
is missing to the amount o f --------.” In other words, the accountant
76 111 So. 765.
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in producing testimony is limited to a statement of the character 
and content of the accounting records. The revelation of the facts 
as found in the books is the scope of the accountant’s testimony. 
The making of inferences from the facts revealed by a statement 
of the showing of the books is purely within the province of the 
jury. If the expert accountant’s testimony concerns any accounting 
fact which might properly be understood by the lay-jurors, the 
accountant testifying is limited to a bare statement of the fact; 
the jurors alone make deductions from the fact. However, if the 
accounting fact is one that is not intelligible to the lay-jurors, the 
accountant-witness is permitted to explain the fact to the jurors. 
Then, finally, if the fact is such that it can not be explained so that 
the jury may obtain a proper understanding of the fact, the expert 
accountant may present to the jury his conclusions as to the fact 
shown by the books.77
The cases defining the scope of the accountant’s testimony make 
his rôle before the jury too narrow, too restricted to accomplish 
the greatest good in the cause of truth. In theory the courts seek 
to bring to the jury practically the same degree of understanding 
of facts as is possessed by the witness. Except in the case of a very 
simple set of books it is impossible for the accountant to convey an 
adequate picture of the character and content of accounting rec­
ords. The jury can not be made to comprehend the meaning of the 
records in the way the accountant understands it. The accountant 
through many years of study, training, and practice has acquired 
an apperceptive background which enables him to place interpreta­
tions and meanings upon the accounting data, which are not pos­
sible to the lay-jurors. The ability of the jury to discover the truth 
would be facilitated if the accountant-witness were permitted not
77 Note: (1885) Railroad Co. v. Schulz, 43 Oh. St. 270, 283, 1 N. E. 324: “It 
must not be supposed that there is any rule of evidence concerning the opinions 
of witnesses which is peculiar to fences, highways, bridges or steamboats or to 
any other special subjects of investigation. Where the facts concerning their con­
dition can not be made palpable to the jurors so that their means of forming  
opinions are practically equal to those of the witnesses, opinions of such w it­
nesses may be received, accompanied by such facts supporting them as they may 
be able to place intelligently before the jury.” This case represents the weight of 
authority on the point.
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only to state what the records contain but also to state his opinion 
as to the inferences to be drawn from the records.78
Courts, in the case of expert testimony on value, have made 
an exception to the rule which prohibits a witness from giving 
opinionative testimony. The courts of the United States generally 
allow opinionative evidence concerning value. Anyone who has 
peculiar knowledge of the value of specific property or of a business 
enterprise may offer his opinion of such value before the jury. It 
is quite often impossible for the witness to picture to the jury all 
the factors that lead him to place upon specific property a certain 
value. Hence, from necessity, in order that the jury may utilize 
the expert witness’ information on value, courts allow his testi­
monial opinion relative to the worth of specific property or of a 
business' enterprise.79
In agreement with the principle admitting expert testimony 
generally with respect to value, several courts have broadened the 
scope of the admissibility of the accountant’s expert testimony to 
include his opinion relative to the worth of property or of a busi­
ness enterprise. In support of this principle the supreme court of 
Georgia in 1927 in the case of Bitting v. State 80 held:
“* * * It does not seem to us that any of the evidence to which 
objection was made was improperly admitted for any reason sug­
gested in the exceptions or argument of counsel. It has frequently been 
held that proof of value is merely matter of opinion, no matter how 
the information of the witness may have been derived, whether based 
upon his own estimate, or upon an estimate accredited by the witness, 
but derived from the opinions of others. And while this court has 
decided that ‘the opinions of persons cannot be proved or used in 
evidence this way; that is, a witness will not be permitted to prove 
the opinions of others on any question,’ if the testimony sought to 
be excluded is given as the opinion of the witness himself, and 
vouched for by the witness as such on his oath, it is not to be 
excluded merely because upon cross-examination the sources of his
78 Note: For a discussion of the desirability of American courts’ following the 
English ruling permitting even lay-witnesses to state their opinions after they have 
presented personally observed facts see Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, section 
1929.
79 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, sections 1940-1944.
80 139 S. E. 877.
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information and the information which caused him to form the 
opinion testified to are discovered. The jury may discredit the opinion 
of the witness after they know the causes which lead to the forma­
tion of his opinion; but the opinion of the witness as to value, if 
it is his own opinion, is admissible as evidence for whatever it may 
be worth, regardless of the reliability of the data upon which he was 
induced to base his opinion. * * *”
Bitting v. State, supra, held that an expert witness’ opinion with 
respect to value is admissible regardless of the sources of the 
information upon which the witness has based his opinion. An­
other case, Stephens v. United States,81 decided in 1930 by the 
circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, quite in agreement with the 
preceding case, held that an expert accountant’s testimony on value 
may be admissible even though the witness’ opinion is not based 
solely upon the accounting records of the business or property to 
be valued. A portion of the decision reads:
“Another contention in this group relates more particularly to the 
testimony of the witness Bryan. Referring to what appear to be 
annual financial statements of Stephens & Co., he criticized them as 
not reflecting the true financial condition of the company as of the 
dates to which they relate. One of the criticisms was that they ex­
hibited as assets stocks or bonds which, as he contended the record 
showed, had either not been issued or of which the company had 
not acquired possession and ownership during the periods covered 
by the statements. Clearly, we think the objections made to this part 
of the testimony are without merit. The other criticism was that 
some of the statements exhibited items of stocks or bonds as assets 
at highly excessive overvaluations. In reaching his conclusion as to 
what would have been a reasonable valuation he frankly stated that 
he resorted to information not appearing in the books and records 
of the company. But it appears that he was not only a trained ac­
countant in the strict sense, but that he had had long and wide 
experience in connection with business where it was necessary to 
observe and place valuations upon such securities, and, as he put it, 
he followed the same course in this case in resorting to sources of 
information touching value ‘as I have done all my life in valuing 
securities.’ While the propriety of receiving his testimony in this 
81 41 F. (2d) 440.
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respect is not entirely free from doubt, we are of the view that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it, and that there was 
no prejudicial error.”
Closely akin to the two preceding cases is the case of Manley v. 
State,82 decided by the court of appeals of Georgia in 1927, which 
held that an expert accountant’s testimony as to the solvency of a 
business may be competent evidence. A portion of the opinion 
reads:
“It is true that R. E. Bentley, an expert witness in behalf of the 
state, testified that he had made an examination and analysis of the 
books of this bank, and that from such examination and analysis said 
bank was insolvent as far back as the first of 1915, and that such 
insolvency had continued from that date down to the time the bank 
closed its doors and went into the hands of the superintendent of 
banks for liquidation. This opinion of this witness is competent 
evidence on the question of the insolvency vel non of this bank. 
Such an opinion is not conclusive upon the jury. The testimony is 
intended to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion upon the 
subject; but the jury is not bound by such opinion and can disregard
*  *  * ”
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The rule which allows an expert accountant’s opinionative testi­
mony on questions of value has the support of the well-settled 
common law permitting expert witnesses generally to testify with 
respect to value.83 The accountant through his review and analysis 
of accounting records can make estimates of values in a manner 
not intelligible to the lay-juror. Moreover, the technique employed 
would be beyond the comprehension of the jury. Hence, in order 
that the jury may avail itself of this technical information as to 
value, the accountant-witness is permitted to state his conclusions 
as to the value of the business the records of which he has ana­
lyzed. The determination of the financial condition of a business 
as to solvency is a special problem of estimating values. Hence, 
the courts allow an accountant who has reviewed the records of a 
business to state whether or not he thinks the business was insol­
vent at the time the cause of action arose.
82 144 S. E. 170, 166 Ga. 563.
83 Wigmore on Evidence, volume IV, secs. 1940-1944.
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A ccountant’s R ight to Refresh his M emory from Records
The supreme court of Nebraska in 1922 in the case of Heilman v. 
State 84 held:
“* * * An expert accountant who has examined the books of a 
public officer to ascertain an issuable fact and compiled a statement 
may refresh his memory from the compilation and testify to the 
result. The books, records, vouchers and documents used by the expert 
in making his computation were in court available to defendant, and 
the evidence was not objectionable on that ground.”
The object of placing evidence before the court is to convey to 
the jury a proper understanding of the truth of the case. Since the 
accountant-witness is primarily concerned with conveying to the 
minds of the jurors a knowledge of the accounting records under 
consideration, certainly, any aid, such as a re-examination of the 
records, that would facilitate an accurate representation of the truth 
would be permitted by the court.
84 189 N. W. 303, 109 Neb. 15.
Chapter IV
SOME SPECIAL RIGHTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Champerty
any comprehensive treatment of champerty must involve some 
attention to maintenance, for champerty is a special kind of 
maintenance. The common law and the statutes of both America 
and England are so diverse in their rulings on the two subjects 
that no adequate definition of either can be given. Any general 
statement regarding the nature of either misdemeanor must neces­
sarily be qualified by diverse exceptions, depending upon the stat­
utes and court precedents of the jurisdiction in which the remedy
against the misdemeanor is sought.1
Maintenance is an officious intermeddling in a suit that in no 
way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with 
money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it. According to the 
early common law and statutes of England maintenance was an 
offense against public justice, since it kept alive strife and conten­
tion and perverted the remedial process of the law into an engine 
of oppression.2
Champerty is a species of maintenance. It is a bargain to divide 
the proceeds of a litigation between a party to the suit and the 
attorney or layman supporting the litigation. The division of the 
proceeds of the litigation distinguishes champerty from maintenance 
in general.
While maintenance and champerty were prohibited by the Roman 
law, the modern law on the subjects is based largely upon the 
developments that took place in feudal England. It was a common
1 Note: Where the jurisdiction of the complaint against maintenance or cham­
perty is different from the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose, the 
suit must always be tried in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where 
the complaint is made. (Thornton on Attorneys at Law, volume II, p. 662.)
2 4 Blackstone’s Commentaries 135.
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practice during the early legal history of England for great and 
powerful feudal lords to take upon themselves litigation in behalf 
of weaker members of the community. In many instances the claims 
were unjust; but the feudal lords overawed the courts and obtained 
judgments, the benefits of which went largely to the feudal lords. 
Hence, to combat this pernicious practice, common-law decisions 
and statutes made maintenance and champerty crimes, and rendered 
invalid contracts tainted with those misdemeanors.
While the early law was severe on the perpetrators of mainte­
nance and champerty, except where maintenance was extended 
for purely charitable purposes, there is no record that anyone was 
punished criminally for the commission of either misdemeanor. 
The effect of the laws on maintenance and champerty is to be 
found in the voiding of contracts. In modern times there is not 
the great amount of need for rigid laws on champerty and mainte­
nance which existed in feudal Europe. The statute of limitations, 
the statute of frauds and the giving of costs against the unsuccess­
ful party have contributed to prevent groundless and vexatious 
litigation and have caused a relaxing of the severe rules against 
champerty and maintenance of mediaeval England. In many states 
the doctrine of maintenance and champerty is scarcely recognized, 
even by the courts. Where the laws of maintenance and champerty 
are recognized the many exceptions have modified their ancient 
severity. Neither maintenance nor champerty has been held to 
exist where the person maintaining and the suitor stood in some 
social relation, as that of relatives by consanguinity or affinity, mas­
ter and servant or landlord and tenant.3 It is well-settled law that 
maintenance or champerty does not exist where the one offering 
assistance in litigation has any interest whatever in the subject of 
the suit. Whether this interest is great or small, vested or con­
tingent, certain or uncertain, it is, if honestly believed to exist, 
sufficient to remove the case from the rules against maintenance 
and champerty.4
By the great weight of modern authority fees charged by an 
attorney to a client for professional services and dependent upon
3 Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N. E. 747, 16 L. R. A. 723.
4  5 R. C. L .  p. 274.
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the amount of recovery are not within the rules against mainte­
nance and champerty. But if the attorney agrees, not only to prose­
cute or defend the case for a fee contingent upon the success of 
the litigation, but also to bear the expense of witness fees or costs 
of the suit, the agreement is champertous. If, in addition to the 
contingent-fee stipulation, the agreement provides that the client 
shall not settle by compromise or otherwise without the consent 
of the attorney, the agreement is champertous. If the contingent 
fee was a reward for the attorney’s services as a witness or for 
the quashing of a criminal prosecution, the agreement providing for 
such fee is champertous. Even where the attorney’s contract is 
champertous and, therefore, void, the attorney is generally per­
mitted to recover on a quantum meruit for the value of services 
rendered.5 Some courts, including the supreme court of the United 
States, refuse to be concerned with all the technicalities of the com­
mon-law tests of champerty and maintenance and consider merely 
whether the particular contract in question is oppressive in charac­
ter, and, if not, to uphold it, though the attorney agreed to bear 
the expenses of the litigation and contracted for a share of the 
proceeds.
In the main, the rules of maintenance and champerty applicable 
to attorneys govern in the contractual relationships between lay­
men. A difference lies in the fact that the attorney contributes his 
services while the layman generally hires the legal service neces­
sary to prosecute or defend the suit whose court costs he has agreed 
to bear and in whose proceeds he has been promised a share. Not 
all courts require that the layman must bear the costs of the suit 
in addition to sharing in the proceeds of the trial before he can be 
said to be guilty of champerty; some courts have held agreements 
void for champerty where the layman was promised a share in the
5 Note: By the weight of authority it is no defense to an action that the plain­
tiff has made a champertous contract for its prosecution, unless the cause of action 
be based upon the champertous agreement, as where the cause of action was 
assigned to the plaintiff by a champertous agreement. For further illustration, if 
a note or an account be assigned to an attorney for litigation with the under­
standing that the attorney is to get a percentage of the profits from litigation, the 
cause of action is invalid; but if no assignment is made to the attorney and the 
suit is brought in the name of the client, the cause of action will not be invalidated 
by the fact that the attorney is to bear costs of the suit and divide the proceeds 
of the litigation with the client. (Thornton on Attorneys at Law, volume II, p. 684.)
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recovery in consideration of his rendering services to the litigant 
or securing evidence to sustain the suit or attending to the prose­
cution or defense of the suit.6
Some of the more important general characteristics of the laws 
of maintenance and champerty having been set forth, it remains 
to show to what extent the public accountant is subject to the 
rules of maintenance and champerty. The occasions on which an 
accountant as such might deem it necessary to enter into an agree­
ment involving maintenance or champerty would be rare. The 
most probable situations inviting champertous agreements by pub­
lic accountants would be in practice before the agencies for the 
collection of income taxes, federal and state. The accountant would, 
in such practice, be acting as a counselor and should be subject to 
the same rules of maintenance and champerty as are applicable to 
the attorney.
It might easily happen that an accountant would be asked to 
enter into a champertous agreement to furnish evidence. It seems 
to be the weight of authority that an agreement to furnish existing 
documents and information already in the hands of the promisor 
to a litigant for use as evidence in an action from which the prom­
isor is to share in the recovery is not champertous.7 On the other 
hand, if the one providing the existing information further stipu­
lates that he will procure for a contingent fee other information 
necessary to sustain the suit, the agreement is champertous, tending 
to perjury and a perversion of justice.8 By the weight of authority 
an agreement to pay an ordinary witness as compensation a fee 
in excess of the statutory amount is invalid, on the ground that 
the agreement lacks consideration and has a tendency to perjury. 
An agreement to pay a witness a fee contingent on the success of 
the suit is doubly vicious in that the agreement not only violates 
the statutory-fee bill, but also tends to induce the witness to color 
his testimony so as to win the suit. In common with a lay witness, 
the compensation of an expert witness can not be made to depend
6 W illiston on Contracts, volume III, sections 1711-1716; 5 R. C. L., pp. 268- 
286; T hornton on Attorneys-at-law, volume II, pp. 652-687; Note— 16 L. R. A. 
745.
7 Annotation, 34 A. L. R. 1537.
8 Ibid.; Annotation, 16 A. L. R. 1433.
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upon the contingency of the successful outcome of the litigation. 
Likewise, by the weight of authority,. an expert witness can not 
demand compensation in excess of the statutory witness fee before 
testifying to facts within his knowledge, although it may have 
required professional study, learning or skill to ascertain them.9 
If the expert witness has acquired knowledge of the facts through 
previous employment with a litigant or anyone else, he must tes­
tify without more compensation than the statutory fee. On the other 
hand, if the witness, after he has been summoned to testify, must 
make preliminary preparation or render professional services for 
the purpose of qualifying himself to give expert testimony, he is 
entitled to compensation for such preparatory services.10 Hence, a 
public accountant in response to a court order to testify could not 
be compelled to make an audit without compensation in order that 
he might qualify to testify as an expert concerning certain account­
ing records.
An American case dealing with champerty on the part of an 
accountant was decided by the supreme court of Wisconsin in 1924. 
The facts of this case, Miller v. Anderson,11 were as follows:
The plaintiff, who was an accountant, was employed as head 
accountant and credit man of the Interstate Packing Company at 
Winona, Minnesota, for a year beginning in February, 1922. In 
the early part of his employment the accountant heard the super­
intendent state that the company owed a stock shipper at Tomah, 
Wisconsin, a large sum of money and that the company remained 
silent about the debt because the shipper was unaware of the 
claim. After the accountant left the employ of the Interstate Pack­
ing Company he ascertained the name of the stock shipper, de­
fendant in this case, and entered into a contract with the shipper 
for the collection of the debt.
The contract entered into between the plaintiff accountant and 
the defendant stock-shipper provided that the accountant, with the
9 Note: The English courts and a substantial minority of American decisions 
have held that an expert witness can not be coerced to testify unless he has had 
compensation greater than the fee allowed a lay-witness.
10 Annotation, 2 A. L. R. 1576; Annotation, 16 A. L. R. 1457; Williston on 
Contracts, vol. III, sec. 1716.
11 196 N. W. 869, 183 Wis. 163, 34 A. L. R. 1529.
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coöperation of the shipper, should make such investigations of 
shipments and sales made by the stock shipper to the Interstate 
Packing Company as the accountant deemed necessary to deter­
mine whether any debt was due by the Interstate Packing Company 
to the shipper. The contract further provided that, if it should be 
ascertained that a balance was due the shipper from the Interstate 
Packing Company and if such debt should be collected, the ac­
countant and the shipper would share equally in all moneys thus 
received.
After the execution of this contract the accountant and the 
shipper obtained from the railroad over which the shipper had made 
his shipments the number of carloads of stock the shipper had 
sent to the Interstate Packing Company. By means of an intensive 
search the accountant and shipper were able to find among the 
shipper’s possessions sales tickets issued by the Interstate Packing 
Company, which tallied with records of the railroad. Then the 
accountant and the shipper compared these tickets with the credits 
to the shipper’s account on the books of the bank where he was 
accustomed to make deposits. All the sales tickets except two corre­
sponded with the credits to the shipper’s account on the bank 
books. After the accountant and the shipper determined the amount 
of the two shipments for which no payment had been made, the 
shipper drew a draft for that amount upon the Interstate Packing 
Company. The draft was returned unpaid. Then the shipper went 
to the Interstate Packing Company and succeeded in collecting 
$3,750. The shipper refused to remit half of the collection to the 
accountant; and the accountant brought an action for that sum 
against the shipper. The shipper set up the defense of champerty. 
The court’s opinion in part follows:
“That a champertous contract is void and will not be enforced is 
a trite proposition. Contracts to pay for collecting and procuring testi­
mony to be used in evidence, coupled with a condition that the 
contractee’s right to compensation depends upon the character of the 
testimony procured, or upon the result of the suit in which it is to 
be used, have been uniformly condemned by the courts as contrary to 
public policy, for the reason that such agreements hold out an induce­
ment to commit fraud or procure persons to commit perjury. Thus, a
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contract to pay a physician a percentage of the recovery for acting 
as an expert in a personal-injury action is against public policy.
“Likewise, it has been held * * * that an agreement to pay a 
witness more than the statutory witness fees for appearing and testify­
ing to facts within his knowledge is contrary to public policy and 
void. This is especially true where the compensation is dependent 
upon the successful outcome of the litigation.
“It will be observed that these several principles involve a common 
element, namely, existing or contemplated litigation. Such contracts 
are held to contravene public policy because they tend to the perver­
sion of justice. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the contract 
between the parties for the purpose of ascertaining whether it con­
templated the institution of any action or proceeding and the rendi­
tion of any service or assistance on the part of the plaintiff condemned 
by the foregoing principles.
“It must be conceded that the contract, on its face, does not provide 
for the institution of any litigation, nor does any suggestion appear 
therefrom that either of the parties had any such thought in mind. 
But in cases such as this we are not confined to a consideration of the 
written contract. Parol evidence is competent to show that a writing 
valid on its face is a mere cover for an illegal transaction. * * * 
The answer alleges that the written contract was and is a part of 
an attempt to cover a simultaneous oral understanding and agreement 
between the parties which does offend against the foregoing prin­
ciples. Parol evidence of the negotiations leading up to the written 
contract was therefore admitted and must be considered in this con­
nection. But the parol evidence fails to reveal any thought at any 
time on the part of either of the parties that litigation with the pack­
ing company would be necessary or likely. In fact, it was not suggested 
by either party, so far as the parol evidence discloses. The nearest 
approach to such a suggestion occurred after the contract had been 
executed and after the draft made upon the packing company had 
been returned unpaid. The parties then went to a lawyer’s office, and 
the plaintiff suggested that the account be placed with a lawyer, to 
be handled in the form of a collection. But the defendant did not 
like that. He thought he knew the vice-president and stock buyer of 
the packing company and that he could make a settlement with him. 
He went to Winona and effected a settlement with him. The record 
discloses a situation where the defendant had simply lost sight of the 
fact that he had not been paid for two carloads of stock shipped to
the packing company. When he was first told that the packing com­
pany was the debtor which the plaintiff had in mind, he could not 
believe that the packing company owed him anything. It was plain­
tiff’s task to get together defendant’s records and accounts and the 
records of the railway company, for the purpose of informing de­
fendant of the true situation of affairs. Plaintiff knew that the packing 
company knew that they were owing the defendant. Certainly plain­
tiff did not assume that litigation would be necessary to enforce 
collection. There was no agreement, expressed or implied, that plain­
tiff would bear any part of the expense of the litigation. There is no 
evidence to show that it was assumed by either party that, even if 
litigation should result, plaintiff would be a necessary witness. As we 
now view the case, we are at a loss to divine the character of the 
evidence which plaintiff could have given, had litigation resulted, 
that would have been in any sense substantial or material. De­
fendant’s case would have been proved by showing that he had 
shipped a certain number of carloads of stock. This could have been 
shown by the records of the railroad company. Defendant’s own 
testimony would have been sufficient to show that he had not been 
paid for two carloads so shipped. It would then have devolved upon 
the packing company to prove payment. Any testimony that the 
plaintiff might have given would have been so remote and of so little 
weight or materiality that it can not characterize the contract as one 
having for its purpose the influencing of litigation. To condemn this 
contract as one against public policy is to carry the principles invoked 
by the respondent to a prudish extreme, and would compel a holding 
that a business man whose accounts have become confused or involved 
may not employ an accountant to audit them for a compensation 
contingent upon the amount eventually collected. To such an extreme 
we are not prepared to go where the gist of the contract is not to 
promote successful litigation, but rather to place the client in the pos­
session of the true facts concerning his affairs and accounts.”
In the case of Miller v. Anderson, supra, there were the follow­
ing conditions in the alleged champertous agreement:
(1) A compensation contingent upon collection of a debt.
(2) A promise by the plaintiff to search defendant’s records to 
procure evidence to substantiate the claim which the plaintiff knew 
existed.
(3) No litigation contemplated.
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(4) No mention or implication that plaintiff was to bear any 
cost of litigation.
The agreement was not champertous, for in every champertous 
agreement there must be present or contemplated litigation. Fur­
thermore, the agreement was not champertous because the contin­
gent remuneration was to be derived from an ordinary collection 
of a business debt and not from the proceeds of a law suit and 
also because the information was to be procured to substantiate a 
business debt and not to sustain litigation. Certainly, an accountant 
may perform an audit for a fee contingent upon certain collections 
where litigation is not contemplated.
While decisions generally have not been concerned with the 
adequacy of evidence to sustain litigation where champerty is 
alleged, yet the court’s position in this case seems to be well taken 
in holding that an agreement to furnish evidence for litigation is 
not champertous unless the evidence affords substantial proof in 
the case. If there is no material or substantial proof in the evidence 
which the plaintiff can offer, he can do little or nothing by the 
production of such evidence to pervert the course of justice. This 
thought inclines toward the recent innovation of certain courts, 
including the supreme court of the United States, in brushing aside 
the technicalities of champerty and seeking to determine whether 
or not the agreement in reality tends toward oppression and per­
version of justice.
While the court in this case is correct in the philosophy of the 
law of champerty, it appears to be erroneous in taking the position 
that the only evidence the plaintiff could have produced for litiga­
tion was from his knowledge of the accounts of the packing com­
pany. While the cases that have been involved with the commission 
of champerty through production of documentary or other evidence 
have been concerned with information not in the possession or 
control of the litigant, it would seem that, as in this case, where 
th e  ev id en ce  w a s in  su ch  a c o n d it io n  th at it c o u ld  n o t  b e  used  
without the services of an accountant, even though the records were 
possessed or controlled directly or remotely by the litigant, courts 
should hold that the accountant procured evidence in making the
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search or audit and interpretations indispensable to the use of the 
records as evidence.
O wnership of W orking P apers
English cases are singularly silent on the subject of ownership 
of papers upon which accountants base their reports to their 
clients.12
An important decision rendered in 1927 by the supreme judicial 
court of Massachusetts in the case of Ipswich Mills v. Dillon 13 set 
a precedent for American courts with respect to the rights of a 
public accountant to his working papers. In this case the defendants 
had been employed for many years prior to 1926 to conduct the 
audits and prepare income-tax returns for the plaintiff textile mill. 
The plaintiff in 1926 in order to obtain certain data for income- 
tax purposes demanded from the defendants “all papers in your 
possession belonging to Ipswich Mills.” The accountants refused to 
give up the papers; and the plaintiff sought a court order to compel 
the defendants to deliver the papers.
The Ipswich Mills v. Dillon case held as property of the public 
accountant the following records, papers, letters and documents 
prepared in the course of the accountant-client relationship:
(1) Office copy of client’s income-tax return, a copy of which 
had been sent to the client.
(2) Office copies of schedules relating to the client’s income-tax 
returns, copies of which had been sent to the client.
(3) Carbon copies of letters from accountant to collector of in­
ternal revenue.
(4) Carbon copies of letters from accountant to his client.
(5) Original letters from client to accountant.
(6) Original letters from client’s attorney to accountant.
(7) The research data, or working papers, the accountant had 
obtained from a review of the client’s accounting records.
Since the accountant in this case conceded that the client was 
owner of papers that had originated in the client’s office or in the
12 “The Ownership of Accountants’ Working Papers,” The Accountant, London, 
1927, volume 77, p. 187.
13 157 N. E. 604.
office of the client’s selling agents, or in the office of someone asso­
ciated with the client’s selling agents, the court did not rule on the 
title to such papers. Such papers doubtless were the property of 
the client, since apparently the accountant had nothing to do with 
them except to gain custody of them for purposes of review.
The decision in the case, that the public accountant is an inde­
pendent contractor and not an agent of his client, is well substanti­
ated by reason and by precedents in other professions. The public 
accountant assumes none of the essential characteristics of an agent 
in his contract with his client. The professional accountant does 
not represent the mind of his client in the making, changing or 
cancelling of business contracts for the client with third parties. 
The public accountant is not subject to direction and control by the 
client as is an agent to his principal.
Since the public accountant acts in the capacity of an independent 
contractor and not as an agent in dealing with his client, the work­
ing papers he must prepare in order to render his reports to his 
client become his own property. He contracts with his client to 
furnish reports showing the condition of the accounting records of 
the client and does not agree to provide the client with means by 
which such reports are prepared.
The public accountant is responsible to his client to render effi­
cient income-tax service. Because of the many contingencies that 
may arise after the return has been prepared and sent to the col­
lecting agency, it is vital to the accountant that he retain a copy 
of the return, for only in this way can the client be assured of 
competent income-tax service. Unless the courts grant the account­
ant title to his copy of the income-tax return, the professional ac­
countant can have no assurance that he will be able to retain the 
data necessary to cope with subsequent contingencies.
As the accountant should be allowed to retain title to copies of 
income-tax returns rendered for his client, so should the accountant 
be permitted to own carbon copies of letters sent by the account­
ant. In the cou rse  of accounting practice questions concerning pre­
vious audits arise and require the attention of the auditor. The 
continuation of the accountant’s relation with his client may hinge 
upon the accountant’s giving prompt attention to matters involv­
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ing the former audit. It may easily happen that the information 
necessary to solve the question is contained in the carbon copy of a 
letter. It is essential to the practice of public accounting that the 
practitioner be permitted to own carbon copies of letters relating 
to audits he has performed. Only in this way can the accountant 
give to his client continued and trustworthy service.
Courts uniformly allow to the recipient of a letter complete title 
for all purposes except publication. The paper and the manuscrip­
tion upon it constitute a gift by the sender to the recipient. Of 
course, a public accountant should not be permitted to reveal to 
third parties confidential information received by letter from his 
client; but he should be permitted to own the letters he receives.
While the Ipswich Mills v. Dillon is the only case on the owner­
ship of the public accountant’s letters, documents and working 
papers prepared in the course of the accountant-client relation, the 
principles of the case are sound and should be followed in future 
decisions.
Virginia has a statute which entitles a public accountant to own­
ership of his working papers:14
“All statements, records, schedules and memoranda made by a 
certified public accountant or a public accountant, or by an employee 
or employees of a certified public accountant, or public accountant, 
incident to or in the course of professional service to clients by such 
certified public accountant, or public accountant, except reports sub­
mitted by a certified public accountant, or public accountant, to a 
client, shall be and remain the property of such certified public 
accountant, or public accountant, in the absence of a written agree­
ment between the certified public accountant, or public accountant, 
and the client, to the contrary.”
Florida has a similar statute.15 No cases have arisen under these 
statutes of Virginia and Florida.
T he A ccountant’s L ien  upon  H is E mployer’s Books 
Prior to a consideration of the subject of the accountant’s lien
upon his employer’s records as a security for the payment of service
14 Acts of assembly, Virginia, 1928, chapter 454, section 572a.
15 C ertified Public A ccountant L aw s o f the U nited  States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc., p. 41.
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fees, it is well to devote some attention to the nature of a lien. 
A lien is a legal claim or charge on either personalty or real estate 
as security for the payment of some debt or obligation. On the 
basis of source of creation liens are divisible into common-law, 
equitable, maritime and statutory. On the basis of the scope of the 
claims, liens are divided into general and specific.
A common-law lien is a right originating from a contract im­
plied in law by which possession of personal property may be 
retained until some debt due on or secured by such property is 
paid or satisfied.16 A common-law lien will be implied where a 
lien in a particular set of circumstances has received immemorial 
recognition at common-law or is uniformly and generally allowed 
by trade custom or practice. When the custom is first proved to 
establish a lien, the lien arises from the intentions of the parties as 
interpreted from the facts within the custom; but after common- 
law courts have repeatedly held a lien to exist in accordance with 
the particular trade custom or usage, the type of lien becomes so 
well established that it is implied in law. The common law makes 
a contract in the circumstances in order to afford a sure remedy 
to a person who has performed services for another. The claimant 
has neither title nor a right to obtain title to the property; he 
simply has a right of detainer for use as an effectual agency for 
inducing or compelling a settlement of a just claim. It necessarily 
follows, then, that a common-law lien can exist no longer than the 
duration of possession by the claimant. Furthermore, the party 
claiming the lien must show the just possession of the thing held; 
the lien can not be founded upon an illegal or fraudulent act or 
breach of duty.
An equitable lien is a charge or encumbrance placed upon per­
sonal or real property by a contract expressed, or implied in fact, to 
insure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.17 The 
charge or encumbrance is not a conveyance of title to the creditor, 
nor is it a right to obtain title, but rather a right to have a certain 
obligation settled through sale of identified property under court 
order. An equitable lien is created by the intentions of the parties.
16 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 1-26.
17 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 27-96.
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An equitable lien is a means of affording justice where it may be 
deduced from an express contract or surrounding circumstances that 
the parties must have intended that a charge be maintained upon 
specific property to insure performance of some obligation. While at 
common law a lien means merely the right of possession until a 
pecuniary recovery is made from the general resources of the debtor, 
in equity a lien affords a way of satisfying rights and obligations out 
of identified property even though the chattel is not possessed by the 
creditor. As between the debtor and creditor the lien may be effec­
tual even though possession of the property is retained by the debtor. 
The kinds of equitable liens are as varied as the possibilities of form­
ing contracts creating them. An example of an equitable lien 
arising from an express contract is to be found in an agreement of 
a merchant to permit the sale of his stock of merchandise under 
court order to satisfy a claim of purchase money in case of default. 
An implied equitable lien arises when a debtor gives an order to a 
third person to pay a creditor out of a specific fund under the con­
trol of the third person.
By legislation in America practically all the common-law liens 
and many of the equitable liens have been enlarged in their scope 
or have been made more effectual by provisions for their enforce­
ment.18 In many instances the statutes have gone beyond the liens 
previously recognized at common law or in equity and have cre­
ated a number of new liens. The tendency of legislation is to 
extend the protection afforded by liens to all persons who supply 
labor or materials for others. A common form of remedy in a 
statutory lien is a legal attachment. But in some states the statutes 
provide for equitable action as a remedy for the statutory lien. 
The equitable action is usually in the form of a decree for a sale of 
the property in order to obtain funds to satisfy the debt upon 
which the lien is based.
A specific lien is a right which attaches to specific property as 
security for some demand for the unpaid price of work done or 
materials furnished in repairing or constructing the identical chattel. 
While a specific lien may be created by common law, a contract or 
a statute, the origin of this type of lien is to be found in the com-
18 Jones on Liens, volume I, secs. 97-112.
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mon law. The specific or particular lien was made necessary to 
protect tradesmen and artisans for the price of work done on goods 
in their possession. The principal specific liens upon personal 
property at common law are those of mechanics and artisans, inn­
keepers, carriers, sellers or vendors and landlords under the process 
of distress. The specific lien has been adopted by equity and statutes 
to include situations where possession is not in the creditor. The 
specific or particular lien is favored by the decisions and legislation. 
It adds confidence to business and does not place any unconscion­
able restraint upon property.
A general lien is a right attached to a particular chattel to serve 
as security for a general balance of account due from the owner. 
While the general lien is generally confined to common law, it may 
be equitable or statutory. General liens are looked at with jealousy 
by courts, because such liens encroach upon the common law and 
destroy the equal distribution of the debtor’s estate among his 
creditors. The principal general liens are those of factors and 
brokers, bankers, lawyers upon their clients’ papers and moneys, 
warehousemen and wharfingers.19
Two cases have defined, though inadequately, the rights of an 
accountant to a lien on his employer’s books. Each case appeared 
in 1901. Burleigh v. Clark, Lim.,20 was decided by the chancery 
division of England:
“The accountant now took the view that he had a lien on the books 
of the company for work done, and he refused to deliver up the 
books except on payment by the receiver of his account, £137. The 
way in which he got possession of the books was this: He asked leave 
of the directors and the secretary to take away the books to his own 
office, as he said the company’s office was small and inconvenient for 
him, and he could do the work better in his own office.
“His lordship said that the affidavits filed showed that the re­
spondent claimed a lien, not as auditor, but as accountant. In his 
opinion the question of an auditor’s lien did not arise and had it done 
so, he considered that an auditor had no such lien; but that point he 
did not now decide. In respect of the share register, the accountant 
had no possible lien on that, but he held that he was entitled to a lien
19 Jones on Liens, vol. I, secs. 1-152; 37 Corpus Juris, pp. 306-323.
20 The Accountant, London, 1901, volume 27, law reports section, p. 65.
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on such books only as he had actually worked upon, in respect of his 
proper remuneration for work upon those books only.”
Scott Shoe Machinery Co. v. Broaker,21 the other opinion, was 
rendered by the city court of New York. In this case an action of 
replevin was brought by a client to recover possession of books in 
the hands of certain public accountants who held the books in 
an effort to enforce payment for services rendered to the client. 
The decision reads:
“At common law, liens were given to attorneys, warehousemen, 
wharfingers and to other special classes of persons. There was no such 
thing as an accountant’s lien. And, except in the case of these favored 
classes, the only persons having a lien at common law are bailees 
employed to change, alter, repair or do work upon some article, and 
who by their services have added something to its value. In this 
latter class are the liens of tailors, carpenters, etc. This class appears 
to be the same as is provided for by section 70 of the New York 
lien law. The defendants certainly do not come within this class. 
They have done nothing to the books but have merely made an 
examination of them. After their examination the books remained as 
they were before, nothing whatsoever having been added to their 
value. The object of the examination made by an accountant is the 
preparation of a report. The report may be something of value, or it 
may not, but the books themselves are not the least changed or 
improved by the investigation.”
These two reported cases, dealing with the accountant’s lien upon 
his client’s books, are doubtless correctly decided in the light of 
the well-established law of liens. In the two cases the only sem­
blance of a lien was a specific lien at common law, and that had 
necessarily to be predicated upon the possession of the records by 
the accountant and also upon the improvement of the records by 
the accountant’s labors. In other words, an accountant’s lien upon 
his client’s books must be based on a possession lawfully obtained 
and an improvement of the records effected by the accountant 
through recording entries or otherwise. Generally the accountant 
will not obtain possession of his client’s records, nor will he usually 
improve the records themselves. Hence, in most instances the two
21 71 N. Y. S. 1023, 33 Misc. Rep. 382, 10 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 130.
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most essential elements of the common-law lien would be absent 
from the accountant’s dealings with his client. Even where the 
elements of possession and improvement of the books are present 
it cannot be expected that courts will allow more than the common- 
law specific lien. It can not be expected that courts will allow to 
the accountant the common-law general lien upon his client’s books 
to ensure collection of his service fees, in view of the jealous atti­
tude courts usually assume towards general liens.
The occasions upon which an accountant might acquire an 
equitable lien to secure payment for services, indeed, would be rare. 
Any demand on the part of the accountant for an express contract 
giving him a lien upon his client’s records would probably mean 
the termination of relations with the client. However, it is conceiv­
able that an implied equitable lien may arise in favor of the ac­
countant. It might happen that a client would give an order to a 
collecting agency to pay out of funds collected from the client’s 
accounts receivable a certain sum as compensation to an account­
ant for auditing services. In such circumstances the accountant 
would have an implied equitable lien upon the collection fund to 
secure payment for auditing services.
No state seems to have a statute giving the public accountant a 
lien upon any property of his client to secure payment for auditing 
services. In fairness to accountants, state legislation might well 
provide for a lien upon the records or other property of clients to 
secure payment for auditing services. Of course, any such statute 
should be coupled with an appropriate remedy such as impounding 
of records or the sale of property to effect payment of the debt.
R ights of the P ublic A ccountant U nder U nited States 
Bankruptcy A ct
A proper understanding of the public accountant’s rights under 
the United States bankruptcy act must be based upon a general 
concept of the section dealing with priorities and, then, upon a 
survey of the court interpretations dealing specifically with public 
accountants. With this end in view the statute is quoted and dis­
cussed generally and then the cases pertaining to accountants are 
presented and reviewed.
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“United States bankruptcy act of 1898, as amended, section 64: 
Debts which have priority, (a) The court shall order the trustee to 
pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United 
States, state, county, district or municipality, in the order of priority 
as set forth in paragraph (b) hereof: provided, that no order shall 
be made for the payment of a tax assessed against real estate of a 
bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate 
therein as determined by the court. Upon filing the receipts of the 
proper public officers for such payments the trustees shall be credited 
with the amounts thereof, and in case any question arises as to the 
amount or legality of any such tax the same shall be heard and 
determined by the court.
“(b) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of 
dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, 
and the order of payment shall be (1) the actual and necessary cost of 
preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; (2) the filing 
fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases, and, where property of 
the bankrupt, transferred or concealed by him either before or after 
the filing of the petition, shall have been recovered for the benefit of 
the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the expense of one 
or more creditors, the reasonable expense of such recovery; (3) the 
cost of administration, including the fees and mileage payable to 
witnesses as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United 
States, and one reasonable attorney’s fee, for the professional services 
actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed, 
to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases while performing 
the duties herein prescribed, and to the bankrupt in voluntary and 
involuntary cases, as the court may allow; (4) where the confirmation 
of composition terms has been refused or set aside upon the objec­
tion and through the efforts and at the expense of one or more 
creditors, in the discretion of the court, the reasonable expenses of 
such creditors in opposing such composition; (5) wages due to work­
men, clerks, traveling or city salesmen or servants which have been 
earned within three months before the date of the commencement of 
the proceeding, not to exceed $600 to each claimant; (6) taxes payable 
under paragraph (a) hereof; and (7) debts owing to any person who 
by the laws of the states or the United States is entitled to priority: 
provided, that the term ‘person’ as used in this section shall include 
corporations, the United States and the several states and territories of 
the United States. * * *”
It is established law that where state statutes giving priority of 
claims against a bankrupt are in conflict with the priorities laid 
down in section 64 of the United States bankruptcy act, the federal 
statute is given precedence under constitutional authority conferred 
upon the national government to enact and enforce national bank­
ruptcy laws.22
Interpretations of the act may be. gleaned from decisions of the 
federal courts. The priorities recited in section 64 apply merely 
to the general assets of the estate. They are superior only to the 
rights of general or unsecured creditors. A mortgage or other lien 
given and accepted in good faith and for a present consideration, 
which is not voidable as a preference or otherwise in fraud of the 
bankruptcy act, is, with respect to property subject to such liens, 
superior to the prior claims enumerated in section 64 of the act. 
The courts interpret section 64 to mean priority over other claims, 
not out of the funds derived from the sale of the bankrupt’s prop­
erty, but out of such sum as remained after the satisfaction of the 
debts duly secured by liens lawfully existing when the bankruptcy 
proceedings were instituted. Courts have taken the position that 
it was the plain intent of congress, in framing the bankruptcy act, 
not to impair but to protect and preserve statutory, common-law 
and equitable liens as well as mortgages, thought to be indispensable 
to the protection of business transactions and commercial prosperity 
of the country.23 The federal courts have also justified the priority 
of statutory liens over the priorities set forth in section 64 on the 
ground that a contrary holding would operate as an undue en­
croachment upon rights reserved to the states. While a number of 
cases have relegated certain statutory liens to the position of 64b (7) 
providing for the priority of debts due persons entitled to priority 
under the laws of the United States or the states, statutory liens, 
with other liens and mortgages, are generally given first claim on 
the bankrupt’s assets.24
22 In re Rodgers & Garrett Timber Co. (D. C., Md. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 571; In 
re Glover Casket Co. (D . C., Ga., 1932) 1 F. Supp. 743; In re Inland Dredging 
Corporation (C. C. A., N. Y., 1932) 61 F. (2d) 765, certiorari denied (1933) 
53 S. Ct. 403.
23 In re Proudfoot, F. 733 (1909).
24 United States Code Annotated, title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104, p. 73 (1927); 
Ibid., p. 4 of 1933 cumulative pocket part.
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The actual and necessary cost of preserving the bankrupt’s estate 
subsequent to the filing of the petition is next in priority following 
liens. While the determination of what items shall be included in 
the actual and necessary cost of preserving the bankrupt’s estate is 
within the sound discretion of the court in control of the proceed­
ings, it may well be expected that the judicial discretion will follow 
other cases in allowing items of expense as costs of preserving the 
estate. Debts resulting from the following expenditures have been 
held, apparently by the weight of authority, to come within the 
preferred claims as costs of preserving the estate: receiver’s salary; 25 
receiver’s current expenses incurred for the estate; 26 rent to land­
lord for storage of bankrupt’s property during receivership; 27 re­
ceiver’s expenses incurred to preserve bankrupt’s stock of fish; 28 
wages of guards to protect property of estate subsequent to filing 
of petition whether during receivership or trusteeship; 29 assignee’s 
expenses of appraisal for sale prior to filing petition in bank­
ruptcy; 30 audit services after common-law assignment prior to 
bankruptcy adjudication; 31 wages of laborers who operated factory 
during receivership; 32 fire-insurance premiums during period of 
common-law assignment preceding filing of bankruptcy petition 
and period between time of filing of petition and appointment of 
trustee.33
Let us now consider some of the claims which courts have held 
to be included in the second group of priorities described in sec­
tion 64b. Fees paid by creditors for filing the petition in bank­
ruptcy have been uniformly held to come within the second group
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25 In re Scott (D. C., N. C., 1900) 99 F. 404.
26 In re Veler (C. C. A., sixth circuit, 1918) 249 F. 633.
27 In re Erlich (D. C., Pa., 1924) 297 F. 327. Note: It is well-settled law that 
where a landlord has a statutory lien on bankrupt’s property for rent at the time 
of commencement of bankruptcy proceedings the claim has precedence over the 
priorities of section 64 of the bankruptcy act. See: In re Menzies (D. C., Arizona, 
1932) 60 F. 1064; U. S. C. A. 11, bankruptcy, section 104, p. 18 of 1933 cumu­
lative pocket part.
28 In re Alaska Fishing & D. Co. (D. C., Wash., 1909) 167 F. 875.
29 In re Mitchell (C. C. A., 2nd. circuit, 1914) 212 F. 932.
30 In re Cooper (D. C., Mass., 1917) 243 F. 797.
31 In re Hanson Co. (D. C., Iowa, 1922) 283 F. 850.
32  In re Erie Lumber Co. (D. C., Ga., 1906) 150 F. 817.
33 In re South Bend Lumber Co. (D. C., Wash., 1924) 2 F. (2d) 783.
of priorities of section 64b.34 Debts incurred by a trustee or ex­
penditures made by creditors for the purpose of recovering to the 
estate property concealed or transferred before or after the filing 
of the petition in bankruptcy, where the transfer or conceal­
ment was made in actual or constructive fraud, by the weight of 
authority have been included in the second class of priorities of 
section 64b.35
What items shall be included in costs of administration, the third 
group of section 64b, is within the reasonable discretion of the 
court in control of the proceedings. In the absence of abuse the 
court’s discretion will not be questioned upon appeal. Items gen­
erally interpreted by the courts as coming within costs of adminis­
tration are these: office expenses of trustee; care and custody of 
bankrupt’s property while in hands of trustee; rent during trustee­
ship; commissions of receiver and referee; expenses incurred in car­
rying out bankrupt’s contracts; accountant’s services; attorney’s 
fees.36
The discussion of the fourth class of priorities of section 64b, 
which gives priority to the cost of successful resistance to confirma­
tion of creditors’ composition agreement, should be preceded by 
some attention to the meaning of confirmation of creditor’s com­
position agreement under the act. Section 12 of the bankruptcy act 
provides that “a bankrupt may offer, either before or after adjudica­
tion, terms of composition to his creditors, after, but not before, 
he has been examined in open court, or at a meeting of his creditors, 
and has filed in court the schedule of his property and the list of 
his creditors required to be filed by bankrupts.” The court may 
compel dissentient creditors to join in the agreement. On confirma­
tion by the court and distribution of the consideration the case is 
settled. Section 64b (4) which provides for priority of creditors’ 
claims for expenses incurred in successful resistance to confirmation 
of a composition agreement was added in 1926. It seems that no 
court has ruled upon the new provision. Hence, we have not a court 
in terp reta tio n  o f  th is fo u r th  g r o u p  o f  prior c la im s. H o w e v e r , th e
214 R esponsibilities and R ights of A ccountants
34 In re Silverman (D. C., N. Y., 1899) 97 F. 325.
35 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
36 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, secs. 102 and 104.
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wording of this added provision makes it clear that the judge, in 
his discretion, in the order named in section 64b, may give priority 
to creditors’ claims for reasonable expenses for attorney’s fees, 
witness fees, and other costs incident to a successful opposition to 
a confirmation of a composition agreement between the bankrupt 
and his creditors.
The fifth group of claims under section 64b, which gives priority 
to wages, has been interpreted by a long line of decisions. The 
wages must have been earned within the period of three months 
preceding the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. The wage 
earner must have been a servant, not an independent contractor, 
in order that his claim may receive priority under this fifth provi­
sion. Generally, high executives have been held not entitled to 
priority with respect to their salaries. Presidents, general managers 
and treasurers of corporations have been held to be without the 
preferred group of section 64b(5). On the other hand, the salary 
of a manager of a branch of a chain-store system has been held to 
come within this fifth group of prior claims. Generally, this provi­
sion of section 64b has been interpreted to apply to wages of com­
mon laborers, clerks, salesmen, stenographers and bookkeepers. 
A foreman’s salary is a preferred claim under the fifth group if the 
foreman did the same kind of work as his subordinates were 
doing.37
Prior to 1926, under section 64, courts generally placed taxes 
second only to liens; but, under the amended section, taxes, federal 
and state, have been relegated to sixth place in the priorities set 
forth in section 64b.38
The seventh set of claims in order of priority, which consists of 
debts to persons entitled to priority under state or federal laws, is 
really an adoption of such laws so far as they do not conflict with 
the intent and purposes of the bankruptcy act. Claims under this 
seventh provision do not include specific liens and mortgages, but 
they do include freight charges of railroads under federal control, 
bank receiver’s claim against bankrupt for double liability as stock-
37 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
38 Ibid.
holder, landlord’s prior claim under state statute and mechanics’ 
liens which are given preference by state laws.39
The enumeration of items in the seven groups of prior claims of 
the bankruptcy act is not intended to be exhaustive but sufficient 
to show how the public accountant’s claims for services may be 
properly placed.
Apparently only two cases have dealt with the public account­
ant’s claims for services rendered before the time of adjudication 
in bankruptcy, as a part of the first group of preferred claims under 
section 64b, which provides for priority of debts incurred to pre­
serve the estate. In re Hanson & Tyler Auto Co.,40 the first of the 
two cases, involved the following facts:
The Hanson & Tyler Auto Company in 1920, at the request of 
certain creditors, authorized the plaintiff accountants to make an 
audit of its business but later refused the auditors access to the 
books. The creditors then held a meeting for the purpose of having 
a general assignment of the bankrupt Hanson & Tyler Auto Com­
pany made under the laws of Iowa. The creditors also employed 
the plaintiff accountants to perform the audit. The estimated cost 
of the audit was $1,500; but the actual cost was $3,337.99. The 
accountants began the audit before the state-law assignment became 
effective and completed the audit thereafter. The completed audit 
was used by the trustee under the state-law assignment, and later 
by the trustee in bankruptcy after the case was taken to the federal 
district court of Iowa. After ruling that the court would protect 
“an assignee under state laws and under provision of a state court 
to the extent of the service or expense which is beneficial to the 
estate,” the court held in regard to the preference of the account­
ants’ claim for their services as follows:
“With respect to the matter under consideration, it does not appear 
that an audit was in fact made for the assignee under the general 
assignment. The audit was made under an arrangement with the 
bankrupt itself and certain creditors of the bankrupt and largely com­
pleted before the assignment under the state law was made. It is 
claimed, however, that it was not completed, and that some of the
39 U. S. C. A., title 11, bankruptcy, sec. 104.
40 D. C., Iowa, 1922) 283 F. 850.
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work overlapped the period of the assignee’s administration, but 
how much does not appear. The estimated cost at the time the 
arrangement was made is said to have been $1,500. The complete 
audit for which the charge is made is certified by the referee with the 
record and evidence, and the court is fully convinced that the esti­
mated sum is very ample compensation for the making of the audit 
in question. There is an item in the bill of $865.49 for traveling 
and subsistence expenses. This item is a very unusual one to be in­
cluded without explanation.
“Now, on this 31st day of July, 1922, said matter comes on for 
final determination and order in the premises, and, after carefully 
considering the claim as filed, the summary of evidence certified, and 
the entire record in the case, the court is convinced that $1,500 is very 
ample compensation for the services performed, and especially when 
the item for traveling and subsistence expenses is allowed in addition, 
which the court reluctantly includes, making an aggregate allowance 
of $2,365.49. From this should be deducted the $250 paid on Novem­
ber 18, 1920. The court is further of the opinion that the sum of 
$500, of the $1,500 service item, may be allowed as preferred, on 
account of having been rendered to the assignee under the state law 
and being beneficial to the estate.
“It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the order of the referee, 
which is now reviewed, be modified, and that said claim be estab­
lished in the sum of $2,115.49, and that said claim to the extent of 
$500 only be established and allowed as a preferred claim, the balance 
to be established as a general claim only, and that the order of the 
referee, petitioned from, as so modified, be approved and affirmed.”
In the Hanson & Tyler Auto Co. case the court ruled that the 
claims for audit services rendered after the assignment under state 
laws was made and before the bankruptcy adjudication took place 
were preferred under section 64b of the bankruptcy act. In the first 
place the court held that the auditors’ claims should be preferred 
on the ground that proper recognition of the assignment under 
state laws should be made. This policy on the part of federal courts 
is in effect an adoption of the state laws into the bankruptcy pro­
ceedings so far as such laws do not conflict with the bankruptcy 
act. This ruling would place the auditors’ claims within group 7 of 
the preferred claims under section 64b, which provides for priority
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of claims preferred under state and federal laws. The court, how­
ever, went further and held that the auditors’ claims were entitled 
to priority because their services were instrumental in preserving 
the bankrupt’s estate during the period of assignment. Under this 
ruling the auditors’ claims were advanced to the position of the 
first group of prior claims under section 64b, which provides for 
priority of claims on account of services rendered to preserve the 
bankrupt’s estate. Claims for services rendered the assignee under 
the state laws prior to adjudication in bankruptcy should receive 
the same status with respect to priority as claims for services ren­
dered during receivership. Generally, expenses incurred during re­
ceivership are classed as costs of preserving the estate. Certainly an 
audit rendered to ascertain the property and debts during receiver­
ship partakes of the nature of services to preserve the estate. In re 
Hanson & Tyler Auto Co. should be a guide for future decisions.
In re Cabel Upholstering Co.41 is the second of the two cases 
dealing with the placing claims for auditing services rendered dur­
ing receivership within the first group of preferred claims under 
section 64b. The decision follows:
“The involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed February 28,
1924. An examination of the statement rendered by the attorney 
shows that all services, with the exception of two items, were rendered 
prior to bankruptcy. The statement rendered by the auditor does not 
show what part of the services were rendered prior to bankruptcy and 
what were rendered after, but the referee finds that for the most part 
the services were incurred prior to the filing of the petition, and that 
whatever services were rendered afterwards did not tend to preserve 
the estate.”
The court in the Cabel Upholstering Co. case gave little consid­
eration to the accountant’s services to the bankrupt. The court was 
correct in refusing to give priority to claims for auditing services 
rendered prior to the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy. 
Such claims are construed as debts to general unsecured creditors. 
It is possible that the public accountant’s services subsequent to 
filing the petition were slight and could not have been material
41 (D. C., Mass., 1925) 6 F. (2d) 1019.
in preserving the estate. If so, the court was correct in refusing 
to give preference to claims for such services; but if the audit had 
been performed in any considerable proportion during receivership 
the court should have included the claims for that proportion as 
costs of preserving the estate.
The decision In re M. E. Smith & Co.,42 a case placing the ac­
countant’s claim for services rendered during trusteeship under 
section 64b(2) which gives priority to costs of administration of 
the estate of the bankrupt was in part as follows:
“I find, therefore, as a finding of fact, that the claimant did perform 
accounting (auditing) services for the former trustee herein, with the 
consent and approval of the referee during the years 1927 to and 
including a part of the year 1930, and that the reasonable value of the 
unpaid balance due said claimant is the sum of $1,029.75; that said 
claim was, and is, a valid claim against said bankrupt estate as an 
administration expense, and should have been paid before the declara­
tion of any dividend, or at least before the declaration of a final 
dividend to the creditors, * * * (claim ordered paid out of un­
claimed dividends).”
The M. E. Smith & Co. decision is sound in holding that audit 
services rendered during trusteeship are costs of administration. 
Generally, cases have held that current expenses incurred for the 
estate during the trusteeship are costs of administration. Though it 
might be argued that an audit helps preserve the estate during the 
trusteeship, as in checking cash and inventories, yet, generally the 
ascertainment of property will be effected through an audit during 
the receivership, and the audit during the trusteeship will serve 
largely the interests of administration. In re M. E. Smith & Co. 
should be of controlling importance to courts in future decisions.
When, in the case of the bankruptcy of a stockbroker, it becomes 
necessary for the trustee to engage accountants to unravel the details 
of the bankrupt’s books in order to trace securities of creditors, ex­
penditures for such services are chargeable to the claimants of the 
securities, except those who were able to trace their securities with-
42 (D. C., Neb., 1931) 52 F. (2d) 212.
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out the aid of accountants. This principle was established by In re 
J. C. Wilson & Co.43 as follows:
“It was necessary for the trustee to engage accountants to unravel 
the details contained in the Harris books. An order has been made 
apportioning this expense among various claimants including the 
trustee. * * * No question has been raised as to the reasonableness 
of the charges. While it is true that the trustee represented general 
creditors, and doubtless has done everything in his power in their 
interest, nevertheless it is also true that the work on these accounts 
was for the benefit of the claimants, and work which it would have 
been necessary for them to have done, if this arrangement had not 
been made. These disbursements, in my opinion, were therefore 
chargeable to each claimant in the amounts set forth in the petition 
of M. & L. W. Scudder. In a case such as that of Mrs. Conant, who 
was able to trace her securities without the aid of accountants, no 
charge for that service should be made.”
The decision in the case of J. C. Wilson & Co., that security 
owners who were not able to trace their securities which had been 
pledged by the broker with money lenders and who availed them­
selves of the services of public accountants in the employ of the 
trustee should be charged individually with the costs of the account­
ants’ services incurred in discovering their securities is beyond ques­
tion sound. Since the securities were owned by the customers 
(claimants) of the bankrupt, the expense of tracing them would 
not constitute a charge against the estate of the bankrupt. As to 
the mode of enforcing the order the case is silent, and there seems 
to be no other case in point; but a court, sitting in equity, would 
probably give priority to the accountants’ claims over other claims 
against the securities, in view of the fact that the accountants’ serv­
ices were rendered at the instance of the trustee in bankruptcy.44
43 (D. C., N . Y., 1917) 252 F. 631.
44 Note: As to the reasonableness of charges for services of public accountants 
in bankruptcy proceedings see: In re Weisman (D . C., Conn., 1920) 267 F. 588; 
Kennedy v. Nathan (C. C. A., Pa., 1930) 43 F. (2d) 71; In re Kroeger Bros. Co. 
(C. C. A., Wis., 1921) 276 F. 8.
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E xpenses of A udit in  A ddition to P ersonal Services of 
A ccountant
Where it is clear from the contents and circumstances of an 
auditing contract that only the personal services of the public ac­
countant are engaged, additional cost such as traveling expenses 
and compensation for necessary assistance and the like incurred in 
making the audit must be paid for by the client. The supreme court 
of Montana in 1925 in the case of Callan v. Hample 45 gave a clear 
justification of the rule:
“* * * The character and effect of the employment of an expert 
accountant does not differ materially from the employment of a 
doctor, a lawyer or other professional man. He is retained to perform 
services requiring his personal skill and technical knowledge not 
common to the one employing him, and therefore to proceed with the 
work in accordance with his own methods and ideas without being 
subject to direction or orders from his employer as to details. Such 
an employment does not constitute the relation of master and servant 
and is not governed by the rules applicable to such relation. (26 Cyc. 
970; Eldred v. Mackie, 178 Mass. 1, 59 N. E. 673; Groesbeck  v. Pinson, 
21 Tex. Civ. App. 44, 50 S. W. 620.) Such employment of pro­
fessional men and skilled workers may necessarily entail the employ­
ment of others to attend to certain details, and the outlay of incidental 
expense money, and a contract to pay the expenses thus necessarily 
incurred, as well as and in addition to the reasonable value of the 
services of such an one, may be inferred from the nature of the em­
ployment and the surrounding circumstances.
“The expert accountant could not be required to pay for necessary 
assistance, toll charges and traveling expenses, out of the reasonable 
compensation for his personal services any more than a doctor could 
be required to pay nurses’ wages, drug bills and hospital expenses 
out of his compensation, or a lawyer to pay filing fees, witness fees 
and necessary traveling expenses out of the reasonable compensation 
for his services.”
The bankruptcy courts regularly allow public accountants’ claims 
for clerical and stenographic expenses necessary in bankruptcy 
audits. While reasonable amounts of traveling and hotel expenses
45 236 P. 550, 73 Mont. 321.
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of the accountants have generally been allowed in bankruptcy 
audits, the courts make such allowances with no little reluctance.46 
The allowance for expenses in addition to the cost of the auditors’ 
services should be made unless it can be shown that it was the clear 
intent of the auditing agreement that the accountants should bear 
all costs of the audit.
N ature of A ccountant’s Services A ffect Reasonableness of 
C harges
Two decisions, one by the Louisiana supreme court 47 in 1928 
and the other by the Louisiana court of appeals 48 in 1929, placed 
high values upon accountants’ income-tax services, which the judges 
classed as legal as, compared to values placed upon the usual audit­
ing work which the judges thought was clerical. Perhaps the courts 
have been correct in attaching a higher value to income-tax services 
than to mere routine of reviewing records and making up working 
papers; but time spent in the preparation of the business reports 
from the working papers, in analyzing the financial and operating 
condition of the business, in designing an accounting system or in 
installing a budgetary control system should be compensated by 
fees on a parity with those for legal services rendered in income- 
tax matters.
A uditing Contracts w ith  Corporations and G overnmental 
A gencies
The validity of public accountants’ contracts for audits entered 
into with corporations and governmental agencies is dependent 
upon the authority of the representative or representatives, of the 
corporation or governmental subdivision. The authority of the 
corporate representative is generally dependent upon the resolutions 
of the directors, the corporate charter and the laws designed to 
regulate corporations. Likewise, the contracting authority of a 
governmental agency is dependent upon the statutes and ordinances 
applying to the particular subdivision of government.
46 In re Weisman (D. C., Conn., 1920) 267 F. 588; accountant’s unusual hotel 
bills and Pullman fares were not permitted as claims for bankruptcy audit, Matter 
of Marks (D. C., Ga., 1909) 22 Am. Bankr . Rep. 54.
47 Robinson & Co. v. Connell, 117 So. 774, 166 La. 685.
48 Derbes v. Dixie Mill Supply Co., 124 So. 316, 11 La. App. 522.
Two cases before the supreme court of New York, one 49 in 1907 
and the other 50 in 1915, illustrate the complexities which may 
arise over the authority of corporate representatives to employ 
public accountants to make audits.
An example of the complexities which may affect the authority 
of governmental agencies to contract appears in a decision rendered 
by the supreme court of Kansas in 1908.51 The court ruled that 
a foreign corporation of accountants was eligible, even though the 
corporation had not obtained a permit to do business in Kansas, 
to contract with the governor of Kansas to audit the records of 
state departments. The reason advanced by the court was that the 
corporation of accountants was not doing business in Kansas as 
long as the employees of the corporation prepared only the working 
papers in Kansas and made up the reports outside of Kansas.
Public accountants who care to enter into auditing contracts with 
corporations or governmental subdivisions should have their con­
tracts approved by competent attorneys.
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P ower of P ractitioners of P ublic A ccountancy to Incorporate
The public accountancy statutes of the various states and the 
District of Columbia differ considerably in their provision for the 
incorporation of public accounting firms. Most of the state public 
accountancy statutes are silent on the matter. Illinois and Michigan 
provide specifically in their public accountancy statutes that public 
accounting firms may incorporate.52 It is probable that in many 
more states authority for public accountants to incorporate is to be 
found in the general laws of incorporation. Accounting firms have 
been chartered in the state of New York.51
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Mexico, 
South Dakota and Wisconsin prohibit by statute a corporation 
from assuming the certified public accountant’s title.52 An Iowa 
statute forbids the incorporation of accounting firms.52 Florida has
49 Teele v. Consolidate Amusement Co., 102 N. Y. S. 666.
50 Bartels v. Ferncliff  Cemetery Association, 155 N. Y. S. 322, 169 App. Div. 421.51 
Haskins & Sells v. Kelly, 93 P. 605, 77 Kan. 155.
52 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc.
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a statute which prohibits the practice of public accountancy by a 
corporation whether domestic or foreign.53
The American Institute of Accountants holds that “audit com­
panies and similar organizations are detrimental to the best interests 
of the accounting profession.” 54
The very essence of the public accountant’s work is personal 
service. He renders his services in a position of trust in which he 
owes to his client a duty to exercise skill, efficiency and good faith 
and to the public a duty to certify only business reports free from 
the taints of fraud. The corporate form of organization may make 
it possible for accountants to shift the individual responsibilities 
which they owe their clients and the public in some circumstances. 
Hence, in the interest of the client, the public and the accountant, 
the corporation as a form of organization for accountants should 
not be favored.
53 Certified Public Accountant Laws of the United States, American Institute 
Publishing Co., Inc.
54 See appendix, page 227.
APPENDIX
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
OF
TH E AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
(1) A firm or partnership, all the individual members of which are 
members of the Institute (or in part members and in part associates, 
provided all the members of the firm are either members or associates), 
may describe itself as “Members of the American Institute of Ac­
countants,” but a firm or partnership, all the individual members of 
which are not members of the Institute (or in part members and in 
part associates), or an individual practising under a style denoting a 
partnership when in fact there be no partner or partners or a corporation 
or an individual or individuals practising under a style denoting a 
corporate organization shall not use the designation “Members (or 
Associates) of the American Institute of Accountants.”
(2) The preparation and certification of exhibits, statements, schedules 
or other forms of accountancy work, containing an essential misstate­
ment of fact or omission therefrom of such a fact as would amount to 
an essential misstatement or a failure to put prospective investors on 
notice in respect of an essential or material fact not specifically shown in 
the balance-sheet itself shall be, ipso facto, cause for expulsion or for 
such other discipline as the council may impose upon proper presenta­
tion of proof that such misstatement was either wilful or the result of 
such gross negligence as to be inexcusable.
(3) No member or associate shall allow any person to practise in his 
name as a public accountant who is not a member or an associate of 
the Institute or in partnership with him or in his employ on a salary.
(4) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly allow or agree 
to allow a commission, brokerage or other participation by the laity in 
the fees or profits of his professional work; nor shall he accept directly 
or indirectly from the laity any commission, brokerage or other par­
ticipation for professional or commercial business turned over to others 
as an incident of his services to clients.
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(5) No member or associate shall engage in any business or occupa­
tion conjointly with that of a public accountant, which in the opinion 
of the executive committee or of the council is incompatible or in­
consistent therewith.
(6) No member or associate shall certify to any accounts, exhibits, 
statements, schedules or other forms of accountancy work which have 
not been verified entirely under the supervision of himself, a member 
of his firm, one of his staff, a member or an associate of this Institute 
or a member of a similar association of good standing in a foreign 
country which has been approved by the council.
(7) No member or associate shall take part in any effort to secure 
the enactment or amendment of any state or federal law or of any regula­
tion of any governmental or civic body, affecting the practice of the 
profession, without giving immediate notice thereof to the secretary of 
the Institute, who in turn shall at once advise the executive committee 
or the council.
(8) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly solicit the 
clients or encroach upon the business of another member or associate, 
but it is the right of any member or associate to give proper service and 
advice to those asking such service or advice.
(9) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly offer employ­
ment to an employee of a fellow member or associate without first 
informing said fellow member or associate of his intent. This rule shall 
not be construed so as to inhibit negotiations with any one who of his 
own initiative or in response to public advertisement shall apply to a 
member or an associate for employment.
(10) No member or associate shall render or offer to render pro­
fessional service, the fee for which shall be contingent upon his findings 
and the results thereof.
(11) No member or associate of the Institute shall advertise his or 
her professional attainments or service through the mails, in the public 
prints, by circular letters or by any other written word except that a 
member or an associate may cause to be published in the public prints 
what is technically known as a card. A card is hereby defined as an 
advertisement of the name, title (member of American Institute of 
Accountants, C. P. A., or other professional affiliation or designation), 
class of service and address of the advertiser, without any further 
qualifying words or letters, or in the case of announcement of change 
of address or personnel of firm the plain statement of the fact for the 
publication of which the announcement purports to be made. Cards
Resolutions
permitted by this rule when appearing in newspapers shall not exceed 
two columns in width and three inches in depth; when appearing in 
magazines, directories and similar publications cards shall not exceed 
one quarter page in size. This rule shall not be construed to inhibit the 
proper and professional dissemination of impersonal information among 
a member’s own clients or personal associates or the properly restricted 
circulation of firm bulletins containing staff personnel and professional 
information.
(12) No member or associate of the Institute shall be an officer, a 
director, stockholder, representative, an agent, a teacher or lecturer, 
nor participate in any other way in the activities or profits of any 
university, college or school which conducts its operations, solicits pros­
pective students or advertises its courses by methods which in the opinion 
of the committee on professional ethics are discreditable to the pro­
fession.
RESOLUTIONS
Adopted by the American Institute of Accountants, September 16, 
1919:
Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that audit companies 
and similar organizations are detrimental to the best interests of the 
accounting profession.
Adopted by the council of the American Institute of Accountants, 
April 11, 1932:
Whereas, Estimates of earnings contingent upon future transactions 
should always be clearly distinguished from statements of actual earn­
ings evidenced by definite records, and
Whereas, An accountant may properly assist a client in estimating 
the results of future transactions, so long as no one may be led to believe 
that the estimates represent certainties,
Be it resolved, That no public accountant should permit his name to 
be used in conjunction with such an estimate in a manner which might 
lead anyone to believe that the accountant could vouch for the accuracy 
of the forecast; and
Be it further resolved, That violation of this dictum by a member or an 
associate of the American Institute of Accountants be considered by the 
committee on professional ethics as cause for charges under the provision 
of article V, section 4 (e) of the bylaws, or rule 2 of the rules of pro­
fessional conduct of the American Institute of Accountants, or both.1
1 Note: For a detailed treatment of the ethics of the accounting profession, see: 
A. P. Richardson, Ethics o f a Profession, New York, American Institute Publishing 
Co., Inc., 1931.
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